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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
BETTER DEVILS OF OUR NATURE: 
THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE-JUSTIFYING IDEOLOGIES IN OPINION FORMATION 
 
 
 
 Extensive theoretical and empirical research has examined the role that violence-
justifying ideologies play in generating violent behavior. Yet, a substantial body of this 
work employs measures that are consistently associated with sexist attitudes and gender 
stereotypes. As a consequence, scholars are limited in our ability to fully comprehend 
individuals’ propensity to endorse, or even promote violent behavior – or how these 
attitudes influence perceptions of victims and related policy preferences.  
 I contribute to this line of research by creating a gender-neutral battery of anti-
violence questions, in large part divorced from sexist stereotypes, to assess the 
consequence of those attitudes for politics and public policy in the United States. This 
flexible new measure of “violence-rejecting sentiment” can travel across policy areas and 
disciplines. Individuals scoring higher on this scale are less comfortable with violence as 
a social tool. My new instrument builds upon a common measure of “honor codes”, 
commonly used in research on rape and rape victims (Saucier et al. 2015) but it requires 
fewer question items (7 vs. 35), and in large part isolates attitudes toward violence from 
gender role expectations. Finally, I use survey experiments and regression analyses to 
examine how these attitudes (toward gender and violence respectively) independently 
and interactively impact opinion formation; this includes evaluations of victims of sexual 
and police violence, but also assessments of support for public policies to address these 
issues in the United States. I find that violence-justifying ideologies – sexism and racism 
in particular – attenuate the normatively positive effects of anti-violence values in many 
circumstances. This includes support for policies and services to assist victims and 
reduce violence.  
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CHAPTER 1.  ON HUMAN VIOLENCE 
1.1 Introduction 
When the petite brunette stepped into her apartment-complex elevator in April 
2007 and found 31-year-old Robert Williams waiting there, she did not anticipate the 
unspeakable horror that awaited her.  Williams got off on the same floor as the 23-year-
old Columbia University journalism student, followed her to her door, and shoved his 
way into her apartment, where he repeatedly raped and sodomized the young woman for 
19 torturous hours. Williams doused his victim in bleach and boiling water, forced pills 
down her throat, glued her mouth shut, and bound her with shoelaces and duct tape. This 
vicious attack, which began around 10 p.m., continued late into the following afternoon. 
Williams then hurled the woman into her bathtub and demanded she gouge out her own 
eyes with a pair of scissors. After trying to end her life instead, by attempting to stab 
herself in the throat, Williams cracked her skull open with a heavy object and slit her face 
and eyes with a butcher knife (Eligon 2008). 
The violence Williams delivered on his 23-year-old victim might be exceptionally 
horrendous, but violent attacks – including murders, attempted murders, and forcible 
rapes – appear in the news media from around the globe every day. Violence remains a 
devastating feature of modern society that impacts millions of individuals year after year, 
and the damage that these events inflict upon victims is immeasurable. 
 Despite the fact that violent attacks occur on what seems to be a day to-day, if not 
hour-to-hour, basis, evidence indicates that acts of violence may actually be declining 
over time (Elias, 2000; Krieken, 1989; and Pinker, 2011). Circumstantial evidence from 
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the United States might back up this optimism. While victimizations have been on the 
rise in the United States lately – the total number of violent crimes increased from 2015 
to 2016, and again from 2016 to 2018 – this uptick follows a 62% decline from 1994 to 
2015 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2019). 
The Pinker school of thought attributes the decline of violence to changing 
cultural norms. It’s not just that opportunities for violence have declined, or that the 
incentives for violence have changed. Rather, “civilizing” influences are winning out. 
People are socialized into a value system that teaches them to abhor violence.  These anti-
violence values constrain their own behavior, and also aggregate up so that governments 
and social groups behave less violently as well. 
This dissertation focuses on the behavioral mechanism that supposedly explains 
declining violence. One observable implication of the Pinker school of thought is that 
cultural norms ought to shape public opinion in a fashion that alters public policy. At the 
individual level, therefore, whether someone rejects or embraces violence-justifying 
attitudes ought to shape that person’s policy-relevant opinions. I am skeptical about the 
extent to which abstract values actually constrain politically relevant behavior, however, 
including how an individual processes a specific act of violence as well as how the 
individual evaluates public policies rooted in violence. This question of why violence has 
declined has both practical implications for policy makers (as a guide for attempts to 
prevent future violence) and scientific value for scholars (as a contribution to our 
understanding of mass behavior). 
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1.2 Values about Violence 
Optimists argue that attitudes lead the way, and that a decline in citizens’ 
tolerance of violence has produced a corresponding increase in support for public policies 
that assist victims and promote equitable judicial outcomes. My data are cross-sectional, 
so I cannot observe how these attitudes and policy preferences have changed over time. 
Rather, I contribute to this line of research by focusing in on the individual-level linkage 
between abstract values and politically relevant opinions.  I do so by 1. creating a short-
scale measure of anti-violence values; 2. observing the explanatory power of such values 
in predicting politically relevant opinions; and 3. examining how violence-justifying 
attitudinal constructs, such as gender and racial stereotypes, allows an individual to get 
around or ignore broad cultural values. 
While there are infinite forms of human violence and depravity in the world, I 
focus exclusively on violence against women and police violence in the United States.  
Addressing each in separate empirical chapters, I find that once other attitudinal packages 
(e.g. gender and racial stereotypes) are considered, an individual’s orientation toward 
violence (or non-violence) has minimal bearing on opinion formation. This is true for 
both individuals’ perceptions of victims and propensity to support public policies to 
address the violence. More specifically, when I employ experimental methods to bring 
gender and racial stereotypes to the fore, making them salient for survey respondents, 
these predispositions undermine the meaningfulness of abstract cultural values toward 
violence. These violence-justifying ideologies dominate when it comes to explaining 
opinions toward victims, perpetrators, punishments, and policies. 
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 Stephen Pinker (2011) argues, in his seminal work The Better Angels of our 
Nature, that violence has declined over time and that we are living in the most-peaceful 
era of human existence. One important implication of this thinking, if true, is that our 
present is less sinister than our past. The peace we enjoy today is a result of past 
generations, appalled by the brutality of their time, working hard to reduce it – a change 
in values encouraged by a torrent of historical forces (e.g., the growth of government 
power, commerce, feminization, and cosmopolitanism). 
Other scholars offer a less-optimistic view of human nature and its mutability. 
Wrangham and Peterson (1996), for example – in a book that also attracted popular 
attention in its day – argue that aggressive behavior is hard-wired in humans and rooted 
in our ties to primate ancestors. Perceived in this way, violent (or non-violent) behavior is 
not a result of prevailing cultural norms or values, which may change quickly or adapt to 
laws and customs, but instead biologically based.  
Theoretically, these views are not mutually exclusive, but they do suggest the 
need for a multi-pronged approach to reducing violence (e.g. identifying effective and 
persuasive techniques to decrease violence-justifying attitudes in the first place and 
implementing effective institutional reforms to deter violent behavior and punish 
perpetrators). We must also address the possibility that individuals will justify violence 
when it suits their (perceived) interests – that it is not values, but material incentives that 
explain changes in violence.  
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The Slow Policy Progress against Violence 
Some scholars do consider incentives and opportunities for violence (Elias 2000; 
Krieken 1989). They credit the decline in humans’ taste for violence with the mass 
expansion of public policies designed to protect classes of victims that faced extreme 
persecution in earlier times. I argue that while conditions certainly have improved over 
time, the codification of laws to combat violence – especially violence against women 
and racial minorities – has proven painstakingly slow in the United States. Racism and 
sexism provide longstanding, culturally resonant excuses for resorting to the use of force, 
and as I demonstrate in later chapters, gender and racial stereotypes continue to shape 
individuals’ perceptions of victims and evaluations of crimes – much more so than 
attitudes toward violence (or non-violence) in the abstract. 
1.2.1 Violence against Women 
In the not-too-distant past, legal and cultural norms protected the right of a man to 
control his wife’s sexuality. Prior to the 1970s, men usually were not prosecuted for 
murdering an adulterous wife, forcibly preventing her from leaving the house, or using 
intimidation, coercion, and violence to control her movements. In fact, until the late 
1970s, marital rape was not a crime in any state. And despite the codification of laws to 
protect women, the judicial system has often failed victims of rape and sexual assault. For 
example, jurors have been known to let sexist attitudes toward women affect their 
deliberations in rape trials (Jacobsen & Popovich 1983), including sentencing decisions 
(Mazella & Feingold 1994; Spohn & Spears 1996). Eventually, it took a wave of 
feminism in the late 1970s to help shift public perceptions of rape, and today the criminal 
justice system is required to take these crimes seriously (Rivera, 1996).  
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Htun & Weldon (2012) found that feminist mobilization – more so than 
progressive parties, women in government, or other political and economic advancements 
– explains variation in the development of policies to address violence against women 
internationally. In other words, VAW is rarely raised as a priority among social justice 
and human rights organizations without pressure from feminists demanding laws that 
alter the opportunities and incentives for such violence. The authors point out that most 
human rights groups did not recognize rape as a violation of women’s rights until 
pressured by feminists in the 1990s to do so. And it was not until the Violence against 
Women Act of 1994 that policies providing funding for rape prevention, the use of DNA 
tests and rape kits, and the implementation of laws putting first-time rapists behind bars 
took hold (Pinker 2011, 403). 
In sum, it takes a strong women’s movement to command the attention and 
support of the general public and, equally as important, to convince politicians to place 
institutional reforms on legislative agendas. This is certainly true of movements to 
combat violence against women in the United States. That progress continues today, as 
new organizations have emerged to support victims of sexual violence. Perhaps most 
well-known, the #Me Too movement began with the goal to “address both the dearth in 
resources for survivors of sexual violence and to build a community of advocates, driven 
by survivors, who will be at the forefront for creating solutions to interrupt sexual 
violence in their communities” (Me Too 2018). 
1.2.2 Anti-Black Violence 
Police violence is another phenomenon that dominates media coverage in the 
United States. These stories often include a racial component, with the victims being 
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young black males. That African-Americans face racial disparities in the criminal justice 
system is nothing new. Post-slavery, in many regions of the United States, the 
government turned a blind eye as raging mobs publicly tortured and executed victims in 
the street. These violent lynchings – thousands of recorded incidents exist – remain a 
blight on American history. Despite the fact that between 1882 and 1968 almost 200 anti-
lynching bills were introduced in Congress, not a single bill was enacted. It was not until 
June of 2005 that the U.S. Senate apologized for its’ failure to enact anti-lynching bills 
when they were most needed (Associated Press 2005). And it would take until 2018 for 
Senators to propose the “Justice for Victims of Lynching Act”, designating lynching a 
Federal hate crime (Garcia 2018).  
While we have definitely made substantial progress in terms of race relations over 
time, racial disparities in the criminal justice system continue to strain the American 
fabric. The Sentencing Project, a non-profit organization dedicated to criminal sentencing 
reform, for instance, claims that African-Americans experience racial bias at nearly every 
level of the criminal justice system – from their initial interactions with law enforcement 
officers, to adjudication and sentencing, to parole and re-entry (Sentencing Project 2008). 
Police shootings involving white officers and black suspects spark mass protests and riots 
nationwide, and numerous organizations have emerged to address perceived injustices. 
Perhaps most prominent, Black Lives Matter began as a “call to action in response to 
state-sanctioned violence and anti-black racism. The impetus for that commitment was, 
and still is, the rampant and deliberate violence inflicted on us by the state” (Black Lives 
Matter 2018). 
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While it is true that the Supreme Court, Congress, and state legislatures have 
produced or defined laws to curb and punish violent acts, the extent and durability of this 
“cultural shift” is less clear. Do the top-down, elite-imposed policies truly enjoy mass 
consent? Have the bottom-up, citizen-led social justice movements changed hearts and 
minds? Or, do both lack a strong popular foundation? 
1.3 Explaining Policy Preferences Related to Violence 
Given the astonishingly slow and tentative progress exhibited by policies intended 
to stop violence against women and racial minorities, social science would benefit from a 
better understanding of why the public does or does not support policies to protect 
victims of violent crimes and punish perpetrators. Isolating the attitudes that may erode 
public support for such policies should be equally important. And because the two efforts 
have something in common – both involve the public’s tolerance for violent action, 
whether at the hands of a predator, or to punish that predator – the discipline’s approach 
to each policy question should not take place entirely in isolation. Instead, this 
dissertation tries to explain a handful of politically relevant attitudes and opinions using a 
unified framework, including similar explanatory variables. 
Do individual attitudes rejecting violence matter in terms of politics and public 
policy? And if so, does a broad decline in violence-justifying attitudes translate to public 
support for policies to support victims and punish perpetrators? What role do racial and 
gender stereotypes play in terms of public perceptions of victims and suspects, or support 
for violence-related public policies? In the United States these are important and timely 
questions – questions I address directly in this project.  
 
9 
 
 
        
The possibility that prejudice and stereotyping – common justifications for 
treating other people badly – might be hidden because elites consider them socially 
undesirable is troubling. The implication is that when people make actual decisions, such 
as whether to discriminate, those underlying prejudices may rival facts and 
circumstances, or general anti-violence values, when it comes to criminal justice 
outcomes and the treatment of victims and perpetrators 
I will not be the first researcher to consider how an individual’s attitudes might 
influence policy-relevant behavior, but I will contribute to the literature on opinion 
formation by using experimental studies and issue framing to examine the factors that 
help shape support for policies to assist survivors and punish criminals. More 
specifically, I contribute to prior research by 1. creating a short-scale measure of anti-
violence values, distinct from sexist stereotypes surrounding male behavior; 2. employing 
experimental survey designs to investigate additional factors that influence perceptions of 
violent crime victims; and 3. examining the impact of gender and racial stereotypes on 
citizen support for victim services and punitive policies. 
 Political scientists (Bartels 1998; Druckman 2001) have demonstrated that public 
policy preferences often depend on how an issue is framed. This holds for a range of 
policies including affirmative action (Kinder & Sanders 1990), spending on the poor 
(Sniderman & Theriault 1999), and citizen support for war (Hetherington & Suhay 2011), 
to name a few. Related work suggests that “for most people – most of the time” attitudes 
are not stable, that when completing surveys “they are responding to the issue as they see 
it at the moment of the response”, and that different frames produce different results 
(Zaller 1992, 94-95). 
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 Early work on survey response and mass opinion (Converse 1962; Achen 1975; 
Taylor & Fiske 1978) questioned the American public’s ability to construct and maintain 
stable attitudes on a range of political issues and led Zaller to conclude that individuals 
“…do not typically possess ‘true attitudes’ on issues as conventional theorizing assumes, 
but a series of partially independent and often inconsistent ones. Which of a person’s 
attitudes is expressed at different times depends on which has been made most 
immediately salient by chance and the details of questionnaire construction, especially 
the order and framing of questions” (1992, 93). Related research suggests that the way 
issues are framed by elites has a strong influence on public opinion (Druckman 2001; 
Slothuus & DeVreese 2010), and that political opinions are not always either positive or 
negative but ambivalent, or simultaneously positive and negative (Lavine 2001). Applied 
to my research, the implication is that attitudes against violence might be little more than 
lip service, while politically relevant opinions will actually depend on how an event or 
policy is framed and which particular biases sway the individual in each case. 
 Both my methodological contribution and my substantive contribution to the 
study of opinion formation stem from my attempt to unify these disparate literatures 
(violence against women vis à vis police violence) under the umbrella of the broader 
theoretical debate about the power of cultural norms.  Rather than rely solely upon 
existing measures for attitudes toward violence, which are often confounded with gender 
or racial attitudes (e.g. sexist attitudes toward women in the study of rape, or racial 
stereotypes toward minorities in the study of police violence), I develop and test a 
truncated measure of anti-violence values that ought to span those subjects if, as some 
suggest, individuals (men or women) really are bound by their inherent distaste for 
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violence. Then, I apply that new measure to two existing literatures – rape and police 
violence – that have nibbled at the idea that cultural norms are predictive of violence-
related policy preferences. 
1.4 Outline to Dissertation 
 The dissertation will proceed as follows: In Chapter 2, I briefly review the 
scholarship crediting cultural shifts and civilizing influences with a gradual conquest of 
violence, as well as competing theories suggesting that violent behavior is biologically 
rooted and enduring. Despite the growth of anti-violence cultural norms, research 
suggests that people will find ways to justify violence, sometimes directly through out-
group formation and sometimes indirectly through institutions that insulate them from or 
provide cover for the violence (Wolgast 1992). I briefly review work examining how 
people build these ideological and institutional waivers to escape anti-violence norms. 
 In Chapter 3, I summarily review the problems with some popular measures for 
attitudes that scholars use, and develop and test a unique, flexible scale of “anti-violence 
values” that can travel across policy areas and disciplines. My new instrument builds 
upon a prominent measure of “honor codes” used in the literature on sexual assault 
(Saucier et al. 2016), but it requires fewer question items (7 vs. 35), and in large part 
disentangles attitudes toward violence from attitudes toward gender.  
 In Chapter 4, I use this simple scale of anti-violence values, built from gender-
neutral question wording, to help model perceptions of sexual assault and rape, including 
factors that influence sentencing in court cases involving these crimes. My work 
contributes to this literature by: 1. providing theoretical and empirical support for my 
claim that a gender-neutral survey instrument should be used in studies predicting 
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perceptions of rape victims and other rape-related outcomes of interest, at least as a 
control variable; 2. examining how other attitudinal orientations (e.g. hostile and 
benevolent sexism, rape myths, and victim characteristics) shape perceptions of a victim 
– as somehow having precipitated her victimization, and support for related policies (e.g. 
expenditures on services and support for institutional reforms); and 3. Assessing the 
influence of victim behavior and other characteristics on the decision to increase or 
decrease a defendant’s recommended sentence.  
 In Chapter 5, I examine what shapes attitudes toward victims of police violence as 
well as factors that influence citizens’ evaluations of police shootings. In this study, I 
move beyond simple racial manipulations of officers and suspects – common in the 
literature – to incorporate many other factors believed to shape evaluations of use-of-
force incidents, including the prevailing narratives, or issue frames describing these 
events. I will provide theoretical support for my claim that anti-violence values are one 
important predictor in models measuring support for criminal justice policies. 
Additionally, racial considerations, perceptions of the criminal justice system, issue 
framing of the event under consideration, and authoritarianism will explain variation in 
support for policy reforms. By including these factors and experimental treatments in 
empirical models I will be able to examine the impact that each have on respondents’ 
evaluations. Finally, in Chapter 6, I provide a brief conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 2. OUR BETTER ANGELS 
2.1 Introduction 
Empirically, this thesis asks one overarching question: Does the embrace of 
cultural values abhorring violence help predict evaluations of real-life circumstances that 
involve the use of physical force, or correlate with related public policy preferences? In 
asking and answering that focused research question, however, I hope for this thesis to 
speak to a much broader debate over the success of the civilizing process and its likely 
durability. Finding that these abstractions are more than just lip service, that they 
genuinely constrain people – that they shape policy preferences or govern politically 
relevant judgements about predators and victims of violence – would offer some hope 
that the relative peacefulness of today’s world is a construct that can be passed down 
through socialization to future generations. On the other hand, if people can partition 
these abstract values from their practical assessments of real-life circumstances, or apply 
them only to certain groups of people, then the civilizing process would seem to be more 
vulnerable to changes in context. 
 To position my research within that big-picture scholarly discourse, I begin by 
setting up the debate between optimistic and pessimistic theories of human nature – 
specifically, the relationship human beings have with violence. Next, I lay out my 
theoretical argument that social constructions, individual notions of a deviant “other” 
(e.g. out-group formation), and support for violent policies perpetrated by institutions at 
the hands of “others” – artificial persons – provide waivers that allow people to escape 
anti-violent social norms. I argue that individuals can be more punitive toward, and 
relatively tolerant of violence committed against, perpetrators that they fear, loathe, or 
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view as “outsiders” – and less sympathetic toward victims of crime who do not conform 
to traditional social, cultural, or gender expectations. In other words, the significance of 
abstract anti-violence values will be conditional on real-life circumstances. Gender 
stereotypes will shape evaluations of female rape victims, for example – and racial 
stereotypes will influence evaluations of police shootings – more powerfully than 
attitudes toward violence in general. 
2.2 A Theory of Forward Progress 
 Stephen Pinker (2011) is hardly the only scholar to take an optimistic view of the 
trajectory of human civilization (Elias 2000; True 2015), but as a public intellectual who 
wrote a book-length treatise on the subject less than a decade ago, one that compiled 
evidence from a wide variety of disciplines, he stands out for having modernized and 
popularized the concept. 
Pinker’s wide-ranging book poses some difficulty, because he is not explicitly 
theoretical, and he does not isolate the underlying hypotheses being offered to explain 
why violence has declined. However, as my attempt to tease out his tacit theory will 
show, he attributes declining violence in large part to changes in values.  For each time 
period he discusses, cultural norms serve as part of his explanation for why conditions 
improve, and for some periods, those norms represent the dominant explanation.  It is that 
hypothesized causal linkage – anti-violent attitudes result in less willingness to commit 
violent acts or to endorse them when committed by others – which I will test in the 
empirical portion of this dissertation. 
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 The first transition period that Pinker offers for the decline in violence – when 
human beings transitioned from hunter-gatherer societies to civilizations with organized 
governments – conflates two causes that he views as related: a change in food source, and 
the change in political forms that resulted. Evidence strongly supports the first part of this 
argument. Today, evolutionary scientists examine the many ways that violence among 
hunter-gatherer societies may have helped shape the evolution of social behaviors 
(Bowles 2009; Mirazon et al. 2016; Lambert 1997), and contemporary researchers are 
scrambling to document mortality rates among the few remaining hunter-gatherer 
societies before they disappear altogether. There is little doubt, however, that the stability 
provided by a transition to agriculture allowed the development of the state, which could 
suppress human violence in ways that tribal organizations did not. 
His second argument is that, beginning in the late Middle Ages and into the 20th 
century, homicide rates in much of Europe dramatically declined. This claim is more 
description than explanation, and on its face seems to contradict the praise for 
agricultural-based societies implied in the previous discussion. Feudal Europe was, in 
fact, an extraordinarily violent place where the head of the state (e.g. the king) had little 
direct control over the people. Pinker describes medieval people in general as impulsive, 
crude, inconsiderate, dirty, and animalistic. He dubs the subsequent psychological and 
cultural shift away from these behaviors as the “civilizing process.” Thus, the causal 
explanation lurking under the surface is that values changed. Furthermore, this change 
was internalized and reinforced because the new circumstances altered individual 
psychology. “To take advantage of the opportunities, people had to plan for the future, 
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control their impulses, take other people’s perspectives, and exercise the other social and 
cognitive skills needed to prosper in social networks” Pinker claims (2011,77). 
 Slavery becomes important in the Enlightenment era. For much of human history, 
slavery as an institution – the legal right of one person to own another – was the rule, not 
the exception. Upheld in the Bible, justified by Plato and Aristotle, and practiced across 
the globe, slavery persisted in some states until as recently as 1980. Slave systems 
perpetuate violence. The rise of anti-slavery (and also anti-torture) activism therefore also 
represented a battle against interpersonal violence. As Pinker notes, during the 
Enlightenment period, large numbers of like-minded individuals organized against these 
previously sanctioned forms of violence, resulting in mass rejection of them. 
 Economic considerations helped influence the mass movement that began in the 
18th century to combat state support for slavery. Serfdom and sharecropping had become 
less expensive than forced bondage in many places. Yet humanitarian concerns were the 
driving force behind the abolition of slavery. Intellectuals, and their “advocacy of liberty, 
equality, and the universal rights of man let a genie out of the bottle and made it 
increasingly awkward for anyone to justify the practice” (Pinker 2011, 155). This is 
clearly a cultural explanation for the abolition of an inherently violent economic system. 
 As for torture, from ancient to early modern times torture was viewed as an 
acceptable form of punishment. Many states had few, and ineffective, means to control 
crime – so punishments were designed to be as brutal as possible to deter others from 
breaking the law. As was the case with slavery, intellectuals and writers took up the cause 
against human torture. Reformers railed against institutional cruelty that they viewed as 
primitive, savage, and barbaric. Their growing appeal to the humanity of the people 
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throughout the 18th century led to the abolition of punitive torture in every Western 
country by 1850. 
 Pinker reminds us that there have been no wars among the major powers since the 
end of World War II, more than two-thirds of a century often referred to as the “Long 
Peace” (2011, 249). Political scientists continue to debate the determinants of this 
extended period of international accord. Some scholars (Kinsella 2005; Slantchev & 
Alexandrova 2005) call it a “democratic peace” based on their claim that “democracies 
rarely fight one another because they share common norms of live-and-let-live and 
domestic institutions that constrain the recourse to war” (Rosato 2005, 585). Democratic 
countries build strong economic ties to each other as well, through international trade, a 
pattern that might or might not stem from a value-based preference for mutual 
cooperation (Bartilow & Voss 2009).  
 It is possible to explain away the Democratic Peace as being a strategic outgrowth 
of the Cold War (Farber & Gowa 1997). During that period, the United States and the 
Soviet Union engaged in proxy wars while carefully avoiding extreme escalations, and 
only fought each other on battlefields in neutral nations – in part due to a persistent fear 
of imminent nuclear war. However, it would seem unfair to attribute the Long Peace 
entirely to concern with self-preservation. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the decline of American economic dominance brought this bipolar international system to 
a close in the early 1990s, the major powers continued to avoid interstate war with one 
another. Empire building by violent conquest appears to have come to an end. Even 
terrorism, around which fears have escalated, has declined sharply both internationally 
and domestically over time. 
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 Pinker again emphasizes behavioral causes that are a mixture of cultural values 
and psychology. He argues that this “long peace” is a “result of one of those 
psychological re-tunings that take place now and again over the course of history and 
cause violence to decline” (2011, 251). The panic and fear – or psychological damage – 
that terrorism generates is actually a symptom of this changed mindset; because humans 
today are so horrified by violence, they make a big deal of it when it happens, obscuring 
the relatively low death tolls from terror attacks worldwide. 
 Finally, the “Rights Revolution” marked a moral shift in humanity, a movement 
toward non-violence and an emerging organized defense of minorities and other out-
groups who might have been likely targets for violence. A product of the Enlightenment 
and humanism, this movement grew from prosperity, democratic government, expanding 
economies, and technologies that made ideas and people more mobile. Increased capital 
for law enforcement, education, and social services expanded during economic booms. 
Democracies provided a space where historically disadvantaged groups could finally 
participate fully in society. The shift away from an economy based primarily on trade, 
Pinker argues, produced the “hidden hand of an information economy that may have 
made institutions more receptive to women, minorities, and gays, but it still took 
government muscle in the form of antidiscrimination laws to integrate them fully” 
(2011,477).  
 Categorizing this complicated story that spans five different eras might seem 
impossible – economics, politics, technology, values, and psychology swirl around in it – 
but at a minimum it seems clear that Pinker considers “civilizing” anti-violent values to 
be a significant causal explanation for why violence has declined in practice. His work, 
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and the work of like-minded scholars, therefore, sets up the hypothesis that this 
dissertation will test: Adherence to a humanistic abhorrence for violence should influence 
evaluations of real-life circumstances that involve the use of force, and help shape related 
public policy preferences relevant to social and political perspectives. 
2.3 A Theory of Biological Determination 
Some scholarship casts doubt on whether violent impulses can be so easily purged 
from human interactions. Wrangham and Peterson (1996), for example, underscore the 
evolutionary roots of violent human behavior, tracing it not to youthful socialization or 
psychological adaptations but to inbred biological imperatives. The authors’ account of 
human violence contrasts with Pinker’s rosy story of evolving cultural norms and values, 
focusing instead on reproductive competition, defense of scarce resources, and natural 
selection. 
Recent research in this vein has shown that the animal genetically closest to 
human beings, the chimpanzee, is especially violent. Chimpanzees engage in murder, 
rape, and lethal raids that are similar to human war. By the early 1970s, Jane Goodall was 
observing these behaviors in Tanzanian chimps, a development that marked a profound 
shift in the study of human behavior because it undermined a romanticized view of 
humans in their natural state that blamed society for corrupting humankind. Of thousands 
of mammals, and millions of other animal species, the violent behaviors described in this 
research exist only among humans and chimpanzees. 
 Richard Dawkins (1976), in his controversial book The Selfish Gene, similarly 
argued that selfish and violent behavior – especially in males – is a product of human 
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beings’ instinctive struggle for survival. Other evolutionary scholars examine violent 
human behavior in the context of genetic fitness. Raine points out that “despite what we 
may think of our good-naturedness, we are, it could be argued, little more than selfish 
gene machines that will, when the time is ripe, readily use violence and rape to ensure 
that our genes will be reproduced in the next generation” (2013, 14). Viewed in this way, 
the influence of evolution on behavior is a story of genetic competition and the hard-
wired capacity for violence required for successful reproduction. 
Biological explanations for rape, as a specific act of violence, have been 
dismissed in the literature (Brownmiller 1975; Dworkin 1981). Gender is a social 
construct, so feminist theory casts doubt on whether biological imperatives can explain 
cross-gender interactions. At some level, a man’s decision to rape a woman must be 
rooted in socially and politically structured gender systems (Vogelman & Eagle 1991, 
213). Nevertheless, even if the particular expression of violence might have social 
origins, the rapists’ underlying impulse to engage in violence may not. 
 Optimism about changing human nature seems to be undermined by what 
happens whenever civilization temporarily collapses. Arquilla (2015) looked at trends in 
violence in terms of wars and found that those in which a million people or more died 
doubled between 1900 and 1950. These “big kill” wars include the Spanish Civil War, 
the two World Wars, and the civil war in China. During the second half of the 20th 
century, the so-called Long Peace, the number of “big kill” wars doubled again. Six of 
these devastating wars occurred in Africa, a continent then emerging from a period of 
colonization that exposed residents to Western values. Smaller conflicts that cause the 
death of hundreds of thousands also are trending upward. Violent impulses appear to 
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remain widespread, even if the devastating nature of modern technology often can be 
sufficient to deter nations from indulging those impulses.  
 Focusing on wars involving 10 million casualties or more does not seem to 
support optimistic conclusions either. After doing so, Cirillo and Taleb challenge the 
claim that human belligerence has changed in some kind of structural way. The 
methodology of war may have changed, such that battle deaths no longer serve as the best 
indicator of hostile conflict, but the pattern of deadly events does not appear different. In 
technical terms, they argue that “inter-arrival times among major conflicts are extremely 
long, and consistent with a homogenous Poisson process: therefore, no trend can be 
established – we as humans cannot be deemed less belligerent than usual” (2015, 1). The 
shift away from battlefield deaths, a narrow indicator of declining violence, masks the 
evolving nature of war toward state-sponsored assassinations and the increasing use of 
remote-controlled drones. 
2.4 Ideological Waivers Justifying Violence 
 Even if we believe that anti-violence cultural norms mark the contemporary 
zeitgeist – that a random person is indeed less willing in contemporary times to commit 
violence against another random person – it may be that people dodge those norms to 
tolerate (if not endorse or even demand) violence when their predispositions encourage it. 
In particular, people build ideological waivers that allow them to escape principles of 
non-violence in certain circumstances or against specific groups (Wolgast 1992; 
Schneider et al. in Sabatier & Weible 2014; Nisbett & Cohen 1996). In doing so, they can 
conform to civilized norms while doing little or nothing to stop violence that they think 
will benefit them. Accordingly, I argue that even if culture makes a difference, attitudes 
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toward specific groups of people (out-groups) will more powerfully shape evaluations of 
real-life circumstances that involve the use of force, and opinions regarding relevant 
public policies. 
2.4.1 Social Constructions 
 Long ago, scholars realized that much of the political landscape is socially 
constructed – drawing on emotions and symbols – rather than objective reality (Luke 
1989). The social construction of target populations, either positive or negative, often 
determines how politicians and policymakers allocate benefits and burdens to specific 
groups (Chanley & Alozie 2001; Barrilleaux & Bernick 2003). Closely related to out-
group prejudice, “social constructions are powerful images or stereotypes that help 
explain why public policy, which can have such a positive effect on society, sometimes – 
and often deliberately – fails in its nominal purposes, fails to solve important public 
problems, perpetuates injustice, fails to support democratic institutions, and produces 
unequal citizenship” (Schneider et al. in Sabatier & Weible 2014, 105). 
 The allocation of benefits and burdens that a target group receives is closely tied 
to whether the public and political elites view the group as “deserving” or “undeserving” 
of resources (Gilens 1996; Feldman & Huddy 2005). Conceptually, social constructions 
are similar to individual perceptions of in-groups and out-groups: groups with which the 
individual identifies and groups from which the individual feels alienated. Out-groups are 
often racially, ethnically, religiously, or behaviorally defined. Positive or negative 
stereotypes may be attributed to distinct social groups such as members of the military, 
the elderly, mothers, the unemployed, criminals, etc.  
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 Social-identity theory attempts to explain how these categorizations can shape 
individual behavior. It focuses on how one defines the “self” in terms of group 
membership, group processes, and intergroup relations (Hogg 2018). An individual’s 
social identity is based upon that individual’s belief that he or she belongs to a specific 
group. Accordingly, subjectively similar individuals represent the in-group, while 
individuals who differ represent the out-group. Intergroup categorization, and the social 
comparison process which it requires, produce predictable consequences: In-group 
members are judged positively, and out-group members are judged negatively (Stets & 
Burke 2000). The concept of identity is of great interest to political psychologists who 
study political behavior. These socially constructed groups may contend with each other 
over a variety of resources – political, economic, or cultural – depending on the context 
in which they find themselves (Voss 1996). Political demands for group respect (e.g. 
racial minorities and gays and lesbians) require explanations that incorporate identity 
(Taylor 1994; Monroe et al. 2000; Huddy 2001).  
One approach tries to expand beyond the dual categorization of in-group vs. out-
group.  That approach sorts groups into several distinct social roles. The social-
construction framework (Schneider & Ingram 1988; 1993; 1997), partitions target 
populations into four subgroups: the advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants. 
The advantaged (e.g. doctors, homeowners, the elderly) enjoy high levels of political 
power, a larger share of resources and benefits, and very few burdens. Contenders (e.g. 
activists, banks, and labor unions) also receive more benefits than burdens but are viewed 
negatively by much of society. Dependents (e.g. mothers, the handicap, and the poor) are 
constructed as deserving of resources and benefits; however, these groups have very little 
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political power and may be overlooked by policymakers. Deviants (e.g. drug dealers, 
criminals, dropouts) also receive very few benefits, have very little political power, suffer 
much greater burdens, and are often targets in terms of punitive policy. Much of society 
blames deviants for social ills in the United States, which affords politicians and 
policymakers cover to target these groups with little consequence. As Schneider et al. 
point out, “policymakers stand to gain considerable political capital from punishing those 
who do not have the power or wherewithal to fight back and whom the broader public 
believes are undeserving of anything better” (2014, 112). 
In the following pages, I develop my theory that social constructions and 
identities are categorizations that produce a wide-range of “ideological waivers” 
individuals can build to forgive violent behavior, violence they otherwise claim to abhor. 
By categorizing a victim as part of an out-group, violence can be justified. If true, this 
theory provides additional evidence that individuals’ attitudes toward violence (or non-
violence) in the abstract, are interlinked with their attitudes toward specific “types” of 
victims and predators when it comes to preferences involving punitive policies.  
2.4.2 Racial Stereotypes 
Racial prejudice is one example of an ideological waiver (out-group formation) 
that allows individuals to overlook violence against – or the targeting of – specific groups 
of people. For instance, some whites believe that blacks are more likely to be criminals, 
are inherently more violent; those whites view the criminal justice system as a 
satisfactory means to control them (Gilliam & Iyengar 2000; Weaver 2007). Accordingly, 
“racial prejudice contributes to whites’ support for police use of force, and this 
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relationship should be stronger for the use of excessive force than for the use of 
reasonable force” (Barkan & Cohn 1998, 749).  
Additional research on implicit racial bias suggests that individuals link blacks 
and other minority groups to a range of social problems including crime, violence, and 
undesirability as neighbors (Bobo & Kluegel 1997; Bobo 2001; Quillian & Pager 2001). 
Or, as Loury explains, “race is a mode of perceptual categorization people use to navigate 
through a murky, uncertain world” (2002, 17). Racial bias in this form can persist 
regardless of conscious prejudice towards blacks or other minorities, a concept that many 
scholars refer to as “symbolic racism” (McConahay 1976; Kinder & Sears 1981; Sears 
1988; Devine 1989). And, the idea that some whites believe blacks should be treated 
equally, but unavoidably harbor negative attitudes toward blacks at the same time, has 
strong effects on whites’ racial policy preferences. This should extend to attitudes toward 
crime and punishment policy. 
Blacks, on the other hand, are more likely to report being victimized by the police 
(Weitzer & Tuch 2004) and are less likely to trust law enforcement (Rosenbaum et al. 
2005). They tend to view law enforcement as an institution designed to protect dominant 
(white) group interests and equate law enforcement with the institutionalized 
maltreatment of minorities and the neglect of subordinate (black) interests. Accordingly, 
some blacks endorse what Anderson (1999) coins a “code of the street” – an ideology 
that justifies violence and aggression by certain people in certain contexts.  
Anderson examines the informal rules that govern behavior in economically 
depressed urban areas, which often exhibit particularly high levels of violence and an 
“ethic emerges where the influence of the police ends and personal responsibility for 
 
26 
 
 
        
one’s safety is felt to begin…a quite primitive form of social exchange that holds would-
be perpetrators accountable by promising an ‘eye-for-an-eye’, or a certain payback (1999, 
10). Residents of many inner-cities face serious challenges and an increased risk of being 
victimized. These beliefs are a byproduct of a widespread fear and lack of trust in the 
police and criminal justice system in the United States. This is especially true of young 
black individuals living in crime ridden inner-cities. 
2.4.3 Gender Stereotypes 
Sexism and perceived gender expectations are ideological waivers for violence 
that allow individuals to target victims and reward predators. For example, research 
suggests (Glick & Fiske 1996; Viki & Abrams 2002) that hostile sexism is associated 
with greater endorsement of rape myths, and “benevolent sexism” seems to indicate that 
when women violate traditional gender stereotypes they are perceived to be at least 
partially to blame for being attacked sexually. In other words, individuals are able to 
forgive violent behavior that otherwise they may have been inclined to abhor. In a 
practical sense, scholars have found a link between negative perceptions of victims and 
juror decisions in rape trials (Brownmiller 1975; Ellison et al. 2009). When jurors 
perceive victims as deviants based upon evidentiary considerations like sexual history 
(Barber 1974), level of resistance (Deitz et al. 1984), or alcohol consumption (Norris et 
al. 1992), they are much less likely to sympathize with the victim or severely punish the 
perpetrator. 
As Peacock & Barker point out, “Across much of the world, rigid gender norms 
and harmful perceptions of what it means to be a man or woman, encourage men to 
engage in high-risk behaviors, condone gender-based violence, grant men the power to 
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initiate and dictate the terms of sex, and make it difficult to for women to protect 
themselves from either human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or violence and to seek 
health services” (2014, 2). Other research (Murnen et al. 2002, Flood 2011) suggests that 
men’s adherence to sexist, patriarchal, and sexually hostile attitudes increase the 
likelihood that they may commit violence against women. In short, negative 
constructions of masculinity and gender-inequitable attitudes harm women. 
2.4.4 Honor Codes 
Honor codes provide yet another example of an ideological waiver that relaxes 
non-violent norms – one that justifies violence less based on the identity of the target and 
more based on the violation of other social norms. Existing social science research on 
honor codes already documents the role they play in shaping individuals’ support for 
violence and violent public policies (Barnes et al. 2012; Cohen & Nisbett 1997). This line 
of research suggests that for some people, a set of moral values (honor beliefs) require 
that individuals respond aggressively to insult, threat, or provocation to maintain a 
reputation for strength and toughness (Osterman & Brown 2011). Accepting personal 
responsibility for one’s own safety reflects a form of social exchange where affronts and 
provocation are met with swift and aggressive retaliation. Cultural adaptations of honor 
include behavior that is organized around pride and respect backed by the credible threat 
of violence. Far from preventing violence, this form of civilized behavior sometimes can 
require it. 
Large bodies of work examine cultural differences in these beliefs, and the 
evidence suggests that some human groups perpetuate violence more than others (Nisbett 
& Cohen 1996; Anderson 1999). These belief systems can attach to perceived gender 
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roles (Rodriguez et al. 2002; Saucier et al. 2015), to cultural identity (Nisbett & Cohen 
1996), or to individual-level needs (Vandello et al. 2008). Whatever the source, this sort 
of violence-justifying belief system can aggregate up to explain different social outcomes 
across entire regions (e.g. higher levels of violence in the American South and parts of 
the West than elsewhere in the United States). 
The shared assumption that violence is often justified, if not required, also helps 
shape laws and public policy outcomes in these regions. Examples include “opposition to 
gun control, support for laws allowing for violence in protection of self, home, and 
property; a preference for a strong national defense; a comfort with the institutional use 
of violence in socializing children; and a willingness to carry out capital punishment and 
other forms of state violence to prevent crime and maintain social order” (Nisbett & 
Cohen 1996, 83). More recently, stand-your-ground laws found in the South have 
generated controversy nationally (Lave 2012). 
The research on violence-justifying ideologies traces them to the same sort of 
economic and technological circumstances that dominated Pinker’s optimistic book. 
Scholars root the origins of honor culture to the prevalence of herding economies among 
early settlers. Nisbett and Cohen suggest that honor cultures “should be found wherever 
the possibility exists that scarcity will be produced by the predatory actions of others, 
especially when the state is unwilling or unable to provide protection from such 
predation” (1996, 89).  If conditions change, the context-dependent “civilizing process” 
can change with it, so that it is not so civilizing. 
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2.4.5 The Artificial Person 
 While it may not be apparent immediately, I will make the case here that 
representatives or institutions (artificial persons) at times provide cover or justification 
for violent behaviors. Identities are constructed through the process of “othering” to 
generate difference. In fact, ‘identity’ is not conceivable without difference. For instance, 
in terms of individuals, it would not make sense to say “I am white” if it did not imply a 
difference from being a different race or ethnicity. My focus in this section, however, is 
on the modern state as a political identity, and the persons and institutions that maintain 
the monopolization of violence enjoyed by the government (Diez 2004).  
American citizens in large part accept – if only grudgingly at times – the 
concentration of authority and power vested in those who represent the ‘state’ (e.g. 
politicians, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and even juries of their peers). 
These are the actors who maintain the state’s monopolization of violence, the ones who 
make laws, punish criminals, declare war and peace, and perform all the other actions 
necessary for maintaining the safety of the people (Skinner 1999, 2). The sovereign state 
and its overreaching tentacles has been described as an ‘artificial person’, but a necessary 
improvement to a world where competing identities produced constant war and a life 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1968, 186). Others, however, worry 
about the power of the ‘state’, through its representatives and institutions, to impose 
selective violence. 
Wolgast provides an excellent example of the artificial person as a problematic 
facet of society. She points out that the “more we practice the substitution of one person 
for another, the more natural the practice becomes. And the variety of artificial persons 
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becomes greater…military actions [for example] are seen as the deeds of citizens in 
whose name they are done, whether these authors command them or not” (1992, 14). She 
certainly is correct that the idea of the artificial person is applicable to a variety of 
representatives. For example, law enforcement or agents of the criminal courts should be 
viewed as artificial persons. For that matter, the same could be said of vigilantes – those 
outside the law who deal in violence. And, to turn Wolgast’s point on its head, while 
some individuals may be alarmed by the behavior of representatives whose behavior they 
are assumed to endorse, others may approve of those same behaviors while at the same 
time escaping personal responsibility for the consequences they produce. This is how the 
concept of the artificial person can serve as a waiver, or justification for violent behavior.  
Cops and courts purportedly act out the will of the people. Yet, this arrangement 
allows individuals to escape responsibility while (indirectly) endorsing violence. It also 
can allow us to avoid conscious awareness of what’s being done in our names. One can 
claim to abhor violent behavior, and at the same time tolerate if not embrace the brutality 
of others’ actions – whether it is a police officer killing a suspect, a judge imposing the 
death penalty, or a soldier wiping out foreign enemies. More worrisome, perhaps, is the 
likelihood that some individuals endorse such secondary actions, or indirect violence, 
against only some (out-groups) of people about whom they may know relatively little. I 
examine this possibility empirically in later chapters.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 Violence-justifying ideologies come in a variety of forms and allow individuals to 
respond aggressively – or allow others to do so in their place – while still retaining a 
surface-level commitment to civilized norms. The examples discussed in this chapter are 
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part-and-parcel of American culture but looking across time or place would furnish an 
array of additional examples. The overall point, however, is that societies have 
constructed justifications for violence before – and when they do so, it does not require 
the collapse of civilization or the reversal of the entire “civilizing process” to permit such 
backsliding. Norms against violence may not have the constraining power that Pinker 
gives them credit for having, either because people conform to them without really 
drawing on the values or because they can abandon them based on a variety of 
convenient excuses.  
 My goal with this dissertation is to test for those possibilities as best I can using 
survey experiments. In the following chapters, I will contribute to that enterprise 
theoretically and empirically in several ways. First, I will develop and validate a 
generalized, flexible scale of “anti-violence values” that can travel across policy areas 
and disciplines, and which serves to disentangle attitudes towards violence from gender-
attitudes. Then, I will test my theory that other stereotypical attitudes about specific 
groups (e.g. blacks, women, law enforcement officers), interact with attitudes about anti-
violence, bias evaluations of victims and predators, and have serious implications in 
terms of politics and public policy. Ultimately, my conclusions about the civilizing 
process will lean toward the pessimistic side of the debate outlined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING HONOR-BASED 
ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENCE 
3.1 Introduction 
Violent crime continues to be a serious problem nationwide, and research shows 
(Flood & Pease 2009) that public policies designed to decrease violent crime rates must 
address the underlying attitudes that overtly normalize and justify violent behavior. It 
might seem straightforward to create and use a scale that directly asks people about their 
attitudes toward violence, but that is harder than it seems.  Aside from the most abstract 
of questions, most survey items designed to assess attitudes toward violence already 
frame them in policy terms, distracting from the underlying cultural values that 
supposedly motivate policy preferences. 
This problem arose as a detour in my own empirical work for this dissertation.  I 
tried using an adapted General Violence measure already appearing in the literature 
(Schnabel 2018), but the question items did not hold together well as a scale and, instead 
of capturing broad attitudes toward interpersonal violence, they appeared to reflect 
political ideology. 
A different option and the path that ultimately I will follow in the research to 
come, builds from a scale used in the Honor Beliefs literature (Saucier 2016).  That scale 
initially posed a major problem as well, because it did not use gender-neutral question 
wording. Instead, it specifically framed honor in terms of how men should behave.  
Conflating attitudes toward violence with attitudes toward gender is problematic because 
core beliefs about the appropriate roles of men and women are an important and 
consistent predictor of support for certain, very specific forms of violence. For example, 
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in their investigation of gender-role attitudes, religion, and spirituality as predictors of 
beliefs about violence against women, Berkel et al. found that “gender role attitudes were 
the best overall predictor of domestic violence beliefs” (2004, 119). Their study, 
however, did not assess respondents’ attitudes toward violence more generally. 
The focus of this chapter, therefore, is on conceptualizing and measuring 
individuals’ attitudes toward violence and gender as independently as possible to 
determine the role that each plays in predicting perceptions of victims, perpetrators, and 
violence-related public policy preferences. This requires developing a survey instrument 
that does not confound the two explicitly. Doing so will allow me to examine, in later 
chapters, across social groups and beyond gender, important mediating factors (i.e. 
“ideological waivers”) that help shape public opinion and policy related to violence. 
Measuring Attitudes toward Violence 
Research on violence cannot get away from gender entirely. We know that males 
are disproportionately to blame for crimes of all kinds, and research suggests that cultural 
norms influence violent behavior among men (Vandello et al. 2008). Gendered violence, 
in particular is overwhelmingly committed by males (Flood & Pease 2009), so from a 
policy standpoint it is understandable that scholars focus on mysoginistic or patriarchal 
culture – and the behaviors of men – when they study violence against women. 
While other research (Curry 1998; Jones 2009; Strauss 2008; Howard 2015) 
shows that women sometimes do perpetrate violence, they certainly do not commit 
violent acts at rates comparable to men. What many women do, on the other hand, is 
participate in the masculine honor codes advanced by Saucier et al. (2016) that endorse 
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and teach violence. Men may be the ones specifically expected to build a reputation for 
strength and toughness (Cohen & Nisbett 1996), but women perpetuate this value system. 
As Vandello and Cohen point out, “Women are clearly very much a part of all cultures of 
honor – teaching it to their sons, enforcing it on their menfolk and, quite often, even 
participating in its violent behavior patterns themselves. This was true historically and it 
appears to be true in many cultures of honor today” (2003, 86).  
The Honor Belief literature therefore examines closely the consequences of 
gender expectations and the endorsement of male violence. Scholars have used the 
Masculine Honor Belief Scale (MHBS) developed by Saucier et al. (2016) to examine 
whether honor codes correlate with violence-justifying attitudes. Their scale consists of 7 
distinct factors related to masculine honor beliefs including (1) masculine courage (e.g. 
“a man should not be afraid to fight”); (2) pride in manhood (e.g. “a man should be 
expected to fight for himself”); (3) socialization (e.g. “you would want your son to stand 
up to bullies”); (4) virtue (e.g. “a man who ‘doesn’t take any crap from anybody is an 
admirable reputation to have’”); (5) protection (e.g. “it is a male’s responsibility to 
protect his family”); (6) provocation (e.g. “if a man’s spouse is insulted, his manhood is 
insulted”); and (7) family and community bonds (e.g. “a man’s family should be his 
number one priority”).  The resulting measure, therefore, consists of 35-items, most of 
them explicitly mentioning gender. 
The Masculine Honor Belief Scale successfully predicts behavior-related attitudes 
in both domestic and international research. This includes published work suggesting that 
masculine honor beliefs are associated with men’s assertion that offensive slurs warrant 
violent reprisal (Saucier et al. 2014) and that walking away from a fight is “non-manly” 
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(O’Dea et al. 2017). It also predicts attitudes toward rape and rape victims (Saucier et al. 
2015), war and peace (Saucier et al. 2018), and gun enthusiasm and aggression (Matson 
et al. 2019). In terms of American electoral politics, Matson et al. (2019) also found that 
masculine honor beliefs helped to predict positive perceptions of Donald Trump, and 
negative perceptions of Hillary Clinton.  
While this masculine measure of honor is quite useful for studying the role of 
gender expectations in predicting violent behavior perpetrated by men, it does not allow 
the researcher to focus on general anti-violent attitudes. The gendered (i.e., sexist) 
attitudes about who should engage in violence contaminate any attempt to measure 
whether violence should take place at all. To parse out those two distinct types of 
attitudes, I employ a pair of strategies: 
 First, I will re-word the questions in the honor scale so that they are 
gender-neutral. Instead of asking about men, husbands, and sons, I will 
ask about people more generally. Respondents may make assumptions 
about who would or would not be engaging in the actions they are 
endorsing, but at least I will not be imposing that judgment on them. 
 Second, to counteract any remaining gender-based attitudes in those scales 
– which could appear, for instance, if a respondent asked about violence 
assumes that it would be men engaging in it – my analysis will include 
more explicit measures of gender attitudes as well. With controls included 
for two measures of sexism, the independent variation remaining in my 
honor-based, but adapted, anti-violence scale ought to be the portion 
reflecting generalized attitudes against violence. 
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This adapted scale allows me to address my primary research question directly, 
which is whether individuals who condemn violence, on average, are more likely to 
support public policies to assist victims and punish perpetrators. The correlational results 
presented in this chapter support my use of the new scale in the analyses presented in 
chapters four (sexual assault and rape), and five (police violence).   
Admittedly, I found it rather difficult, if not impossible to completely disentangle 
gender attitudes and attitudes toward violence. This is likely because in the United States 
individuals are, in large part, socialized to believe that honor codes apply mainly to men. 
I do, however, defend the value and scholarly utility of asking violence-related questions 
without imposing gender roles upon survey respondents, and I will provide support for 
my neutrally worded scale. Specifically, using gender-neutral question items produces a 
sharp decline in the association between honor beliefs and benevolent sexism for both 
males and females, thereby picking up the influence that gender has on a person’s 
sympathy toward violent crime victims – a relationship that remains hidden when using 
the masculine honor belief scale. The new measure also produces a notable decline in 
association with conservatism, compared to the original. 
 It follows then that honor codes should be assessed beyond the narrow sets of 
beliefs that many people have in terms of male behavior. Research should be robust to the 
possibility that a respondent’s expectations of anyone, male or female, in terms of violent 
behavior, are not much different from the respondent’s expectations of males in certain 
situations – which, if true, should inform theories of violence. On the other hand, 
adherence to specifically masculine honor codes might be nothing more than an indirect 
way to express sexist values. The argument I advance in this chapter is that more research 
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is needed to examine gender-neutral attitudes towards honor-based violence and the role 
they play in shaping public opinion and violence-related public policy preferences. 
It’s not even clear that a narrowly masculine measure of honor could provide a 
full picture of attitudes related to gender-based issues. In particular, conflating gender 
attitudes and attitudes toward violence seems problematic when attempting to predict 
attitudes toward sexual assault or rape victims. A man with a strong sense of honor, and 
therefore a willingness to fight if necessary, might also hold highly protective attitudes 
toward women (what scholars sometimes call benevolent sexism) – or, he might carry his 
comfort with the use of force when resolving conflicts over to conflict between a man 
and woman. A man who feels distaste toward violence might similarly abhor sexual 
assault – or, alternatively he might harbor feelings of a misogynist nature (what scholars 
sometimes call hostile sexism) that encourage him to diminish the significance of sexual 
assaults, especially if something about the circumstances prevent them from becoming 
openly violent.  
For research contexts in which the theoretical distinction between gender attitudes 
and honor attitudes could matter, scholars ought to employ a different measure. 
Accordingly, my research moves beyond the gender-specific orientation typical of most 
work in this realm, to develop a non-gendered anti-violence measure that could predict 
attitudes toward victims of violence and toward violence-related public policies.  
3.2 Seeking Gender-Neutral Honor Questions 
My primary argument, thus far, is that attitudes toward violence should be 
assessed independently of someone’s attitudes about male behavior, or for that matter 
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about other social groups. That said, a common theme unites research in this realm. The 
respect for strength – the idea that an individual should maintain a willingness to risk 
serious injury or death in defense of symbolic as well as tangible goals – is common in 
many of the world’s cultures. Such a belief system provides the justification for why 
individuals employ violent acts when resolving disputes. Broadened to a societal level, 
the need for a community or a country to exhibit such strength may be employed to 
justify aggressive public policies, including those that allow the state to impose harsh 
punishments or that tolerate acts of violence by individuals in positions of power. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I set out to examine (in an explicitly gender-
neutral way) the implications of an individual’s belief that violence is not acceptable. To 
pursue this approach to honor and violence, I first needed to disentangle gender roles 
from attitudes toward violence that are commonly conflated in prior research. To do so, I 
decided to build explicitly on the widely used Masculine Honor Belief Scale (MHBS) 
developed by Saucier et al. (2016), but to modify it by altering the language in a gender-
neutral way. The original masculine question wording is displayed in bold face, while the 
non-gendered replacement wording is displayed in italics (Table 3.2.1).  
The measure I propose exploits all of the advantages of the MHBS but ought to 
help scholars better understand the complexity of honor beliefs as they relate to 
perceptions of aggression and violence – not only with regard to rape or other crimes that 
typically target women, but also in unrelated policy areas such as police violence. This 
modification will allow me to parse out the independent role of honor beliefs and other 
violence-justifying attitudes (e.g. those built from racism, sexism, or authoritarianism) in 
predicting support for relevant public policies. 
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Table 3.2.1 | Honor Belief Question Items 
  
Masculine Courage It is important for a man (an individual) to act bravely. 
A man (an individual) should not be afraid to fight.                                                
It is important for a man (an individual) to be able to face danger.  
It is important for a man (an individual) to be able to take pain. 
It is important for a man (an individual) to be courageous. 
 
  
Pride in Manhood It is important for a man (a person) to be more masculine (tougher) than other men 
(people). ** 
A man (a person) should be embarrassed if someone calls him a wimp. ** 
A man (a person) should be expected to fight for himself (themselves).  
If a man (a person) does not defend his wife (their spouse), they are not a very strong man 
(person). 
If a man (a person) does not defend himself (themselves), they are not a very strong man 
(person). 
                                                
  
Socialization If your son (child) got into a fight, you would be glad that he (they) stood up for himself 
(themselves).  
You would want your son (child) to stand up to bullies. 
As a child you were taught that boys (you) should defend girls (other children). 
If your son (child) got into a fight to defend his sister (a sibling), you would be glad they did 
so.  
As a child you were taught that boys (people) should always defend themselves. 
 
  
Virtue You would praise a man (a person) who reacted aggressively to an insult. ** 
Physical aggression is always admirable and acceptable (no change). ** 
It is morally wrong for a man (a person) to walk away from a fight. ** 
A man (a person) who doesn’t “take any crap from anybody” is an admirable reputation to 
have. ** 
Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself (no change). ** 
 
  
Protection A man (person) should protect his wife (their spouse) because it is the right thing to do.  
If a man (person) cares about his wife (their spouse), he (they) should protect her (them) 
even if everyone else thinks it’s wrong. 
A man (a person) should stand up for a female (anyone) who is in the family or is a close 
friend. 
It’s a male’s (person’s) responsibility to protect his (their) family. 
A man (a person) should protect his wife (their spouse). 
 
  
Provocation/Insult If a man’s wife (a person’s spouse) is insulted, his manhood (that person’s pride) is 
insulted. 
If a man’s (a person’s) mother is insulted, his manhood (that person’s pride) is insulted.  
If a man’s (a person’s) father is insulted, his manhood (that person’s pride) is insulted. 
If a man (a person) is insulted, his manhood (that person’s pride) is insulted. 
If a man’s (a person’s) brother is insulted, his manhood (that person’s pride) is insulted. 
 
  
Family Bonds It is important to spend time with the members of your family (no change). 
It is important for a man (an individual) to be loyal to his (their) family. 
A man’s (an individual’s) family should be his (their) number one priority. 
It is important to interact with other members of your community (no change). 
It is a man’s (a person’s) responsibility to respect his (their) family. 
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This chapter also describes the development of a short-form version of the 
gender-neutral anti-violence scale. This is useful for a number of reasons. First, it 
consumes much less space on a survey instrument, which either lessens the cost of 
research or allows the inclusion of other useful questions (I will exploit that property in 
chapters 4 and 5). Second, the subscales of the original measure include a relatively large 
number of questions (5-items) dealing with similar issues, which could try the patience of 
respondents who dislike the feeling that they are being asked the same thing multiple 
times, ultimately producing less-reliable data. We can be more confident in survey 
responses given to an instrument of more reasonable length. Finally, the question items 
included in the MHBS are inherently sensitive in nature because they focus on 
individuals’ willingness to endorse violence. I argue that the truncated version I propose 
is less likely to prompt participants to provide what they believe to be socially desirable 
responses. 
 My first pass at developing a new honor & violence scale focused on that 
explanatory variable, along with related scales also employed by Saucier et al. (2016): 
 Hostile sexism (e.g. “women fail to appreciate all men do for them”) 
 Benevolent sexism (e.g. “every man ought to have a woman he adores”) 
 Trait aggression (e.g. “given enough provocation, I might hit another person”), 
and 
 Conservatism (e.g. “how liberal or conservative do you perceive yourself to be 
on foreign policy issues, economic issues, and social issues?) 
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 To examine the criterion validity of the MHBS, the authors included measures 
they believed would be associated with the honor inventory: benevolent sexism and 
aggressive personality traits. To examine discriminant validity, the authors included 
measures they believed would not be associated with the inventory: conservatism and 
hostile sexism. 
Gender Attitudes 
The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI), created by Glick & Fiske (1996) 
includes two correlated components of sexism that, nevertheless, represent contrasting 
orientations toward women. The questionnaire involves sexism, both sexist animosity (or 
hostile sexism) and a subjectively positive alignment (benevolent sexism). Each, the 
authors claim, encompass three sources of ambivalence: paternalism, gender 
differentiation, and heterosexuality. The ASI is the most frequently used measure of 
ambivalence toward women, with 3785 citations between 1996 and 2019 (Pennsylvania 
State University 2019). Saucier et al. included the ASI in their original questionnaire, 
which was designed to identify reliable items to include in the MHBS. While the authors 
did not expect their measure would significantly correlate with hostile sexism, they did 
hypothesize that higher levels of masculine honor would be associated with benevolent 
sexism because it is “characterized by role restrictive behaviors that include men’s 
protection of women” (2016, 9). 
Aggressive Behavior 
The Aggression Questionnaire, constructed by Buss & Perry (1992), is the most 
frequently used inventory on human aggression, with 6019 citations between 1992 and 
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2019 (CiteSeerX, 2019). Factor analysis yielded four distinct scales: physical aggression, 
verbal aggression, anger, and hostility. This scale, however, focuses on individuals’ 
propensity to behave violently or be verbally abusive. Saucier et al. included the 
Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry 1992) in their original study constructing the 
masculine honor scale because the authors’ “conceptualization of masculine honor 
includes the belief that physical aggression is sometimes appropriate, and even necessary, 
we hypothesize that higher levels of masculine honor beliefs would be associated with 
higher levels of trait aggression” (2016, 9).  
Because the focus of my dissertation lies squarely on the predictive role of anti-
violence attitudes and not propensity to behave violently, I chose not to model my new 
scale on the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry 1992). I also decided against 
modeling other popular measures of attitudes toward violence to create my scale because 
either the question items tapped policy orientations closely related to my dependent 
variables of interest in later chapters (Velicer et. al 1989; Anderson et. al 2006) or were 
specifically designed for children and adolescents (Funk et. al 1999; 2003).  
Expectations for My New Measure 
   Having stripped the original MHBS of its gendered orientation and role-restrictive 
language, I expect a much weaker strength of association between my new measure and 
sexism, particularly benevolent sexism. I expect the same dip in correlation strength with 
conservatism and, in both cases, I expect this to be true of male and female respondents. 
Including these additional measures allows me to better understand what the MHBS as 
well as my scale really are capturing. The primary purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to 
present and evaluate a modified and updated, gender-neutral measure of honor-based 
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anti-violence attitudes. Data from a large Mechanical Turk survey (N = 1049) is reported, 
and my analysis lends support for my gender-neutral scale among adult populations in the 
United States.1  
3.3 Implementing the Gender-Neutral Honor Battery 
 Thousands of social scientists have published studies using data from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk survey platform. Conducting research in this way is both efficient, and 
relatively inexpensive. Perhaps more importantly, however, scholars have found evidence 
that MTurk participants “provide data that meets or exceeds the psychometric standards 
set by data collected using other means including student samples” (Buhrmester et al. 
2018, 149), and that “relative to other convenience samples often used in experimental 
research in Political Science, MTurk subjects are often more representative of the general 
population” (Berinsky et al. 2012, 366).  
 Despite these advantages, other scholars (Dennis et al. 2019) have found that an 
alarming number of participants circumvent conventional screening methods and provide 
low-quality responses. Accordingly, I took additional steps to detect and delete fraudulent 
responses from any “bad actors” who participated in my survey. Not only did I identify 
multiple responses that originated from a single IP address, but I also identified multiple 
responses that originated from a single geographic location using latitudinal and 
longitudinal coordinates. This led me to exclude 294 potentially fraudulent observations. 
 
1 Berinsky et al. (2012) examined the benefits, and potential limitations of using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk web-based platform for subject recruitment in Political Science Research. When the authors used 
Mechanical Turk samples to replicate previous experimental studies, they found that the average 
treatment effects were very similar. In sum, the authors argue that the potential limitations to Mechanical 
Turk samples – including subject attentiveness and the prevalence of repeat survey-takers – are not much 
of a problem in practice. 
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After closely inspecting my remaining data, I uncovered an additional 26 obvious 
response-set observations and excluded those as well, which resulted in a final sample 
size (N = 1049). 
Participants and Materials  
 M-Turk Workers were given the opportunity to earn $0.25 for completing my 
survey on Amazon’s research survey platform. Participants reported their level of 
agreement with various statements endorsing honor beliefs. In total, data were collected 
with a survey instrument given to 1,049 workers: 43% male, 79% white, 95% between 
the ages of 18 and 65, with a median age of 39.38 and a standard deviation of 13.18. 
Respondents were also asked to complete the scales on hostile sexism, benevolent 
sexism, trait aggression, conservatism, and rape myth acceptance. 
 Workers were randomly assigned to complete one of two scales, the original 
MHBS, or my modified, non-gendered version. That randomization produced little 
variation in the two pools. The 523 workers who received the original MHBS were 44% 
male, 79% white, 95% between the ages of 18 and 64, with a median age of 39.39 and a 
standard deviation of 13.12. By contrast, the 526 workers who received my modified 
scale were 42% male, 79% white, 95% between the ages of 18 and 65, with a median age 
of 39.37 and a standard deviation of 13.24. The goal was to see how different the patterns 
were across the two otherwise identical scales, allowing me to confirm – with data from a 
non-student sample – that the MHBS conflates multiple attitudinal dimensions. 
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Results – Masculine Honor Beliefs 
 The original MHBS items were highly reliable overall, with excellent internal 
consistency (α = .95), and the items on each of the seven subscales also achieved 
satisfactory levels of internal consistency, although it sometimes fell below the level seen 
with the overall battery: masculine courage (α = .89); pride in manhood (α = .85); 
socialization (α = .76); virtue (α = .85); protection (α = .87); provocation and insult (α = 
.96); and family and community bonds (α = .85).2  
Principal Component Analysis 
 Recall that Saucier et al. (2016) reported that the MHBS question items in their 
study yielded seven factors – or subscales – containing five question items each, which 
combine to form a 35-item measure of masculine honor beliefs. However, I did not want 
to assume that the question items went together or grouped as they did in the original 
study. Some items clearly pertain to honor beliefs, while others clearly get at individual’s 
attitudes toward violence specifically. Principal component analysis with varimax 
rotation determined that the items actually produce a six-factor (rather than the seven-
factor) solution as reported by Saucier et al. (2016).  
Provocation and Insult loaded strongest on the first factor (Eigenvalue = 13.09) 
and explained 37% of the variance in the scale. The second factor (Eigenvalue = 5.06) 
was mostly Protection items and explained an additional 14% of the variance. Courage 
 
2 Alpha was developed to provide a measure of the internal consistency of a scale and is expressed as a 
number between 0 and 1 (Cronbach, 1951). Analysts use the statistic to judge whether question items 
included in a scale likely measure the same concept. The more that question items correlate with each 
other, the higher alpha will be. Researchers typically employ a rule of thumb that alphas ranging between 
.70 and .95 indicate a good scale (Bland, 1997; DeVellis, 2003). Alpha is also affected by the number of 
question items; when there are very few items, alpha is reduced (Streiner, 2003). Such a scale may be 
overly susceptible to the idiosyncratic focus of the few questions. 
 
46 
 
 
        
loaded strongest on the third factor (Eigenvalue = 1.73) explaining an additional 5% of 
variation in the scale. The fourth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.39) was mostly comprised of 
Virtue items (or attitudes toward violence specifically) and explained 4% of scale 
variance. Family and Community Bonds loaded strongest on the fifth factor (Eigenvalue 
= 1.19) and explained 3% of the variance in the scale. Finally, the sixth factor 
(Eigenvalue = 1.12) was overwhelmingly driven by two of the Socialization items and 
explained an additional 3% of scale variance. No other factors emerged with an 
Eigenvalue of 1.0 or higher.  
Sex Differences  
 Male respondents scored significantly higher on Masculine Courage (t = 6.37, p = 
.00), Masculine Pride (t = 4.89, p = .00), Masculine Virtue (t = 4.35, p = .00), Masculine 
Protection (t = 4.57, p = .00), and Masculine Provocation/Insult (t = 4.28, p = .00). Males 
and females posted similar scores on Masculine Socialization (t = 1.27, p = .10); and 
Family and Community Bonds (t = -1.51, p = .07). In sum, male respondents were more 
likely to endorse masculine honor beliefs on a range of issues, but females were equally 
likely to agree that boys should defend themselves and others – with violence if 
necessary, and that men should prioritize and defend their family. Males scored 
significantly higher on the full 35-item masculine honor belief inventory compared to 
females (t = 4.98, with 521 degrees of freedom, p < .001). 
  These results align with much of what Saucier et al. (2016, 10) reported in the 
original study. Scores on the masculinity scale were strongly associated with measures of 
trait aggression and benevolent sexism. However, contrary to their findings, data from 
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this study suggest that scores on the scale also are strongly correlated with hostile sexism 
and the conservatism measure (see Table 3.3.1 below).  
Table 3.3.1 | Masculine Honor Intercorrelations 
 
In this first pass, I replicated the original 35-item measure of masculine honor 
beliefs, including seven 5-item subscales. Like the original creators of the masculine 
honor scale, I found that the overall combined measure demonstrated acceptable internal 
consistency, as did each of the subscales. In sum, higher levels of masculine honor beliefs 
were significantly, and positively associated with higher levels of trait aggression, hostile 
sexism, benevolent sexism, and conservatism. 
Results – Gender Neutral Honor Beliefs 
 The gender-neutral additive scale works well overall – although notably, without 
the gendered language to tie it together, my measure of internal consistency dipped a bit 
(α = .93). The items on each of the seven subscales also achieved acceptable levels of 
internal consistency: Courage (α = .83); Pride (α = .78); Socialization (α = .76); Virtue (α 
= .81); Protection (α = .85); Provocation/Insult (α = .95); and Family and Community 
Bonds (α = .79).  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. MHBS 1
2. Trait Aggression 0.384*** 1
3. Benevolent Sexism 0.731*** 0.256*** 1
4. Hostile Sexism 0.529*** 0.347*** 0.416*** 1
5. Conservatism 0.426*** 0.151* 0.332*** 0.560*** 1
* p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  <0.001  35-Item Full Inventory                           N = 523                                                       N = 526
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Principal Component Analysis 
 Again, I conducted principal component analysis and determined that the data 
produced a six-factor solution (rather than the seven-factor) solution suggested by 
Saucier et al. (2016). The first factor (Eigenvalue = 11.15) picked up some Family and 
Community Bonds items along with Protection items and explained 32% of the variance 
in the scale. The second factor (Eigenvalue = 3.65) was entirely comprised of the 
Provocation and Insult items and explains an additional 11% of the variance. Courage 
and Pride items loaded strongest on the third factor (Eigenvalue = 2.48) explaining an 
additional 7% of variation in the scale. The fourth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.85) was mostly 
Virtue with two Pride items (or attitudes toward violence, and maintenance of a 
reputation for being tough), and explained 5% of scale variance. The fifth factor 
(Eigenvalue = 1.51) was mostly Socialization and an additional item relating to 
reputation, and it explained an additional 4% of the variance in the scale. The sixth, and 
final factor (Eigenvalue = 1.28) contained the remaining Family and Community Bond 
items and explained an additional 4% of scale variance. However, the final factor 
revealed that the question about obligation to the community does not fit well with those 
about obligation to the family. This appears to represent respondents’ sense of 
responsibility to self and family at the expense of the broader community – a finding that 
did not emerge from the original gendered items. No other factors emerged with an 
Eigenvalue of 1.0 or higher. 
Interestingly, respondents did not score highly on items endorsing the stereotype 
that individuals should maintain a credible reputation for aggressive behavior, or that 
violence is often acceptable if not required. This suggests that, on average, respondents 
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do not believe that violence is an acceptable social tool, providing preliminary support for 
some scholars’ broader claim (Elias 2000; Pinker 2011) that humans have lost their 
appetite for violence. What remains to be seen, however, is whether or not a distaste for 
violence influences individuals’ perceptions of victims and perpetrators or helps shape 
public policy preferences in any meaningful way. 
While the additive index is adequate, it does not come together so neatly without 
the gendered language structuring responses, which illustrates that my gender-neutral 
wording is removing a problem. Contrary to my analysis of the masculine scale, which 
produced one meaningful factor followed by statistical noise that required varimax 
rotation to make sense of it, in this case, principal component analysis showed clear 
factors emerging prior to rotation. Notably, the question items most directly tied to 
violence held together and stood out more clearly.3 
Sex Differences  
Male respondents again scored significantly higher on Courage (t = 4.17, p < 
.001), Pride (t = 5.59, p < .001), Virtue (t = 5.37, p < .001), Protection (t = 4.02, p < 
.001), and Provocation/Insult (t = 3.21, p < .001). Males and females again posted similar 
scores on Socialization (t = 1.60, p = .06) and Family and Community Bonds (t = 0.15, p 
= .44). Males scored significantly higher on the full 35-item gender-neutral honor 
inventory compared to females (t = 4.92, with 524 degrees of freedom, p < .001). When 
gender was not imposed upon respondents, females scored higher on most items, the 
exception being family bonds and willingness to physically fight. Scores on the modified 
 
3 Rotating principal components can improve their interpretability but also presents drawbacks. For 
instance, because the variation between individual components is spread more evenly after rotation, 
information on the most dominant individual sources of variation in the data may be lost (Joliffe 1989). 
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honor & violence scale again correlated significantly with the measures of trait 
aggression, hostile sexism, and benevolent sexism. However, in most cases, the 
correlation coefficients are much smaller than those found using the original masculine 
honor belief questions (see Table 3.3.2). 
                        Table 3.3.2 | Gender-Neutral Honor Intercorrelations 
 
 With the gendered language removed, my new measure correlates stronger with 
trait aggression (+.08), but the correlations with benevolent sexism (-.15), hostile sexism 
(-.07), and conservatism (-.11) decline sharply. This illustrates clearly that the original 
scale was conflating a sense of honor with sexist attitudes reported by respondents who 
might or might not have been open to the use of force more generally. This is particularly 
true of the relationship between the modified scale and the measure of benevolent sexism, 
the orientation that I most believed was contaminating the MHBS. Removal of the 
gendered and role-restrictive language of the questions produced a notable drop in the 
strength of association with benevolent sexism (-.15), and this was true of both males (-
.17) and females (-.15). Nevertheless, scholars who equate masculine traits with tolerance 
for violence clearly are not wrong – even with gendered language removed, respondents 
endorsing the use of force tend to be more likely to envision a division in gender roles as 
well. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. HBS 1
2. Trait Aggression 0.465*** 1
3. Benevolent Sexism 0.587*** 0.278*** 1
4. Hostile Sexism 0.458*** 0.417*** 0.391*** 1
5. Conservatism 0.319*** 0.124** 0.329*** 0.428*** 1
* p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  <0.001  35-Item Full Inventory (Gender-Neutral)              N = 523                       
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3.4 Trimming the Honor Scale     
  Having compared the data produced using the competing measures, I now turn to 
the selection of a short-form version of my gender-neutral scale. My goal in this section 
is to choose the simplest scientific measure of unobserved anti-violence attitudes using 
the fewest possible observed variables. To achieve this parsimony statistically, I began by 
removing question items included in my gender-neutral scale that are not directly related 
to individual attitudes toward violence. 
 Recall that principal component analysis indicated a six-factor solution, and that 
the fourth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.85) was comprised mostly of Virtue with two Pride 
items, which explained roughly 5% of scale variance. These seven items tap either the 
belief that individuals should maintain a no-nonsense reputation, or that violence is often 
acceptable if not required. Remember, these were also the least popular question items, 
which suggests that on average, respondents do not endorse violence as a social tool. This 
question set should allow me to investigate further whether anti-violence values influence 
perceptions of victims and perpetrators or help shape related public policy preferences 
(see Table 3.4.1). 
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Table 3.4.1 | Principal Component Analysis Factor Loadings 
 
The seven items that I retained for my short scale are the ones that loaded most-
heavily on the virtue/violence factor.  They are as follows: (1) "It is important for a 
person to be tougher than other people"; (2) "A person should be embarrassed if someone 
calls them a wimp"; (3) "You would praise a person who reacted aggressively to an 
insult"; (4) "Sometimes aggression is admirable and acceptable"; (5) "It is morally wrong 
for a person to walk away from a fight"; (6) "A person who doesn't 'take any crap' from 
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 Component 6
Courage 1 0.3671
Courage 2 0.3949
Courage 3 0.4393
Courage 4 0.414
Courage 5 0.388
Pride 1 0.2765
Pride 2 0.3039
Pride 3 0.2363
Pride 4 0.4394
Pride 5 0.3896
Socialization 1 0.4468
Socialization 2 0.4446
Socialization 3 0.3299 -0.3790
Socialization 4 0.4255
Socialization 5 0.3793
Virtue 1 0.4101
Virtue 2 0.3156 0.2234
Virtue 3 0.4911
Virtue 4 0.3195
Virtue 5 0.4693
Protection 1 0.3024
Protection 2 0.3312
Protection 3 0.2764
Protection 4 0.3504
Protection 5 0.336
Provocation/Insult 1 0.4182
Provocation/Insult 2 0.459
Provocation/Insult 3 0.4595
Provocation/Insult 4 0.415
Provocation/Insult 5 0.4409
Family Bonds 1 0.3479
Family Bonds 2 0.4019
Family Bonds 3 0.3889
Family Bonds 4 0.2088 -0.3165
Family Bonds 5 0.3002
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anyone is an admirable reputation to have"; and (7) "Physical violence is the most 
admirable way to defend yourself". 
 These questions nicely capture an individual’s abhorrence of violence. My 
argument is that a new short scale estimated from these questions, while derived from 
closely related honor beliefs, is cleaner not only because it does not impose gender 
expectations on respondents, but because it is comprised of items directly related to 
violence and not honor more broadly. To determine goodness of fit, I used structural 
equation modeling to examine the construct validity of my new, truncated scale. Fit 
indices for the scale determined an acceptable fit: (p > X2 = .00; RMSEA = .08; CFI = 
.95; TLI .93; SRMR = .03). Each of these diagnostic tests confirmed that my gender-
neutral short scale meets or exceeds standards for fit indices laid out in prior literature 
(Hair et al. 2010; Awang 2012; and Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
Sex Differences  
Despite the removal of gendered language, male respondents again scored 
significantly higher on "It is important for a person to be tougher than other people" (t = 
4.66, p < .001); "A person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp" (t = 
6.32, p < .001); "You would praise a person who reacted aggressively to an insult" (t = 
4.76, p < .001); "Sometimes aggression is admirable and acceptable" (t = 3.26, p < .001); 
"It is morally wrong for a person to walk away from a fight" (t = 5.19, p < .001); "A 
person who doesn't 'take any crap' from anyone is an admirable reputation to have" (t = 
1.76, p = .04); and "Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself" (t = 
5.22, p < .001).   
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This is not especially surprising because despite the gender-neutral question 
items, many respondents are likely envisioning male behavior when reading these 
statements. Male respondents were more likely to endorse these gender-neutral attitudes 
toward violence and scored significantly higher than females on the full 7-item non-
gendered scale (t = 6.25, with 1047 degrees of freedom, p < .001). 
 Recall that the full 35-item gender-neutral honor scale produced sharp declines in 
the strength of association with benevolent sexism (-.15); hostile sexism (-.07); and 
conservatism (-.11). While scores on the truncated 7-item violence scale again correlated 
significantly with these other variables, the strength of correlation dropped markedly 
further with benevolent sexism (-.18); hostile sexism (-.13); and conservatism (-.17). This 
lends further support for my claim that my new scale is capturing attitudes toward 
violence rather than honor beliefs or gender stereotypes. For a comparison of correlation 
coefficients across the 35-item masculine honor scale (MHBS); the 35-item gender-
neutral honor scale (HBS); and the truncated 7-item anti-violence scale (ATV); (see 
Table 3.4.2 below). 
Table 3.4.2 | Correlation Coefficients across Scales 
 
This new short-form scale was constructed to measure a person’s attitudes toward 
violence as independently from other attitudes as possible. The truncated version of my 
scale is a worthy and defensible modification of both the full-item MHBS and the gender-
MHBS HBS ATV
Trait Agression 0.384*** 0.465*** 0.408***
Benevolent Sexism 0.731*** 0.587*** 0.280***
Hostile Sexism 0.529*** 0.458*** 0.324***
Conservatism 0.426*** 0.319*** 0.154***
* p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  <0.001                                                    
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neutral HBS for the purposes of this project. I expected that the short scale would exhibit 
weaker correlations with benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and conservatism when 
compared to the long form MHBS and the long form gender neutral HBS respectively. 
Table 3.4.1 supports my expectations. 
It was not possible to produce a measure of attitudes toward violence entirely free 
from gender-role expectations, most likely because people in the United States are often 
socialized to believe that violence is a male-exclusive behavior. However, the gender-
neutral short scale produced sharp declines in correlation strength with the other variables 
as I predicted it should.  This new scale should help me better understand how attitudes 
toward gender and attitudes toward violence, independently and/or interactively, help 
shape violence-related policy preferences and perceptions of victims and perpetrators. 
Some might argue that the impressive declines in correlation I did find are a result 
of the shorter scale itself – that fewer question items produced a poorly measured concept 
of gender-neutral attitudes toward violence. To address this possibility, I created a 
masculine short scale using the same question items I retained for the short-form gender-
neutral scale, but with their original wording intact. The gender-neutral short scale again 
produced sharp declines in correlation strength, compared to the gendered parallel, with 
benevolent sexism (-.11); hostile sexism (-.09); and conservatism (-.11) compared to the 
masculine version of the same questions. 
Others might question whether gender-neutral honor beliefs will correlate with or 
help predict something that the original MHBS will not (or vice-versa). Saucier et al. 
(2015) demonstrate that masculine honor beliefs are associated with perceptions of rape 
and women who have been raped. If my new measures for gender-neutral honor are 
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cleaner (i.e. less tangled up with gender stereotypes) they should correlate with rape myth 
acceptance less strongly than the masculine worded versions.  
Recall that respondents were also asked to complete question items involving rape 
myth acceptance (Gerger et al. 2007). Intercorrelations for the full 35-item masculine 
honor scale (MHBS), the 7-item masculine anti-violence short scale (MATV), the full 35-
item gender-neutral honor scale (HBS), and my 7-item gender-neutral anti-violence scale 
(ATV), are provided; (see Table 3.4.3 below).  
Table 3.4.3 | Correlations Including Rape Myth Acceptance 
 
Stripping the gendered imposed language from the questions produced a subtle 
decline in the strength of association with individuals’ endorsement of rape myth 
acceptance on the 35-item gender-neutral scale (-.02), and the 7-item gender-neutral short 
scale (-.08). While the decline in correlation strength across these scales played out as 
expected, multiple regression analysis should allow me to determine whether my gender-
neutral scales predict something that the masculine versions do not – that is – 
respondents’ propensity to endorse rape myths while controlling for other factors. 
Rape Myth Acceptance  
While early research on sexual violence focused primarily on perceptions of 
victims and blame attributions for incidents of stranger rape (Acock & Ireland 1983), 
MHBS MATV HBS ATV
Trait Agression 0.384*** 0.336*** 0.465*** 0.408***
Benevolent Sexism 0.731*** 0.394*** 0.587*** 0.280***
Hostile Sexism 0.529*** 0.411*** 0.458*** 0.324***
Conservatism 0.426*** 0.263*** 0.319*** 0.154***
Rape Myth Acceptance 0.455*** 0.397*** 0.439*** 0.319***
* p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  <0.001                                                    
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date, acquaintance, and marital rape have gained attention more recently (Russell 1990). 
We know that gender role expectations are one set of underlying attitudes that contribute 
to the occurrence of sexual violence. For example, as Simonson and Subich point out, 
“For men to fulfill the role expected of them by society they must be dominant, powerful, 
sexually aggressive, and able to gain sexual access to reluctant women. In order for 
women to fulfill their expected societal role, they must be fragile, passive, submissive, 
yet still responsible for controlling the extent of their sexual activity (1999, 1).  
Research shows (Mayerson & Taylor 1987) that individuals who embrace 
stereotypical gender roles are more likely to endorse rape myths. Because both forms of 
sexism included in this study serve to justify and maintain traditional gender roles, I 
predict that respondents scoring higher on the overall measure of Ambivalent Sexism will 
be more likely to endorse rape myths. Thus, I derive the following hypothesis: 
H1. On average, respondents scoring higher on Ambivalent Sexism will be more 
accepting of rape myths.  
 However, I also argue that it is important to partition out the Ambivalent Sexism 
subscales to examine the independent effects of hostile versus benevolent sexism. While 
closely related, hostile sexists seek to punish non-traditional women, while benevolent 
sexists seek to protect women in traditional roles. As the creators of the scale point out, 
“BS is the ‘carrot’ – the reward of positive affect, esteem, and protectiveness given to 
women who embrace traditional gender roles; HS is the ‘stick’ – the hostility that women 
who reject traditional roles in favor of taking on traditionally masculine roles face from 
those wishing to ‘keep them in their place’ (Glick & Fiske 1996, 129). Because both 
forms of sexism endorse coercion as a tool to maintain traditional gender roles, I predict 
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that respondents scoring higher on my measures of benevolent and hostile sexism will be 
more likely to endorse rape myths. However, I expect that hostile sexism will have a 
greater effect than benevolent sexism. Based on these insights I derive the following 
hypothesis: 
H2. On average, respondents scoring higher on Benevolent Sexism and Hostile 
Sexism will be more accepting of rape myths. However, this correlation will be 
greater for those scoring higher on Hostile Sexism. 
 Recall that the goal of this analysis is to determine whether my gender-neutral 
honor scale predicts something that the masculine version does not predict. Because both 
versions measure honor beliefs, and because both are positively associated with rape 
myth acceptance, it is likely that respondents scoring higher on either scale will be more 
accepting of rape myths. However, the gender-imposed nature of the masculine honor 
scale likely masks the differences we should see between males and females when it 
comes to rape attitudes. We know, for instance that females, on average, are much less 
likely than males to endorse rape myths (Burt 1980; Anderson & Cummings 1993), but 
early studies did not include measures for gender-role expectations or traditionalism. 
More recent work (Simonson & Subich 1999) provides evidence that gender role beliefs, 
and the embrace of traditionalism that one acquires through early socialization, may be a 
better predictor of rape attitudes than an individual’s biological sex. If true, removing the 
gendered language from the masculine honor scale should unmask the fact that females, 
on average, are less likely than males to endorse rape myths. In light of these propositions 
I derive the following hypotheses: 
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H3a. On average, an individual’s gender will not add significantly to the 
prediction of rape attitudes beyond masculine honor beliefs. 
H3b. Because the gender-neutral nature of my modified scale extracts gender-role 
beliefs it will allow us to see that females, on average, are less likely than males 
to endorse rape myths.  
The first column of Table 3.4.4 shows the results of a regression analysis of rape 
myth acceptance on ambivalent sexism. The results provide support for H1: that on 
average, respondents scoring higher on Ambivalent Sexism are more accepting of rape 
myths. Rape myth acceptance increased by (+0.04) for every one unit increase in 
ambivalent sexism. I then partitioned out hostile sexism from benevolent sexism to obtain 
the independent effects of each on respondents’ rape attitudes. The second column shows 
the results of a multiple-regression analysis which provides support for H2: On average, 
respondents scoring higher on Benevolent Sexism and Hostile Sexism are more accepting 
of rape myths. However, this effect is greater for those scoring higher on Hostile Sexism. 
Rape myth acceptance increased by (+0.61) for every one unit increase in hostile sexism 
and increased by (+0.25) for every one unit increase in benevolent sexism.  
Next, to explore the differences between the original masculine honor scale and 
my modified gender-neutral version, I dropped the sexism measures to examine the effect 
of honor beliefs and other control variables. In the third column of Table 3.4.3, I report 
the results of a multiple-regression analysis of rape myth acceptance on masculine honor. 
As expected, masculine honor beliefs had a positive and significant effect on the 
likelihood that respondents would accept rape myths, all else equal. Respondents’ 
likelihood to accept these myths increased by (+0.59) for every one unit increase in 
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masculine honor. Additionally, these results provide support for H3a; that on average, an 
individual’s gender will not add significantly to the prediction of rape attitudes beyond 
masculine honor beliefs. Respondents’ sex did not have a significant effect on their 
likelihood to endorse rape myths when controlling for masculine honor beliefs and other 
factors. Females were no more likely to reject rape myths than males! 
Finally, in the fourth column in Table 3.4.3, I report the results of a multiple-
regression analysis of rape myth acceptance on gender-neutral honor. As expected, 
gender-neutral honor beliefs also had a positive and significant effect on respondents’ 
belief in rape myths. The likelihood to accept these myths increased by (+0.63) for every 
one unit increase in gender-neutral honor, all else equal. However, these results provide 
support for H3b; that because the gender-neutral nature of my modified scale extracts 
gender-role beliefs it will allow us to see that females, on average, are less likely than 
males to endorse rape myths. In this model, respondents’ sex was a positive and 
significant predictor of their likelihood to endorse rape myths when controlling for 
gender-neutral honor and other factors. Female respondents scored (-0.43) lower, on 
average, on rape myth acceptance, all else equal. However, once hostile and benevolent 
sexism were incorporated in Model 5 and Model 6, biological sex is was no longer a 
significant predictor of rape myth acceptance. 
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Table 3.4.4 | Effect of Honor Beliefs and Sexism on Rape Myth Acceptance 
 
Anti-Violence Values 
In the previous analysis I was able to demonstrate that my new measure, in large 
part, removes the gender role expectations that the masculine honor beliefs scale (MHBS) 
was created to capture (Saucier et al. 2016). My reason for doing so, ultimately, was to 
create a shorter battery by retaining only those question items most directly related to 
attitudes toward violence. As I stated earlier in the chapter, it might seem straightforward 
to use an existing scale that directly asks people about their attitudes toward violence, but 
that is actually much more difficult than it seems. Most existing survey items designed to 
MODEL 5 MODEL 6
Ambivalent Sexism 0.04 **
(0.019)
Hostile Sexism 0.606 *** 0.545 *** 0.593 ***
(0.029)        (0.051) (0.048)
Benevolent Sexism                 0.251 *** 0.144 ** 0.216 ***
(0.030)         (0.057) (0.051)
Age -0.009 ** 0.006          -0.006 *          -0.008 *
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Income -0.007 -0.015 -0.001 -0.013
(0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
Education 0.06 0.036 0.088 ** 0.125 ***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043)
Female                 -0.135           -0.428 ***           -0.011           -0.123
(0.121) (0.126) (0.110) (0.111)
White 0.221          -0.092          0.244          -0.104
(0.178) (0.002) (0.161) (0.169)
Black 0.194 0.348 0.299 0.087
(0.266) (0.260) (0.241) (0.226)
Married 0.041 0.094 0.012          -0.012
           (0.132)         (0.131)          (0.12)        (0.113)
Masculine Honor Beliefs 0.585 *** 0.174 **
(0.066) (0.083)
Gender-Neutral Honor Beliefs 0.634 *** 0.158 *
        (0.077)              (0.080)
Observations 1049 1049 523 526 523 526
Adj. R2 0.42 0.42 0.28 0.24 0.41 0.42
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1
MODEL 3    MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 4
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assess attitudes toward violence inevitably frame them in policy terms that distract from 
the underlying cultural values of interest to me. I tried using an adapted General Violence 
measure already appearing in the literature (Schnabel 2018), but the question items did 
not hold together well as a scale and, instead of capturing attitudes toward violence they 
appeared to reflect political ideology (Conservatism). Rather than use those measures, 
therefore, I turned to a scale used in the Honor Beliefs literature (Saucier 2016) that – 
with adaption – got me much closer to what I needed. 
To this point, however, I have not tested the predictive power of my anti-violence 
values scale. Recall that my new, gender-neutral scale includes seven question items 
assessing individuals’ level of abhorrence toward violence. These seven items tap either 
the belief that individuals should maintain a no-nonsense reputation, or that violence is 
often acceptable if not required. Remember, these were also the least popular question 
items, which suggests that on average, respondents do not endorse violence as a social 
tool. Accordingly, I scaled these items such that higher scores on the scale indicate a 
greater aversion to violence. My goal in subsequent chapters, therefore, is to examine 
whether anti-violence values help shape individuals’ perceptions of victims and 
perpetrators of violence, or personal preferences in terms of violence-related public 
policies. Steven Pinker argues that the steep decline in human beings’ taste for violence 
has “been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence, and often 
the attitudes are in the lead” (2011, xxii). While I do not have the necessary data to 
engage the author’s claim that violence has declined over time, I have created a scale that 
will allow me to test the substantive importance of anti-violence attitudes in subsequent 
chapters. 
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My new measure represents an individual’s abhorrence of violence in the abstract. 
My argument is that this new short scale, while derived from closely related honor 
beliefs, is cleaner – not only because it does not impose gender expectations on 
respondents, but because it is comprised of items directly related to violence and not 
honor more broadly. If true, I would expect my scale to help predict individuals’ 
willingness to endorse rape myths.  Specifically, I expect that the more an individual 
rejects violence, the less likely they are to endorse attitudes that vilify (or blame) victims 
of sexual assault and/or rape. Stated as a formal hypothesis: 
H4. On average, respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be 
less likely to endorse beliefs that blame victims of rape, all else equal.  
Table 3.4.5 | Effect of Anti-Violence Values on Rape Myth Acceptance 
 
MODEL 5
Age        -0.006 * 0.008 * 0.008 * 0.008 ** 0.008 **
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.033)
Education 0.042 0.001 0.013 0.028 0.109 **
(0.036) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.012)
Income 0.001 0.011        -0.014        -0.009        -0.013
(0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019)
Female -0.474 *** -0.351 *** -0.316 ** -0.298 ** -0.085
(0.091) (0.126) (0.124) (0.122) (0.111)
Black 0.562 *** 0.358 0.291 0.166 0.071
(0.196) (0.257) (0.254) (0.251) (0.224)
White 0.029 -0.091 -0.091 -0.054 -0.102
(0.141) (0.194) (0.191) (0.188) (0.168)
Married 0.118 0.089 0.084 0.044       -0.011
(0.009) (0.129) (0.127) (0.125) (0.112)
Conservative 0.319 *** 0.211 *** 0.176 *** 0.144 *** 0.026
(0.027) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034)
Anti-Violence          -0.305 *** -0.215 ***         -0.202 ***       -0.105 ***
(0.033) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035)
Gender-Neutral Honor 0.371 *** 0.187 ** 0.052
(0.089) (0.097) (0.087)
Benevolent Sexism 0.249 *** 0.208 ***
(0.056) (0.050)
Hostile Sexism 0.559 ***
(0.048)
Observations 1049 526 526 526 526
Adj. R2 0.15 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.45
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1
MODEL 4MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
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In Model 1 of Table 3.4.5, I report the results of a multi-regression analysis of 
rape myth acceptance on control variables commonly used in related studies. As 
expected, females were significantly less likely (-.47) than males to endorse rape myths. 
Additionally, conservatism produced a positive and significant effect such that for every 
one unit increase in conservatism, on average, respondents were more likely (+.32) to 
endorse rape myths.  
In Model 2, I incorporate my measure of anti-violence values and find a 
significant and negative effect such that for every one unit increase in anti-violence 
sentiment, on average, respondents were less likely (-.31) to endorse rape myths.  On its 
face, it would seem as though anti-violence values are the real thing.  In Model 3, gender-
neutral honor beliefs had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood that 
respondents would accept rape myths, all else equal. Respondents’ likelihood to accept 
these myths increased (+.37) for every one unit increase in gender-neutral honor. In the 
fourth column, I incorporated benevolent sexism into the analysis. I found a positive and 
significant effect on the likelihood that respondents would accept rape myths, all else 
equal. Respondents’ likelihood to accept these myths increased (+.25) for every one unit 
increase in gender-neutral honor, all else equal.  
Model 5 represents my fully specified model and provides strong support for H4; 
that on average, respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less likely 
to endorse beliefs that blame victims of rape, all else equal. Respondents’ likelihood to 
accept these myths decreased (-.11) for every one unit increase in anti-violence values. 
This effect remained significant despite the inclusion of measures for benevolent (+.21) 
and hostile (+.56) sexism which, when included in the fully specified model, resulted in a 
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respondent’s sex not producing a significant effect on their likelihood to endorse rape 
myths, all else equal. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was twofold; first, to develop and test a gender-
neutral honor scale in large part free from expectations of male behavior and next, to 
extract from that battery a reliable measure for anti-violence values. In this section, I was 
able to demonstrate that my new measure is well equipped to parse out the independent 
and/or interactive roles of sexism and attitudes toward violence, and I was able to do so 
using data collected from a substantial sample of Mechanical Turk workers.  
My modifications to a popular measure of masculine honor (Saucier et al. 2016) 
produced sharp declines in the overall strength of association between my gender-neutral 
honor scale and both hostile, and benevolent, sexism compared to the masculine version. 
This finding was consistent for both males and females. The gender-neutral scale also 
produced sharp declines in the overall strength of association between conservatism and 
the original measure. While I must admit that I was not able to entirely divorce gender 
attitudes from honor beliefs, I did provide strong support for the utility of my scale and 
evidence that it performs in a consistent manner theoretically distinct from its gendered 
counterpart.  
Using principal component analysis, I was able to then extract from the 35-item 
gender-neutral honor questions the 7 items most directly focused on attitudes toward 
violence. I scaled this variable such that higher scores indicate individuals’ increasing 
abhorrence of violence. My new measure performed as theoretically expected when 
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included in a multiple regression model predicting rape myth acceptance. In subsequent 
chapters, it will allow me to more clearly examine the independent roles that stereotypes 
(e.g. sexism and racism) and attitudes toward violence play in predicting perceptions of 
victims and violence-related public policy preferences.  
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CHAPTER 4. PERCEPTIONS OF RAPE VICTIMS AND SUPPORT FOR RELATED 
PUBLIC POLICIES 
4.1 Introduction 
Brock Turner, a former swimmer at Stanford University was found guilty in 2015 
of sexually assaulting, with intent to rape, an unconscious woman behind a campus 
dumpster. The victim, known to the public only as “Emily Doe”, provided a lengthy and 
emotional impact statement detailing the horror of her experience. In part the statement 
read: “You took away my worth, my privacy, my energy, my time, my intimacy, my 
confidence, and my own voice” (“Doe” in Bever 2016). Judge Aaron Persky sentenced 
Turner to only six months in jail followed by probation. He reasoned that a harsher prison 
sentence would have a severe impact on Turner who, in the end, served only three 
months.4 
First person accounts given by rape victims exhibit a recurring theme: The trauma 
does not end when the attack ceases but is perpetuated through the reactions exhibited by 
others who learn of the tragic event. Insensitive police officers, aloof medical staff, and 
avoidant family members all contribute to a sense of alienation experienced by victims. 
Yet, despite the central role played by individual attitudes in shaping the perpetuation, 
experience, and policy environment in which sexual assault and rape occurs, the public-
opinion literature offers only limited guidance for understanding it. 
Sexual violence and rape are notoriously difficult to measure and there is no 
single source of data available to provide researchers a clear, or entirely accurate picture 
of these crimes. Researchers often rely on both the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National 
 
4 In mid-July (2018) Judge Persky was recalled from office. The last time a California jurist was recalled 
from the bench was 86 years prior. 
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Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) – which measures crimes reported, and not reported 
to law enforcement – and the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program administered by 
the FBI, which measures those that are reported in order to estimate the prevalence of 
sexual violence in America. These crimes are underreported for a variety of reasons 
including the belief that police would not or could not do anything to help. In fact, 
research suggests that rape is the most underreported crime of all, and that 63% of 
incidents go unreported (Rennison 2002). According to one study, the conviction rate for 
reported rapes is less than 10% (Frazier et al. 1994) and based on the 2018 NCVS, the 
percentage of sexual victimizations reported to police declined from 40% in 2017, to 25% 
the following year. 
Even though the UCR and the NCVS provide a complementary assessment of 
sexual violence in the United States, the official numbers they produce are often much 
lower than those obtained by other agencies and private organizations. Additionally, 
statistics alone fail to capture the looming danger that individuals face, females in 
particular, when it comes to violent victimization.5 For example, approximately one in 
five women will be raped at some point during their lives, and 20% - 25% of college 
women will become victims of forced sex during their time in college (Cullen et al. 2000; 
Black et al. 2011). Because negative stigmas are often placed upon victims of sexual 
violence, and because they often fear that they will not be believed, many of these crimes 
go unreported. These incidents of violence not only cause serious psychological damage 
and significant short or long-term impacts on victims, such as Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD); they cost the United States more money than any other crime ($127 
 
5 91% of victims of rape and sexual assault are female and 9% are male (Rennison 2002). 
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billion annually) outpacing assault, murder, and even drunk driving (Miller et al. 1996; 
Black et al. 2011).  
Contributions to, and Extensions of Prior Literature 
Rape is widely recognized as an act of power and violence (Anderson & 
Swainson 2001) rather than eroticism, yet research in this realm tends to focus solely on 
gender attitudes and stereotypes while ignoring individuals’ orientations toward violence. 
For instance, much of this scholarship, (Spence et al. 1973; Muehlenhard et al. 1985) 
centers on gender attitudes and stereotypes alone as explanations for perceptions of rape 
victims and evaluations of sexual crimes. However, tolerance for a violent sexual act 
might reflect attitudes toward violence rather than attitudes toward gender.  In this 
chapter, I use my adapted anti-violence values scale (created in Chapter 3) to determine 
whether individuals who condemn violence, on average, are more likely to: 
 Believe a victim’s claim that she was raped; 
 Recommend a long prison sentence for her convicted rapist; 
 Support increased spending on policies to assist victims of sexual 
violence; and 
 Personally advocate for those victims 
  
I extend and contribute to this literature by: 1) providing theoretical and empirical 
support for my claim that anti-violence values do not always translate to positive 
perceptions of rape victims or support for policies and services to assist those victims; 2) 
providing additional empirical support for my broader argument that any normatively 
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positive effects of anti-violence values are (in most cases) absent once moderator 
variables (violence-justifying ideologies) are included in the model; 3) examining 
whether violence-justifying ideologies also moderate individuals decision to (not to) 
impose harsh prison sentences on convicted rapists; and 4) replicating most of these 
findings across multiple large N datasets. To the best of my knowledge these important 
factors have never been incorporated into empirical models predicting support for victims 
of sexual violence, policies to assist those victims, or punitive measures to crack down on 
sexual predators. This research builds on recent work on ambivalent sexism and attitudes 
toward rape victims (Brown & Pehrson 2019; Becker & Wright 2011) but expands on 
this research by: 1) including a large, and more representative sample (not just 
undergraduates), and 2) incorporating my new measure of anti-violence values.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I provide an historical overview of interest 
group efforts to influence public opinion and promote institutional reforms to address 
violence against women. These are formal, and informal groups that collaborate to 
influence public policy and provide information and resources to the public and to 
lawmakers. Many of these advocates play pivotal roles reducing violence against women 
and fostering social and institutional change in the United States. Next, I review some of 
the difficulties advocates encounter as they navigate an ever-changing political 
landscape. For example, it is challenging to convince lawmakers to support – and 
ultimately implement – programs and policies that require significant increases in 
government spending. Without strong public support for policies to reduce sexual 
violence and assist victims, lawmakers often lack the political will to act. Finally, 
extending upon my analyses in chapter three, I re-introduce specific violence-justifying 
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ideologies (e.g. hostile and benevolent sexism) which I argue attenuate the otherwise 
positive force of anti-violence values. I present empirical evidence that those who 
endorse violence-justifying attitudes (sexism in the current analysis) are less likely to 
support victims of sexual violence, or policies and services to assist those victims. This is 
especially true for those most opposed to violence. 
4.2 Feminist Movements to Redress Violence against Women 
Violence against women – sexual or otherwise – is a serious problem worldwide 
and is now viewed as a question of human rights. While most people would agree that 
such violence should be prohibited by law, this was not always so. In fact, as recently as 
1999 the Eurobarometer survey indicated that one in three Europeans believed violence 
against women should not be considered a crime (Htun & Weldon 2012). And in the 
United States, prior to the Violence against Women Act signed into law by President 
Clinton in 1994, the criminal justice system did not provide strong legal protections for 
victims. In the not-too-distant past rape was regarded only as a crime against a man’s 
property; it was not until the 1960s that the feminist movement helped to achieve 
significant reforms in American rape law. 
 Htun & Weldon (2012) suggest that VAW is rarely raised as a priority among 
social justice and human rights organizations without pressure from feminists. They 
remind us that many human rights groups did not even recognize rape as a violation of 
women’s rights until pressured by feminists in the 1990s to do so. VAW advocates face 
many obstacles, however, because their efforts challenge male privilege and male 
domination (Elman 1996). In fact, efforts to address violence against women represent a 
direct threat to established gender roles in most places (Gelb & Palley 1996).  
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 Policy scholars (Kingdon 1984; Heikkila & Gerlak 2013) understand that social 
movements play a primary role in getting new issues onto legislative agendas. Feminist 
movements in particular work tirelessly to foment broad support for policies to address 
violence against women, but to address these problems requires direct challenges to 
historical social and legal norms that perpetuate women’s vulnerability (Rochon & 
Mazmanian 1993). From a policy standpoint legal reforms, counseling and shelter, 
training for first responders and judges, and public education are all important tools to 
address VAW (Htun & Weldon 2012, 550). 
The authors argue that feminist mobilization – more so than progressive parties, 
women in government, or other political and economic arrangements – explains variation 
in the development of policies to address violence against women internationally. 
Additional research suggests that interest organizations and social movements play a 
pivotal role in terms of democratic responsiveness, which enhances the impact of public 
opinion. In a sweeping review on the topic, Burstein found that the “impact of opinion on 
policy is most likely to be statistically significant when more than one organization is 
taken into account…less when only one organization is included…and least likely when 
no organizations are included in the movement (2003, 35). The transnational movement 
fighting violence against women, spearheaded by feminist activists, has successfully 
mobilized to promote several international agreements. Their continued success, 
however, will require the sustained support of the broader public in general, and law 
makers in particular. 
 Decreasing violence requires the efforts of transnational organizations demanding 
reforms from the outside and working to change negative perceptions of victims. That is, 
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legal reforms alone will be insufficient without parallel changes in attitudes due to the 
role that police play in arresting, district attorneys in charging, and judges and jurors in 
determining guilt and sentencing. Combating “rape culture” requires targeted efforts to 
break down stereotypes and educate citizens. As Htun and Weldon point out, “In places 
with less active feminist movements (such as Kuwait), as many women as men support 
‘rape myths’, that is, commonly believed falsehoods about sexual assault” (2012, 553). A 
strong women’s movement can capture the attention and support of the general public 
and convince politicians to place institutional reforms on legislative agendas. This is true 
worldwide; in their exhaustive analysis of social movements spanning 70 countries over 
four decades, the authors discovered that feminist mobilization had the greatest impact on 
the development of programs to address VAW (2012). Yet, all of these programs require 
substantial funding, and lawmakers often lack the political will to address social issues 
without broad support from the public. 
4.3 Political Science and VAW Policy Implications 
Mayhew recognized politicians as “single-minded seekers of re-election” who pay 
close attention to the preferences of their constituents (1974). This helps explain why 
congruence between shifts in public opinion and subsequent public policy adoptions are 
common, especially when opinion on salient issues is stable (Page & Shapiro 1983; 
Burstein 2003). Responsiveness to public opinion on specific legislation can be more 
difficult, however, because it is hard for legislators to predict how the public will view 
specific narrow bills. Instead, politicians will focus on the liberal versus conservative 
“mood” of their constituents as most issues can be situated on this single dimension 
(Poole & Rosenthal 1997; Peterson et al. 2003; Nicholas-Crotty et al. 2009). However, 
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other research suggests that public opinion on some issues of politics and policy does not 
fit so neatly on a single dimension (Stimson 1999), and that citizens are capable of finer 
distinctions, beyond the ideological, when evaluating policies (Jacobs & Shapiro 2000).  
 For instance, some scholars argue that public opinion toward punitive criminal 
justice policies is stable and reluctant to change (Mooney & Lee 1999; 2000; Stimson 
2004). As Nicholson-Crotty et al. put it, “Because criminal justice policy is an area where 
the public exhibits stable and genuine opinions and are likely to use these considerations 
on election day, policy-makers are likely to be able to sense general attitudes about crime 
and punishment that are separate from broader preferences for more or less spending, and 
will adjust criminal justice policy in response to shifts in these attitudes” (2009, 631). 
 We know that many individuals have well-developed opinions on government 
spending. Jacoby (1994) examined public attitudes across a set of ten public policies and 
determined that citizens support spending on a wide range of social programs. He looked 
at program specific spending preferences – welfare versus non-welfare initiatives – and 
found that these represent two different components of public opinion toward 
government spending. In regards to welfare related programs, Jacoby determined that 
“government spending attitudes are responsive to most of the same factors that affect 
other political attitudes, such as party identification, ideology, etc.”; and when asked 
about spending in the abstract, “most citizens seem to translate the phrase ‘government 
spending’ into ‘government spending on programs that could benefit the poor, blacks, 
and other disadvantaged groups” (1994, 354). As a result, there is a significant level of 
public opposition to such spending. While Jacoby did not include services for crime 
victims in his analysis, one might surmise that individuals who are receptive to increased 
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government spending in the abstract would also support increased spending to serve 
victims of violent crime specifically. 
 Attitudes toward government spending are important to consider because, as I 
mentioned before, programs to address violence against women and assist survivors 
require substantial funding, and lawmakers often lack the political will to address social 
issues without public support. Morrow et al. (2004) examined Canadian spending and 
found a direct link between cuts in social entitlements and threats to women who are 
attempting to escape or evade sexual violence. The authors concluded that the 
“dismantling of the social welfare state alongside policy changes that are affecting how 
the state responds to violence against women is significantly undermining women’s 
equality, their safety, and the feminist anti-violence movement” (2004, 358). Survivors of 
sexual violence often depend upon social welfare benefits as they attempt to escape 
violent partners and rebuild their lives; budget cuts or decreased spending on social 
services erodes the capacity of women’s organizations to assist victims. Reductions in 
funding for health care, education, women’s shelters, grass roots feminist organizations, 
legal aid, and many other services including economic support, transportation, and 
childcare assistance make it difficult for victims to break the chains of violence. 
 Looking at budget cuts in Britain, Towers and Walby (2012) found that 
reductions in spending led to sharp declines in the number of victims that women’s 
shelters were able to accommodate, a decline in police and court services, a drop in 
programs available to educate perpetrators upon re-entry, and a steep reduction across a 
wide range of additional government funded services to assist victims of sexual violence. 
The authors warned, “There have been and continue to be significant cuts in the funds for 
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VAW services and services used in relation to VAW. These cuts in service provisions are 
expected to lead to increases in this violence” (2012, 40).  
4.4 Anti-Violence Values, Sexual Assault, and Rape 
An individual’s orientation toward violence should help shape their attitudes 
toward victims – and perpetrators – of sexual violence. Specifically, I expect that 
individuals who are averse to violence will sympathize more with victims, and advocate 
for more resources to assist survivors and decrease the frequency of these crimes in the 
United States. It is less clear, however, whether violence averse individuals would 
support harsh prison sentences for convicted rapists. For instance, violence averse 
individuals who for some reason doubt a victim’s claim that she was actually raped might 
consider a lengthy prison term for the “falsely accused” a form of violence. 
To empirically test the numerous hypotheses that I present in this chapter, I draw 
upon data from four unique surveys. Anti-violence values were assessed with the 
inductively specified scale presented in chapter 3 (see Table 4.4.1). Independent and 
dependent variables of interest are not uniform in all cases (sample A and B included the 
inferior deductive ant-violence scale) or across all survey samples, so findings are 
reported where available throughout the relevant subsections herein. Sample A 
administered pilot items, in online questionnaire form, to 221 students enrolled in an 
introductory American Government course at the University of Kentucky. Sample B 
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administered additional question items to 311 unique Mechanical Turk workers.6 Sample 
C included the seven-item anti-violence values measure which I produced using principal 
component analysis to narrow the range of violence related questions in the full honor 
beliefs battery to seven empirically identified items. This survey was administered to 
1,049 unique Mechanical Turk workers. Finally, sample D also included the inductive 
seven-item anti-violence values measure and was administered to 923 unique Mechanical 
Turk workers.7  
Table 4.4.1 | Survey Samples for Sexual Violence Analyses 8 
 
 
6 Deductive Scale: “An individual should not be afraid to fight”; “People should be expected to fight for 
themselves”; “You would want your child to stand up to bullies”; “A person who doesn’t ‘take any crap’ 
from anybody is an admirable reputation to have”; “It is a person’s responsibility to protect their family”; 
“If an individual is insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family should be their number one 
priority”. 
 
7 Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “It is important for a person to be tougher than other people”; A 
person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp”; You would praise a person who acted 
aggressively to an insult”; “Epstein did not kill himself”; “Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and 
acceptable”; “It is morally wrong for a person to walk away from a fight”; “A person who doesn’t take any 
crap from anybody is an admirable reputation to have”; and “Physical violence is the most admirable way 
to defend yourself”. 
 
8 Data for sample A, B, and C were collected for project entitled “How Attitudes toward Violence and Race 
Influence Public Policy Preferences”; University of Kentucky IRB approval # 16-0045-P45. Data for sample D 
was collected for project entitled “Violence Justifying Attitudes”; University of Kentucky IRB approval # 
50335.    
DEDUCTIVE INDUCTIVE
SURVEY DATE SAMPLE TYPE MHBS HBS ANTI-VIOLENCE ANTI-VIOLENCE
Sample A 4/21/2018 N = 221 Student Pilot O O P O
Sample B 5/11/2018 N = 311 M-Turk O O P O
Sample C 10/14/2019 N = 1049 M-Turk P P O P
Sample D 2/10/2020 N = 923 M-Turk O O O P
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 The anti-violence values short-scale that I created in chapter 3 does not impose 
gender expectations on respondents – it is comprised of question items directly measuring 
individuals’ rejection of violence broadly. Because female respondents scored 
significantly higher on this scale, compared to males in the previous chapter, I derive the 
following hypothesis: 
 H1a: “On average, females will score higher on anti-violence values when 
compared to males.” 
The correlational findings and regression analyses performed in chapter three 
provide other clues for how I might expect my inductively derived anti-violence values 
measure to perform. However, I have not yet examined the role of those values in 
shaping individual evaluations of specific acts of violence. In the current chapter, 
therefore, I present and empirically test several theories to explain not only perceptions of 
a victim of rape, but willingness to impose harsh punitive consequences upon her rapist.  
We know that negative stigmas are commonly placed upon victims of sexual 
violence, and because victims often fear that they will not be believed, many of these 
crimes go unreported. Extensive research (Lonsway & Fitzgerald 1994; Temkin 2010) 
suggests that rape myths, or false stereotypes about rapists and rape victims, can lead 
individuals to blame a victim of sexual violence, or at least question (her) honesty. 
Perhaps the most troubling of these falsehoods is the belief that women commonly or 
routinely lie about rape (Hayes et al. 2013). You will recall from chapter 3 that on 
average, respondents who reported a greater aversion to violence were significantly less 
likely to endorse rape myths. Because violence-averse individuals are significantly less 
likely to endorse prejudicial beliefs that cast doubt upon victims of sexual violence - and 
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more likely to sympathize with and support such victims - I derive the following 
hypotheses: 
H1b: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, 
on average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was raped.” 
H1c: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, 
on average, to support increased spending on policies and services, and to 
advocate for victims of sexual violence.”  
 While I expect that violence-averse individuals will be more likely to believe a 
victim’s rape claim, there will inevitably be some who question whether the rape actually 
occurred. Believing the victim’s claim is possibly the most obvious reason that 
individuals might recommend a lengthy prison term. Thus, the following hypothesis: 
H1d: “Respondents who believe the victim will be more likely, on average, to 
recommend a long prison sentence for (her) convicted rapist” 
Much of my focus in this chapter is on whether individuals who condemn 
violence are more likely to support public policies to assist victims and punish 
perpetrators. I expect that the answer is “yes”, in many cases violence-averse individuals 
will be significantly more likely to sympathize with, support, and demand justice for 
victims. However, I argue that violence-justifying ideologies have the power to dampen 
the effects of anti-violence sentiment. In the following pages I examine additional factors 
that should attenuate the otherwise positive effects of anti-violence values. When it 
comes to questions of sexual violence, two prejudicial belief systems (violence-justifying 
ideologies) warrant additional discussion. Rape myths and sexism can lead people to 
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excuse sexual violence and be hostile toward victims. Determination of the guilt of sexual 
predators, and the sentencing for their crimes are also influenced by these stereotypical 
beliefs (Satish 2016); I discuss each in more detail in the following sections. 
4.5 Rape Myth Acceptance 
 Researchers have long studied the underlying causes of rape to better understand 
its persistence in civil society (Lalumiere 2005). Negative attitudes toward victims help 
perpetuate rape, and rape myths enable a perpetrator to justify his/her behavior (Buddie 
and Miller 2001). These negative stereotypes and misinterpretations of victims (i.e. 
blaming the victim) have serious implications. Beyond the fact that they cause harmful 
psychological damage, these prejudicial attitudes can also bleed into public policy 
decisions (e.g. trial outcomes and rape-related services expenditures). Social scientists 
have examined the consequences predispositions using a variety of research designs 
including mock trials (Field 1978; Ellison and Munro 2009; Mazella and Feingold 1994), 
rape vignettes (Sundberg and Barbaree 1991; Malamuth and Check 1980), videotape and 
written scenarios (Sleed et al. 2002), and newspaper reports (Seligman et al. 1977).  
 Across these studies there is wide consensus that on average, men are more likely 
than women to blame victims of sexual assault and rape, and that victim attributes (e.g. 
sexual experience, level of resistance, clothing and dress etc.) influence individuals’ 
perceptions of victim credibility (Ward 1988). Such attitudes are in stark contrast to the 
message feminists have been working to advance for years. As Harding points out, “If the 
real crime of rape is the violation of another person’s autonomy, the use of another 
person’s body against their wishes, then it shouldn’t matter what the victim was wearing, 
if she was drinking, how much sexual experience she’s had before, or whether she fought 
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hard enough to get bruises on her knuckles and skin under her fingernails” (2015, 12). 
Based on these insights I derive the following hypotheses: 
H2a. “On average, males will score higher on rape myth acceptance when 
compared to females.” 
H2b. “Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, 
respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on 
average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was raped.” 
H2c. “Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, 
respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on 
average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist.” 
H2d. Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, 
respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on 
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual 
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.”  
4.6 Gender Stereotypes and Sexism 
 Glick and Fiske (1996) suggest that sexist attitudes include two positively 
associated components which, nevertheless, reflect opposite orientations toward women. 
Both sets of sexist attitudes produce negative perceptions of victims of sexual violence. 
The authors developed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) to measure hostile and 
benevolent sexism. While hostile sexism needs little explanation, they describe 
benevolent sexism as “a set of interrelated attitudes toward women that are sexist in terms 
of viewing women stereotypically and in restricted roles, but that are subjectively 
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positive in feeling tone (for the perceiver) and also tend to elicit behavior typically 
characterized as pro-social (e.g. helping) or intimacy-seeking (e.g. self-disclosure)” 
(491).  
 Chapleau et al. (2007) interviewed a sample of 420 college students to examine 
the effect of ambivalent sexism on rape myth acceptance. The authors found evidence 
that hostile sexism is associated with greater endorsement of rape myths, but benevolent 
sexism (when operationalized as a unitary construct) had no significant effect. However, 
the component of benevolent sexism focused on the belief that women are “refined” 
ladies was positively and significantly associated, which seems to indicate that when 
women violate this stereotype, they are perceived to be at least partially responsible for 
being attacked sexually. 
 Another study of men and women in Turkey and Brazil (Glick et al. 2002) honed 
on ambivalent sexism and attitudes about wife abuse. Again, both forms of sexism were 
demonstrated to positively correlate with attitudes legitimizing violence. Once more, 
benevolent sexism was unrelated to such attitudes when hostile sexism was controlled for 
in the model. The authors reasoned that “the ostensible protectiveness of benevolent 
sexism is contingent, failing to shield women from abuse if they are deemed to have 
challenged a husband’s authority or violated conventional gender roles” (Glick et al. 
2002, 292). Or as Harding puts it, “If the real crime of rape is sullying a pure woman with 
the filth and sin of sex – making her ‘damaged goods’ in the eyes of other men – then of 
course it matters whether she was a virgin, and what kind of situations she willingly “put 
herself” in, and whether she deliberately risked further physical injury to demonstrate her 
refusal” (2015, 12). 
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Important to the current discussion is the idea that “ambivalence may be evident 
in both an unconflicted form, in which different subtypes of women elicit either 
extremely negative reactions, as well as a conflicted form, in which particular female 
targets activate both hostile and benevolent motives” (Glick & Fiske 1996, 494). Thus, 
survey items attempting to tap benevolent sexism may suffer because they return positive 
responses for different reasons from different people: from hostile sexists because they 
seem to put a woman in her place, from others because they feel genuinely supportive or 
protective. In sum, research involving hostile and benevolent sexism (e.g. Sakalh 2007; 
Chapleau 2007) provides consistent support for the fact that higher levels of each produce 
negative attitudes toward rape victims, but numerous studies (Glick et al. 2002; Abrams 
et al. 2003; Sakalh 2007; and Chapleau et al. 2007) have found that benevolent sexism is 
not related to attitudes toward a victim once hostile sexism is included in the model. 
Based upon these studies, I derive the following hypotheses: 
H3a. “On average, males will score higher on both benevolent, and hostile sexism 
when compared to females.” 
H3b.  “Respondents who score higher on benevolent sexism will be more likely, on 
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual 
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence. However, benevolent 
sexism will no longer predict that support (or advocacy) once hostile sexism is 
controlled for in the model.”  
H3c.  “Respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on 
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual 
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.” 
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H3d: “Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score 
higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim 
that she was raped.” 
H3e.  “Because hostile sexists tend to blame victims, respondents who score higher 
on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison 
sentence for a convicted rapist.” 
H3f. “Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence 
values.  Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less 
likely, on average, to believe a rape claim.” 
H3g. “Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence 
values.  Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less 
likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist.” 
H3h. “Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence 
values.  Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less 
likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to 
address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.” 
4.7 Victim Characteristics 
Research suggests a tendency for people to believe that female victims of sexual 
violence are at least partially to blame for the attack (Muehlenhard 1988; Whatley 1996). 
A females clothing, character, and demeanor are examples of variables that shape some 
individuals’ impulse to blame her, rather than her assailant. And despite the fact that there 
is no longer a legal requirement that a female vigorously resist a male’s sexual attempts 
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in order to prove that she was raped, courts continue to evaluate victim resistance when 
judging two critical elements of rape – non-consent and force (Anderson 1998). In fact, 
several scholars have noted the importance of, and link between victim characteristics 
and juror decisions (Brownmiller 1975; Ellison et al. 2009) and found that rape trials are 
especially sensitive to the influence of extra-evidential factors.  
To test these hypotheses, I included a realistic experimental design for assessing 
the effect of victim characteristics on rape related opinion. In some of my samples 
respondents were asked whether they believed the victim’s rape claim, and in every 
survey, respondents were asked to place themselves in the role of a juror and recommend 
a prison sentence for a convicted rapist. Each unique survey also included items to assess 
respondents’ support for government spending on services to address sexual violence and 
assist victims. Participants were randomly assigned to either a control, or one of two 
treatment conditions which varied the characteristics and behaviors of a rape victim prior 
to, and after her attack. In the “Control” condition, very little information about the 
victim or her behavior was provided. In the “Non-Precipitory” condition, respondents 
heard about a “moral” victim who was portrayed as cautious, doing everything possible 
not only to avoid, but to resist her assailant. Finally, those who received the “Precipitory” 
condition were presented with a victim who might be viewed as overly accommodating 
and minimally resistant to her assailant.  
This experimental manipulation allowed me to establish the causal effect of 
victim characteristics and behaviors on belief in that victim and willingness to impose a 
harsh sentence upon her rapist, among other sexual violence related questions of interest. 
Random assignment is often used to study the effects of issue framing and priming 
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(Iyengar et al. 1984; Kinder 1998; Druckman 2004) and, in the present analysis, any 
differences between the treatment groups can be directly attributed to the victim’s 
characteristics and behavior, all else equal. Based on prior research assessing extra-
evidentiary considerations common to rape cases, I derived the following hypotheses: 
H4a: “Respondents presented with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment will be more 
likely, on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented the 
control.” 
H4b: “Respondents presented with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment will be more 
likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison sentence when compared to 
those presented the control.” 
H4c: “Respondents presented with the “Precipitory” treatment will be less likely, 
on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented the control.” 
H4d: “Respondents presented with the “Precipitory” treatment will be less likely, 
on average, to recommend a longer prison sentence when compared to those 
presented the control.” 
4.8 Data and Measurements 
To test my hypotheses, I administered two pilot surveys. The first was an online 
questionnaire to students enrolled in an introductory American Government course at the 
University of Kentucky (N = 221); the second was an online questionnaire to a small 
sample of Mechanical Turk workers (N = 311) which prior research (Berinsky et al. 
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2012) concludes is acceptable for peer-reviewed projects.9 Having gained valuable 
insights from those pilots, I composed additional question items and fielded two novel 
large sample surveys (N = 1,049; N = 923) via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. As 
noted earlier, independent and dependent variables of interest are not uniform in all cases 
or across all survey samples, so findings are reported where available and when 
appropriate.  
I controlled for the effects of variables common to most empirical analyses in the 
social sciences including individuals’ age, biological sex, education, income, marital 
status, and political ideology. Based on prior research, I also included several items 
which should be useful in characterizing individuals and their views of rape, or that might 
influence attitudes toward victims, perpetrators, and policies to address sexual violence. 
Following Jacoby (2000) I included a control for attitudes toward government spending 
which asked respondents to place themselves on a continuum between the following 
positions: 0 “Government should provide many fewer services, reduce spending a lot”, 
and 10 “Government should provide many more services, increase spending a lot”.10 
This is a crucial control variable; it is likely that some individuals who sympathize with 
victims of sexual violence, nevertheless, broadly oppose increases in government 
spending.  
 
9 Berinsky et al. (2012) examined the benefits, and potential limitations of using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk web-based platform for subject recruitment in Political Science Research. They found that the 
demographic characteristics of Mechanical Turk workers are more representative than student, or other 
convenience samples often used in Political Science research. When the authors used Mechanical Turk 
samples to replicate previous experimental studies, they found that the average treatment effects were 
very similar. In sum, the authors argue that the potential limitations to Mechanical Turk samples – 
including subject attentiveness and the prevalence of repeat survey-takers – are not much of a problem in 
practice.  
10 The measure for government spending preferences was included in sample A, B, and D. 
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In Sample D, I included a control for authoritarianism, a set of beliefs scholars 
have long struggled to measure. Adorno et al. (1950) developed the original F-scale 
(fascism) to measure the authoritarian personality. This scale was not always reliable in 
its time and is now considered conceptually obsolete. The most popular measure today is 
Altemeyer’s Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale (Altemeyer 1981; 1988, 1996). 
However, critics argue that the RWA confounds social conservatism and 
authoritarianism, and that the attitudes the scale was designed to assess are often very 
similar to the dependent variables it is used to predict (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005).11  
Following Hetherington et al. (2011) I used the four-item authoritarianism index 
which asks respondents to indicate which of two positive traits is most important for a 
child to have: “respect for elders” versus “independence”; “obedience” versus “self-
reliance”; “curiosity” versus “good manners”; and “being considerate” versus “being 
well-behaved”. As the authors point out, these values are “fairly well-divorced from 
political ideology and attitudes; therefore, the measure is unlikely to be conflated with 
social conservatism and is easily distinguishable from the dependent variables” (551).  
In samples C and D respondents’ level of aversion to violence was examined 
using the inductively derived anti-violence measure.12 Recall that principal component 
analysis in Chapter 3 produced a 7-item attitudes toward violence factor (Eigenvalue = 
1.85) which was comprised mostly of question items from what Saucier et al. (2016) 
 
11 Only sample D includes the authoritarianism scale. 
12 Sample C includes (N=526) rather than (N=1,049). This is because half of those surveyed in that batch 
were randomly assigned to receive the Masculine Honor Beliefs (MHBS) scale (Saucier et al. 2016) and 
were excluded. Data from the full sample are reported whenever possible. 
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identified as the “virtue” and “pride” subscales of their 35-item honor beliefs battery.13 
These seven items tap either the belief that individuals should maintain a no-nonsense 
reputation, or that violence is often acceptable if not required. These also happened to be 
the least popular question items which suggests that most individuals do not condone 
violence. Respondents reported their agreement with these statements on seven-point 
scales ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”, and the scale was then 
recoded so that higher scores indicated a greater aversion to violence. 
Sex Differences: 
Recall H1a, that “On average, females will score higher on anti-violence values 
when compared to males”. An independent t-test was run on each dataset to determine if 
there were differences in the endorsement of anti-violence values based upon the 
respondent’s biological sex. H1a was fully supported and is visually displayed in Figure 
4.8.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
13 The deductively derived scale administered in sample A and B proved inferior to the inductively 
derived version administered in sample C and D and is, I suspect, not really capturing attitudes toward 
violence. Some question items (e.g. “It is a person’s responsibility to protect their family”; “If an individual 
is insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family should be their number one priority”) are 
likely not related to individuals’ orientation toward violence. Results from sample A and B are omitted. 
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Figure 4.8.1 | Anti-Violence Values, by Sex 
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Females, on average, scored significantly higher on anti-violence values when compared 
to males in sample C and D.  
Respondents’ endorsement of rape myths was assessed using a truncated, 7-item 
version of the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale Short Form (IRMA-SF) developed 
by Payne et al. (1999). The original IRMA-SF is a 20-item questionnaire that taps 
respondents’ agreement with common rape myths. The scale was designed to incorporate 
issues that fall under a number of subscales (i.e. “she asked for it”, “it wasn’t really rape”, 
“he didn’t mean to”, “she wanted it”, “she lied”, and “rape is a trivial event”).14  
Sex Differences 
 Recall H2a, that “On average, males will score higher on rape myth acceptance 
when compared to females”. An independent t-test was run on each dataset to determine 
if there were differences in the endorsement of rape myths based upon the respondent’s 
biological sex across each of the four datasets and is visually displayed in Figure 4.8.2.  
 
 
14 Truncated Rape Myth Acceptance Scale: "When it comes to sexual contacts, women expect men to 
take the lead"; "A lot of women strongly complain about sexual infringements for no real reason, just to 
feel emancipated"; "Interpreting harmless gestures as sexual harassment is a popular weapon in the 
battle of the sexes"; "If a woman invites a man to her home for a cup of coffee after a night out, this 
means that she wants to have sex"; "Any woman who is careless enough to walk alone through dark alleys 
at night is at least partly to blame if she is raped"; "Many women tend to misinterpret a well-meant 
gesture as a sexual assault"; and "Alcohol is often the culprit when a man rapes a woman". 
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Figure 4.8.2 | Rape Myth Acceptance 
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Males, on average, scored significantly higher on rape myth acceptance when compared 
to males in sample A, B, C, and D.15 
Respondents’ endorsement of sexist stereotypes was assessed using the 
Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) developed by Glick and Fiske (1996). The ASI is a 
22-item questionnaire which asks respondents to agree or disagree, on a seven-point scale 
ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with sexist attitudes toward 
women.16 These question items were used to create two distinct 11-item scales 
measuring hostile and benevolent sexism respectfully. 
 
Sex Differences 
Recall H3a, that “On average, males will score higher on both benevolent, and 
hostile sexism when compared to females.”. An independent t-test was run on each 
dataset to determine if there were differences in the scores on either benevolent, or hostile 
sexism based upon the respondent’s biological sex.17 H3a was supported across each of 
 
15 Rape Myth Acceptance 
Sample A: (t = 7.38, with 219 degrees of freedom, p < .001)  
Sample B: (t = 3.34, with 317 degrees of freedom, p < .001) 
Sample C: (t = 6.45, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001) 
Sample D: (t = 6.47, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001) 
16 Sample “A” and Sample “B” included a nine-point scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly 
Agree”. 
17 Benevolent Sexism 
Sample A: (t = 2.98, with 219 degrees of freedom, p < .001) 
Sample B: (t = 2.03, with 309 degrees of freedom, p < .05) 
Sample C: (t = 5.36, with 1047 degrees of freedom, p < .001) 
Sample D: (t = 5.15, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001) 
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the four datasets for both forms of sexism and is visually displayed in the Figures 4.8.3 
and 4.8.4 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hostile Sexism 
Sample A: (t = 7.39, with 219 degrees of freedom, p < .001) 
Sample B: (t = 3.07, with 309 degrees of freedom, p < .001) 
Sample C: (t = 7.52, with 1047 degrees of freedom, p < .001) 
Sample D: (t = 8.32, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001) 
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Figure 4.8.3 | Benevolent Sexism 
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Figure 4.8.3 | Benevolent Sexism (Continued) 
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Figure 4.8.4 | Hostile Sexism 
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Figure 4.8.4 | Hostile Sexism (Continued) 
4.9 Dependent Variables 
99 
If you recall, respondents were randomly assigned to either a baseline condition 
with very little information about the victim, or one of two treatment conditions varying 
victim characteristics and behavior. Each of these rape case treatments is included in 
“Appendix A”, with altered language in bold italics.    
I then asked respondents about a range of sexual violence-related topics of 
interest. The first two items measured the effect of a victim’s characteristics and behavior 
on respondents’ evaluations in their role as a juror in a rape trial, including whether they 
believe the rape occurred, and the number of years in prison they believe the convicted 
rapist should serve (5-50).18 Respondents were also asked whether they would support 
increases in government spending for services and policies to assist victims of sexual 
violence – and whether they would donate materials or volunteer personal time to 
advocate for victims.19  
4.10 Empirical Results – Belief in a Victim’s Rape Claim 
Drawing on data from survey sample C (N = 1,049) I conducted a one-way 
between subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondent’s 
belief that the reported rape actually occurred. There was a significant effect of 
characteristics on belief at the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 
1,047) = 105.67, p = 0.00]. 
18 Sample C and D included the item measuring respondents’ belief that the rape occurred, while sample 
A, B, C, and D each included the item asking how many years in prison respondents would impose at 
sentencing. 
19 Sample B, C, and D included items measuring support for increased government funding. Sample C and 
D included additional items measuring willingness to actively advocate for or donate resources to victims. 
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Because I found a statistically significant result , I computed a Tukey post hoc test 
to compare each of my conditions against every other condition.20 Post hoc comparisons 
indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 6.2, SD = 1.1) and baseline (M 
= 5.2, SD = 1.4) groups differed significantly at p < .05; the mean score for the 
precipitory (M = 4.7, SD = 1.7) and baseline groups differed significantly at p < .05, and 
the difference in means for the precipitory and non-precipitory groups also achieved 
statistical significance at p < .05. This provides support for H4a. “Respondents presented 
with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment will be more likely, on average, to believe the 
victim when compared to those presented the control.” (Table 4.10.1). 
Table 4.10.1 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions   
 
 
 
20 The Tukey's honestly significant difference test (Tukey's HSD) is used to test differences among sample 
means for significance. The Tukey's HSD tests all pairwise differences while controlling the probability of 
making one or more Type I errors.  
Belief in Victim
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Prob > F
Between Groups 428.76 2.00 214.38 105.67 0.00
Within Groups 2122.11 1047.00 2.03
Total 2550.86 1049.00 2.43
Group Means
N Mean SD
Baseline 322 5.20 1.37
Non-Precipitory 341 6.20 1.09
Precipitory 386 4.70 1.69
Total 1049 5.30 1.56
Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)
Differences in Means
Contrast Std. Err. ᵼ p > |ᵼ| Lower Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline 0.97 0.11 8.79 0.00 0.73 1.23
Precipitory v. Baseline -0.56 0.11 -5.17 0.00 -0.81 -0.30
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory -1.53 0.11 -14.44 0.00 -1.78 -1.28
Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)
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Turning to data from survey sample D (N = 923) I conducted a one-way between 
subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondent’s belief 
that the reported rape actually occurred. There was a significant effect of characteristics 
on belief at the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 921) = 139.78, 
p = 0.00]. 
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 
6.3, SD = 1.2) and baseline (M = 5.1, SD = 1.5) groups differed significantly at p < .05; 
the mean score for the precipitory (M = 4.3, SD = 1.7) and baseline groups differed 
significantly at p < .05, and the difference in means for the precipitory and non-
precipitory groups also achieved statistical significance at p < .05. This provides 
additional support for H4a. “Respondents presented with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment 
will be more likely, on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented 
the control.” (Table 4.10.2). 
Table 4.10.2 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions   
 
 
Belief in Victim
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Prob > F
Between Groups 590.04 2.00 295.02 139.78 0.00
Within Groups 1941.84 921.00 2.11
Total 2531.88 923.00 2.75
Group Means
N Mean SD
Baseline 313 5.10 1.47
Non-Precipitory 322 6.29 1.16
Precipitory 288 4.34 1.70
Total 923 5.28 1.66
Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)
Differences in Means
Contrast Std. Err. ᵼ p > |ᵼ| Lower Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline 1.19 0.12 10.29 0.00 0.92 1.46
Precipitory v. Baseline -0.76 0.12 -6.39 0.00 -1.04 -0.48
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory -1.95 0.12 -16.51 0.00 -2.22 -1.67
Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)
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Next, I included a control for the respondents’ biological sex. In survey sample C, 
females were significantly more likely to believe the victim’s rape claim in the “Control” 
condition (F =  3.82, p = 0.05); and the “Non-Precipitory” treatment (F = 22.71, p = 
0.00); but only slightly  significantly more likely than males to believe the victim’s rape 
claim when given the  “Precipitory” treatment (F = 3.26, p = 0.07).21 Taken together, 
females were more likely, on average, to take a non-descript victim of rape, or a victim 
who came across as someone who did nothing to contribute to her attack at her word. 
However, females were only slightly significantly different than males in their 
assessment of a victim who appeared “careless” or somehow “complacent” in her own 
attack. 
In survey sample D, females were significantly more likely to believe the victim’s 
rape claim in the “Control” condition (F = 6.45, p = 0.01), the “Non-Precipitory” 
condition (F = 17.55, p = 0.00), and the “Precipitory” condition (F = 7.87, p = 0.00). In 
sum, females were significantly more likely, on average, to accept a rape claim– 
regardless of the victim’s characteristics or behavior – when compared to males. In both 
survey samples H4a “Respondents presented with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment will 
be more likely, on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented the 
control” was supported. Comparisons of means, by biological sex are presented in Figure 
4.10.1below. 
 
 
21 If respondents do not believe the victim, it’s not a result of how she behaved prior to the attack, but 
whether they think it really was an attack.  Presumably they’re using precipitory behaviors to help them 
infer whether she might have had a consensual interest that’s only afterward being ignored to pretend 
what happened was an attack. The effect size was bigger than for the control – fewer in the category may 
have caused the significance to be less. 
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Figure 4.10.1 | Belief in a Rape Victim 
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Multiple-Regression Models 
 In the previous analysis I was able to demonstrate that, on average, individuals 
base much of their belief in victims of sexual violence on the victim’s personal 
characteristics and behavior both before and after the rape transpires. When a victim 
conforms to traditional gender expectations (e.g. does not live with a romantic partner out 
of wedlock), when it is clear that she was cautious not to put herself in danger (e.g. does 
not allow a stranger into her home to use the telephone), when there is evidence that she 
fought fiercely to prevent being violated (e.g. physical evidence of a struggle), and when 
she reports the incident to law enforcement immediately, both males and females are 
more likely to believe the victim’s claim that she was raped. On the other hand, when a 
victim does not conform to traditional gender expectations when it appears that she put 
herself at unnecessary risk of danger, when there is no physical evidence that she put up 
fierce resistance, and when she does not report the incident to law enforcement 
immediately both males and females are less likely to believe that the victim was actually 
raped.  
 Thus far I have examined differences in individuals’ belief in a victim based upon 
her characteristics and behavior – controlling for respondents’ biological sex – but absent 
any additional covariates. I now turn to testing the additional hypotheses presented 
throughout this chapter. Specifically, H2b: “Because individuals who endorse rape myths 
tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will 
be less likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was raped”; and H3d: 
“Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on 
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hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was 
raped.” 
 My overarching argument throughout this project is that violence-justifying 
ideologies (primarily sexism in the current analysis) should cancel out the normatively 
positive outcomes that individuals’ aversion to violence might otherwise produce. 
Assessing the attitudes that help determine individuals’ belief in a rape victim provides 
the first opportunity to empirically test my theory. Specifically, H3f: “Hostile sexism will 
attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values.  Violence-averse 
individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to believe a 
rape claim.” Sample C and D included the question item assessing respondents’ belief in 
the victim’s claim that she was raped. 
 
Mechanical Turk Sample C 
In order to test my hypotheses, I estimated six models. My key independent 
variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the 11-item measure of hostile 
sexism. To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about women on the predictive power 
of individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between hostile 
sexism and anti-violence values. I expect hostile sexism to produce negative signs: the 
more sexist a respondent is, the less likely they will be to believe the victim. Anti-
violence values should produce positive signs: the more a respondent abhors violence, the 
more likely they will be to believe the victim. My key hypothesis, however, is that 
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interacting these variables will have an attenuating effect; as sexism increases, the 
normatively positive force of anti-violence values will diminish.  
I also included numerous control variables including victim characteristics 
(Control/Non-Precipitory/Precipitory), age, education, income, biological sex, marital 
status, political ideology (conservatism), and rape myth acceptance. I used multiple 
regression to estimate relationships in each of these models, and the results are reported 
below in Table 4.10.3.  
In the fully specified model (Model 6) we see that victim characteristics and 
behavior continue to have a strong impact on whether respondents believe the victim’s 
rape claim. Those given the “Non-Precipitory” treatment were significantly more likely 
(+0.99) than those in the “Control” condition to accept the rape claim, all else equal. 
Respondents given the “Precipitory” treatment were significantly less likely (-0.53) than 
those in the “Control” condition to believe the victim, all else equal. Respondents 
reporting higher levels of education were also significantly more likely to believe the 
victim. For every one unit increase in education respondents scored higher (+0.14) on 
belief, all else equal. Females were significantly more likely to believe the victim (+0.40) 
when compared to men, all else equal.  
Model 6 provides support for H1b: “Individuals who score higher on anti-violence 
values will be more likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was raped”. 
For every one unit increase in anti-violence values respondents were, on average, more 
likely to believe the victim (+0.34), all else equal. The model does not provide support 
for H2b: Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, 
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respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to 
believe a victim’s claim that she was raped. 
 The relationship does go in the expected direction; for every one unit increase in 
rape-myth acceptance respondents were, on average, less likely to believe the victim (-
.13), but the coefficient did not achieve significance.22  I found this particular result 
highly counterintuitive; if rape myths do not independently predict belief in a rape claim, 
what does? It looks as though these two things do: hostile sexism and anti-violence 
values. I suspect that hostility to women prevents respondents from developing the 
sympathy toward a potential rape victim that anti-violence values normally generate, such 
that it works only among respondents who score low on hostile sexism. 
As expected, H3d: “Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims, 
respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe 
a victim’s claim that she was raped” was supported. For every one unit increase in 
hostile sexism respondents were, on average, significantly less likely to believe the victim 
(-.13) all else equal.  
My key hypothesis was fully supported, H3f. “Hostile sexism will attenuate the 
normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are 
hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to believe a rape claim.” The 
 
22 This non-finding may be a result of my using a 7-item truncated version of the original 20-item rape 
myth battery. 
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estimates of the anti-violence slope decrease as function of hostile sexism.23 For 
example, at the lowest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence values slope is at (+0.24), 
and at the highest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence values slope is at (-0.38), a 
decrease of (-0.62). For every one unit increase in hostile sexism, the anti-violence values 
slope decreases by (-0.10). What we are likely seeing here is that the power of hostile 
sexism is greatest in the case when the respondent is on the high end of anti-violence 
values; not only do we have the general ill effect of hostility to women, the potential 
victim also loses the sympathy that otherwise accompanies anti-violence values.  Perhaps 
this is because respondents are focused on the bad (violent) things that will happen to the 
accused if wrongly convicted. That said, the interpretation of interactive effects can be 
challenging. To visually display the impact of this interaction term I created a graph of 
the adjusted means placing hostile sexism on the x-axis with separate graphs for “low”, 
“medium”, and “high” levels of anti-violence values (See Figure 4.10.2). 
 
 
23 I tested to see whether the interaction was significant across all three of my experimental treatment 
conditions. In the baseline group, the interaction term was statistically significant at p < 0.10, and the 
coefficient was in the expected direction (-0.12). In the non-precipitory group, the interaction term did 
not achieve statistical significance. Finally, in the precipitory group, the interaction term was significant at 
p < 0.10, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (-0.13). 
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Table 4.10.3 | Explaining Belief in a Victim’s Rape Claim - Survey C (N=526) 
MODEL 5 MODEL 6
Victim Condition
Non-Precipitory 0.985 *** 1 *** 0.997 *** 0.991 *** 0.993 *** 0.987 ***
(0.107) (0.155) (0.155) (0.151) (0.152) (0.135)
Precipitory        -0.571 ***        -0.541 ***        -0.541 ***        -0.530 ***        -0.530 ***        -0.528 ***
(0.104) (0.144) (0.144) (0.141) (0.141) (0.147)
Age 0.007 ** 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Education 0.059 * 0.183 *** 0.176 *** 0.137 *** 0.143 *** 0.142 ***
(0.035) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.053)
Income 0.018 0.035 0.033 0.036 0.034 0.034
(0.016) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Female 0.355 *** 0.487 *** 0.479 *** 0.38 *** 0.373 *** 0.404 ***
(0.087) (0.129) (0.129) (0.128) (0.128) (0.135)
Married -0.169 * -0.083 -0.173 -0.146 -0.148 -0.163
(0.094) (0.132) (0.132) (0.130) (0.130) (0.132)
Conservatism -0.178 *** -0.131 *** -0.118 *** -0.062       -0.060       -0.048
(0.026) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045)
Anti-Violence 0.107 * 0.074 -0.034 -0.051 0.345 *
(0.060) (0.064) (0.068) (0.069) (0.179)
Benevolent Sexism -0.074 -0.042 -0.026 -0.004
(0.053) (0.052) (0.053) (0.057)
Hostile Sexism -0.256 *** -0.191 *** -0.486 ***
(0.057) (0.072) (0.146)
Rape Myth -0.123 -0.134
(0.084) (0.091)
Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence -0.103 ***
(0.044)
Adj. R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.29
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1 Mechanical Turk Sample C (N = 526)
MODEL 4MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
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Figure 4.10.2 | Predictive Margins Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence - Survey C 
 
I also tested to see whether the interaction was significant across all three of my 
experimental treatment conditions. In the baseline group, the interaction term was 
statistically significant at p < 0.10, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (-
0.12). In the non-precipitory group, the interaction term did not achieve statistical 
significance. Finally, in the precipitory group, the interaction term was significant at p < 
0.10, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (-0.13) (Figure 4.10.3 – 4.10.5). 
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Figure 4.10.3 | Predictive Margins for Control Group 
 
Figure 4.10.4 | Predictive Margins for Non-Precipitory Condition 
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Figure 4.10.5 | Predictive Margins for Precipitory Condition 
 
 
Mechanical Turk Survey Sample D 
In survey Sample D, authoritarianism was added as a control variable. I 
performed multiple regression analysis to estimate relationships in each of my models, 
and the results are reported below in Table 4.10.4. 
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Table 4.10.4 | Explaining Belief in a Victim’s Rape Claim - Survey D (N=923) 
MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7
Victim Condition
Non-Precipitory 1.207 *** 1.217 *** 1.219 *** 1.219 *** 1.206 *** 1.184 *** 1.19 ***
(0.112) (0.114) (0.110) (0.110) (0.108) (0.108) (0.100)
Precipitory        -0.749 ***        -0.764 ***        -0.789 ***        -0.789 ***        -0.833 ***        -0.835 ***        -0.824 ***
(0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.111) (0.111) (0.118)
Age 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.091 *** 0.076 ** 0.083 ** 0.083 ** 0.051 0.054 0.052
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039)
Income 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.003
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Female 0.484 *** 0.482 *** 0.411 *** 0.411 *** 0.272 *** 0.261 *** 0.276 ***
(0.096) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.111) (0.100)
Married -0.088 -0.082 -0.078 -0.078 -0.053 -0.059 -0.064
(0.101) (0.101) (0.110) (0.110) (0.098) (0.097) (0.098)
Conservatism -0.054 *** -0.039 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 ***       -0.004       -0.004       -0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111)
Authoritarianism -0.548 *** -0.463 *** -0.462 *** -0.336 *** -0.328 *** -0.331 **
(0.141) (0.142) (0.150) (0.147) (0.147) (0.153)
Anti-Violence          0.174 *** 0.174 *** 0.042 0.006 0.34 **
(0.047) (0.049) (0.052) (0.054) (0.137)
Benevolent Sexism -0.002 -0.022 0.037 0.061
(0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050)
Hostile Sexism -0.325 *** -0.228 *** -0.455 ***
(0.048) (0.063) (0.109)
Rape Myth -0.161 *** -0.177 **
(0.067) (0.075)
Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence -0.089 ***
(0.035)
Adj. R2 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.3 0.33 0.34 0.35
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1    Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)
MODEL 4MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
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In the fully specified model (Model 7) we see that victim characteristics and 
behavior have a strong impact on whether respondents will believe the victim’s rape 
claim. Those given the “Non-Precipitory” treatment were, on average, significantly more 
likely (+1.19) than those in the “Control” condition to believe the victim, all else equal. 
Respondents given the “Precipitory” treatment were significantly less likely (-0.82) than 
those in the “Control” condition to believe the victim, all else equal. This time around, 
respondents reporting higher levels of education were no more likely to believe the 
victim. Females were significantly more likely to believe the victim (+0.28), on average, 
when compared to men. Finally, respondents who scored higher on authoritarianism were 
significantly less likely (-0.33) to believe the victim, all else equal.  
Model 7 provides additional support for H1b: “Respondents who score higher on 
anti-violence values will be more likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim that she 
was raped.” For every one unit increase in anti-violence values respondents were, on 
average, more likely to believe the victim (+0.34), all else equal. The model also provides 
support for H2b: “Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt 
victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on 
average, to believe a victim’s claim that she was raped.” For every one unit increase in 
rape myth acceptance respondents were, on average, less likely to believe the victim (-
0.08). H3e: “Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score 
higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim’s claim that 
she was raped” was supported. For every one unit increase in hostile sexism respondents 
were significantly less likely to believe the victim (-.46) all else equal. Finally, my key 
hypothesis was fully supported, H3f. “Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively 
 
115 
 
         
positive force of anti-violence values.  Violence-averse individuals who are hostile 
toward females will be less likely, on average, to believe a rape claim.” 
The estimates of the anti-violence slope decrease as a function of hostile sexism. 
For example, at the lowest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence slope is at (+0.25), 
and at the highest level the slope is at (-0.28), a decrease of (-0.53). For every one unit 
increase in hostile sexism, the anti-violence slope decreases by (-0.09). To visually 
display the impact of this interaction term I created a graph of the adjusted means placing 
hostile sexism on the x-axis with separate graphs for “low”, “medium”, and “high” levels 
of anti-violence (See Figure 4.10.6). 
Figure 4.10.6 | Predictive Margins Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence - Survey D  
 
I also tested to see whether the interaction was significant across each of my 
experimental treatment conditions. In the baseline group, the interaction term was 
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statistically significant at p < 0.05, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (-
0.14). In the non-precipitory group, and the precipitory group, the interaction term 
coefficient did not achieve statistical significance (See Figure 4.10.7 – 4.10.9). 
Figure 4.10.7 | Predictive Margins for Control Group 
 
Figure 4.10.8 | Predictive Margins for Non-Precipitory Condition 
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Figure 4.10.9 | Predictive Margins for Precipitory Condition 
 
 In this section, I found strong support for my theory that violence-justifying 
ideologies (hostile sexism specifically) have the power to cancel out the normatively 
positive outcomes that individuals’ aversion of violence would otherwise produce. To 
assess the effect of negative stereotypes about women on the predictive power of 
individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between hostile sexism 
and anti-violence values. In samples C and D, as expected, hostile sexism produced 
negative coefficients: the more sexist a respondent was, the less likely they were to 
believe the victim. Anti-violence values also performed as expected; they produced 
positive signs: the more violence averse an individual is, the more likely they were to 
believe the victim. Most importantly, my key hypothesis – which speaks to my 
underlying theory of violence – was that interacting these variables would produce a 
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negative sign: as sexism increased, the normatively positive force of anti-violence values 
diminished. 
 
4.11 Empirical Results – Prison Sentence for a Convicted Rapist 
Drawing on data from survey sample A (N = 221) I conducted a one-way between 
subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents’ 
recommended prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of 
characteristics on belief at the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 
219) = 11.52, p = 0.00]. 
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 
22.5, SD = 12.9) and baseline (M = 15.7, SD = 11.5) groups differed significantly at p < 
.05. The mean score for the precipitory (M = 14.2, SD = 8.8) and baseline groups, 
however, were not significantly different. Finally, the difference in means for the 
precipitory and non-precipitory groups was statistically significant at p < .05. 
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Table 4.11.1 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions 
 
 
Turning to data from survey sample B (N = 312) I conducted a one-way between 
subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents’ 
recommended prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of 
characteristics on belief at the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 
309) = 11.06, p = 0.00]. 
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 
24.3, SD = 13.9) and baseline (M = 19.6, SD = 13.6) groups differed significantly at p < 
.05. The mean score for the precipitory (M = 15.8, SD = 10.9) and baseline groups, 
however, were not significantly different. Finally, the difference in means for the 
precipitory and non-precipitory groups was statistically significant at p < .05. 
 
 
Recommended Prison Time
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Prob > F
Between Groups 2796.43 2.00 1398.21 11.52 0.00
Within Groups 26461.69 219.00 121.38
Total 29258.12 221.00 132.94
Group Means
N Mean SD
Baseline 71 15.69 11.45
Non-Precipitory 66 22.54 12.96
Precipitory 84 14.21 8.75
Total 221 17.18 11.53
Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=221)
Differences in Means
Contrast Std. Err. ᵼ p > |ᵼ| Lower Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline 6.86 1.88 3.64 0.00 2.41 11.30
Precipitory v. Baseline -1.48 1.78 -0.83 0.68 -5.67 2.72
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory -8.33 1.81 -4.60 0.00 -12.61 -4.05
Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=221)
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Table 4.11.2 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions 
 
 
For survey sample C (N = 1,049) I conducted a one-way between subjects 
ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents’ recommended 
prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of characteristics on belief at 
the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 1,047) = 25.06, p = 0.00]. 
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 
20.6, SD = 13.4) and baseline (M = 15.6, SD = 11.7) groups differed significantly at p < 
.05. The mean score for the precipitory (M = 14.3, SD = 12.5) and baseline groups did not 
differ significantly, but the difference in means for the precipitory and non-precipitory 
groups was statistically significant at p < .05. 
 
 
Recommended Prison Time
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Prob > F
Between Groups 3676.21 2.00 1838.10 11.06 0.00
Within Groups 51336.26 309.00 166.14
Total 55012.46 311.00 176.89
Group Means
N Mean SD
Baseline 106 19.56 13.56
Non-Precipitory 101 24.27 13.99
Precipitory 105 15.81 10.94
Total 312 19.81 13.30
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=312)
Differences in Means
Contrast Std. Err. ᵼ p > |ᵼ| Lower Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline 4.71 1.79 2.63 0.02 0.48 8.93
Precipitory v. Baseline -3.75 1.77 -2.12 0.09 -7.92 0.42
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory -8.46 1.80 -4.70 0.00 -12.71 -4.22
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=312)
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Table 4.11.3 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions 
 
 
Finally, turning to data from survey sample D (N = 923) I conducted a one-way 
between subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents’ 
recommended prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of 
characteristics on belief at the p < 0.05 level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 
921) = 63.23, p = 0.00]. 
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 
24.1, SD = 14.0) and baseline (M = 16.2, SD = 13.2) groups differed significantly at p < 
.05; the mean score for the precipitory (M = 12.8, SD = 10.8) and baseline groups 
differed significantly at p < .05, and the difference in means for the precipitory and non-
precipitory groups also achieved statistical significance at p < .05. 
 
Recommended Prison Time
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Prob > F
Between Groups 7882.62 2.00 3941.31 25.06 0.00
Within Groups 164525.40 1047.00 157.29
Total 172408.02 1049.00 164.51
Group Means
N Mean SD
Baseline 322 15.64 11.67
Non-Precipitory 341 20.61 13.39
Precipitory 386 14.25 12.47
Total 1049 16.74 12.83
Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)
Differences in Means
Contrast Std. Err. ᵼ p > |ᵼ| Lower Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline 4.96 0.97 5.09 0.00 2.68 7.25
Precipitory v. Baseline -1.39 0.95 -1.47 0.30 -3.62 0.83
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory -6.36 0.93 -6.82 0.00 -8.55 -4.17
Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)
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Table 4.11.4 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions 
 
 
Next, I examined differences based on the respondents’ biological sex. In survey 
sample A, females were significantly no different than males in proposed sentence length 
in the “Control” condition (F =  3.51, p = 0.07); but did propose significantly more years 
imprisonment in the “Non-Precipitory” group (F = 12.90, p = 0.00); yet were 
significantly no different from males in terms of proposed sentence in the  “Precipitory” 
group (F = 0.00, p = 0.98). In sum, females were more likely, on average, to propose a 
longer sentence when the victim was cautious, when she resisted her assailant, and when 
she immediately reported the assault to law enforcement, compared to men. However, 
females did not propose significantly longer sentences when the victim was non-descript, 
or when the victim could be seen as “careless” or somehow “complacent” in her attack. 
In survey sample B, females were significantly no different than males in 
recommended sentence length in the “Control” condition (F = 2.85, p = 0.09); the “Non-
Recommended Prison Time
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Prob > F
Between Groups 20671.01 2.00 10335.51 63.23 0.00
Within Groups 150390.33 921.00 163.47
Total 171061.34 923.00 185.53
Group Means
N Mean SD
Baseline 313 16.17 13.18
Non-Precipitory 322 24.06 13.98
Precipitory 288 12.78 10.79
Total 923 17.87 13.62
Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)
Differences in Means
Contrast Std. Err. ᵼ p > |ᵼ| Lower Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline 7.88 1.01 7.77 0.00 5.50 10.27
Precipitory v. Baseline -3.39 1.04 -3.25 0.00 -5.84 -0.94
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory -11.27 1.04 -10.87 0.00 -13.71 -8.84
Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)
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Precipitory” group (F = 1.34, p = 0.25); or the “Precipitory” group (F = 1.17, p = 0.19). 
Overall, females were no more likely, on average, to propose a longer sentence when 
faced with a non-descript victim, a cautious victim, or a victim that some might view as 
“careless” or somehow “complacent” in her attack, compared to men. 
In survey sample C, females were significantly no different than males in 
proposed sentence length in the “Control” condition (F = 0.13, p = 0.72); the “Non-
Precipitory” group (F = 1.98, p = 0.16); or the “Precipitory” group (F = 0.02, p = 0.90). 
Once more, females were no more likely, on average, to propose a longer sentence, 
regardless of victim type, compared to men.  
Finally, in survey sample D, females were significantly more likely than males to 
propose longer sentences in the “Control” condition (F = 6.45, p = 0.01); the “Non-
Precipitory” group (F = 17.55, p = 0.00); and in the “Precipitory” group (F = 7.87, p = 
0.00). This time around, females were more likely, on average, to propose a longer 
sentence regardless of victim characteristics and behavior.  
H4b: “Respondents presented with the “Non-Precipitory” treatment will be more 
likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison sentence when compared to those 
presented the control” was supported; respondents in the “Non-Precipitory” group 
recommended significantly longer prison sentences when compared to those in the 
“Control” group, and this was true for every sample. H4d: “Respondents presented with 
the “Precipitory” treatment will be less likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison 
sentence when compared to those presented the control” was only partially supported; 
respondents in the “Precipitory” group consistently recommended a significantly shorter 
prison sentence compared to those in “Non-Precipitory” group, but this was not always 
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the case compared to those in the “Control” group as I hypothesized. The big news here 
appears to be that what really separates males from females is not how they treat the 
“honorable” versus “unethical” victim. It’s that males are not willing to be as harsh 
against the convicted rapist – regardless of her characteristics and behavior. Overall 
results by biological sex are presented visually in Figure 4.11.1. 
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Figure 4.11.1 | Proposed Prison Sentence for a Convicted Rapist 
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Multiple-Regression Models 
In the previous section, I demonstrated that a victim’s personal characteristics and 
behavior have a significant impact on whether others believe the rape occurred. In the 
current section, I extended the analysis and found that these factors also significantly 
impact recommended prison sentences. When a victim conforms to traditional gender 
expectations, is cautious not to put herself in danger, fights fiercely to prevent being 
violated, and then reports the incident to law enforcement promptly both males and 
females recommend significantly longer prison sentences for her rapist. On the other 
hand, when a victim does not conform to traditional gender expectations, is perceived to 
put herself at unnecessary risk of danger, fails to resist, and does not report the incident to 
law enforcement promptly both males and females recommend significantly shorter 
prison sentences. This alarming finding was true across each of the four survey samples 
reported in my analysis. When it comes to sentencing a convicted rapist, individuals are 
placed in an uncomfortable position. If they doubt that the rape occurred, they may focus 
on the consequences the accused will suffer if wrongly convicted. On the other hand, if 
they believe the victim, they may focus instead on punishing her perpetrator. I now test 
the additional hypotheses presented in this chapter. Specifically, H1d: “Respondents who 
believe the victim will be more likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence 
for (her) convicted rapist””; H2c: “Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to 
blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less 
likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist.”; and 
H3e: “Because hostile sexists tend to blame victims, respondents who score higher on 
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hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a 
convicted rapist.” 
 My overarching argument is that violence-justifying ideologies (sexism in the 
current analysis) will cancel out the normatively positive outcomes that individuals’ 
aversion to violence might otherwise produce. Assessing the attitudes that help determine 
the length of prison sentence a juror might impose upon a convicted rapist provides my 
second opportunity to empirically test this theory. Specifically, H3g: “Hostile sexism will 
attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values.  Violence-averse 
individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to recommend 
a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist.” 
In order to test these hypotheses, I specified a full model for survey sample C and 
D.24 My key independent variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the 
11-item measure of hostile sexism. To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about 
women on the predictive power of individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an 
interaction term between hostile sexism and anti-violence values. My key hypothesis is 
that interacting these variables will produce a negative sign: as sexism increases, anti-
violence values normatively positive force will diminish.  
Once more, I incorporated numerous control variables including victim 
characteristics (non-precipitory/precipitory), age, education, income, biological sex, 
marital status, political ideology (conservatism), rape myth acceptance, and 
 
24 Sample A and sample B are excluded from the analysis for two reasons. Neither sample included the 
question item tapping “belief” in the victim; both survey samples include the inferior (deductive) anti-
violence values scale. 
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authoritarianism. I used multiple regression analysis to estimate relationships in each of 
these models, and the results are reported below in Table 4.11.5.25 
Table 4.11.5 | Explaining Prison Sentencing for a Convicted Rapist 
 
 
25 If an independent variable does not appear in a model it is because those items were not included in 
that sample. Covariates that did not achieve significance in any of the models (except the 
authoritarianism scale) were excluded to preserve space.  
 
SAMPLE C    SAMPLE D
Victim Condition
Non-Precipitory 4.847 *** 2.693 ** 7.721 *** 5.03 ***
(1.342) (1.356) (0.995) (1.027)
Precipitory        -.673 0.475        -3.51 ***        -1.61
(1.247) (1.227) (1.026) (1.026)
Age        -0.022        -0.033        -0.070 *        -0.070 **
(0.041) (0.040) (0.033) (0.033)
Education 0.481 0.171 0.981 *** 0.861 **
(0.446) (0.437) (0.342) (0.332)
Income 0.185 0.111 -0.178 -0.181
(0.204) (0.198) (0.146) (0.142)
Female 1.076 0.267 1.75 ** 1.16
(1.136) (1.111) (0.894) (0.870)
Married -0.527 -0.205 0.6 0.74
(1.148) (1.116) (0.900) (0.873)
Conservatism -0.219 -0.089 -0.12 -0.11
(0.348) (0.339) (0.103) (0.090)
Authoritarianism 0.268 1.023
(1.357) (1.320)
Anti-Violence -2.94 *** -2.828 *** -0.73 -0.74
(0.607) (0.589) (0.494) (0.479)
Benevolent Sexism 0.441 0.496 0.865 * 0.782 *
(0.473) (0.459) (0.446) (0.432)
Hostile Sexism -0.395 -0.018 -1.65 *** -1.13 **
(0.637) (0.622) (0.582) (0.568)
Rape Myth -2.318 *** -2.053 *** -0.37 *** -0.01
(0.740) (0.719) (0.621) (0.604)
Belief 2.169 *** 2.27 **
(0.379) (0.297)
Adj. R2 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.2
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Samples C (N=1,049); and D (N=923)
SAMPLE DSAMPLE C
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The results are unsettling; respondents relied heavily upon the victim’s 
characteristics and behavior when deciding how harshly to punish her rapist. Did she 
allow a stranger into her home? Did she attempt to physically defend herself? Did she 
report the rape immediately? When the answers to those questions were “yes”, 
respondents were willing to impose a significantly longer prison sentence – they did not 
afford the same level of justice to the “Precipitory” victim. This was true despite the fact 
that I controlled for “belief” in both fully specified models. Recall that sample C, and D 
featured an additional question item asking respondents whether they believe that the 
reported rape actually occurred.26 For every one unit increase in respondents’ belief in 
the victim, respondents recommended an additional (+2.17) years in sample C, and an 
additional (+2.27) years in sample D. Thus, H1d: “Respondents who believe the victim 
will be more likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for (her) convicted 
rapist” was fully supported in both samples. This suggests to me that “I bet she is making 
this up” is, in fact, conceptually distinct from “She brought this on herself”. 
In the fully specified models for samples C and D victim characteristics and 
behavior have a significant impact on individuals’ decision to impose more (or less) years 
in prison. In both cases, respondents in the “Non-Precipitory” group recommended 
significantly more prison time - C (+2.69) and D (+5.03) – for  the rapist compared to 
those in the “Control” condition..27 Thus, H4b: “Respondents presented with the “Non-
 
26 Respondents were asked: “Based on the evidence provided, how likely is it that Jim Reynolds raped his 
accuser. Responses ranged between “Extremely Unlikely” and “Extremely Likely” on a 7-point Likert scale. 
27 Regression results for sample A and B not shown. These samples included my deductively derived 
measure for anti-violence values. As indicated earlier, I suspect, that this measure is not really capturing 
attitudes toward violence. Some question items (e.g. “It is a person’s responsibility to protect their 
family”; “If an individual is insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family should be their 
number one priority”) are likely not related to individuals’ orientation toward violence. 
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Precipitory” treatment will be more likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison 
sentence when compared to those presented the control” was supported. 
In sample C, violence averse respondents actually recommended significantly less 
(-2.83) prison time, on average, all else equal.28 Older respondents imposed significantly 
shorter sentences in sample D (-0.07). For every one unit increase in education 
respondents in sample D called for an additional (+0.86) years. Sexism was not a 
significant predictor of sentencing in sample C, however, in sample D, those scoring 
higher on benevolent sexism called for significantly more time (+0.78), and those scoring 
higher on hostile sexism recommended significantly less (-1.13) prison time. Those who 
endorse the belief that women are often at least partially to blame for their own 
victimization recommended significantly more lenient sentences, thus, H2c “Because 
individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score 
higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long 
prison sentence for a convicted rapist.” was partially supported. Respondents who 
endorse rape myths preferred significantly shorter sentences in sample C (-2.05).  
 My key hypothesis, H3g: “Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive 
force of anti-violence values.  Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward 
females will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a 
convicted rapist.” was not supported in the full model in any of my survey samples. The 
interaction term (anti-violence values * hostile sexism) had no significant effect across 
any of my models (not shown).  
 
28 I did test for a moderating effect between anti-violence values and belief in the victim. In neither case 
was the interaction significant. 
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4.12 Support to Assist and Advocate for Victims of Sexual Violence 
In this section I test additional hypotheses concerning support for government 
spending on services to assist victims, and individuals’ willingness to personally advocate 
for victims of sexual violence which I discussed in detail at the beginning of the 
chapter.29 It is important to note that I expect each of my independent variables to 
predict both (non)support for spending, and (un)willingness to advocate in a similar 
manner. Thus, the analyses are presented in tandem. Specifically,  
H1c: “Individuals who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, on 
average, to support increased spending on policies and services, and to advocate 
for victims of sexual violence.”  
H2d. Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, 
respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on 
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual 
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.”  
H3b.  “Respondents who score higher on benevolent sexism will be more likely, on 
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual 
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence. However, benevolent 
sexism will no longer predict that support (or advocacy) once hostile sexism is 
controlled for in the model”; and  
 
29 Respondents were asked whether they think government funding should be higher or lower for the 
following initiatives: Rape crisis centers, rape kit processing, first responder training, rape-prevention 
education. In Sample C and D, respondents were asked how likely they are personally advocate for victims 
in the following ways: Volunteer to work with victims in a rape crisis center, donate money to shelters, 
donate other resources to shelters, demonstrate to raise awareness of sexual violence. 
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H3c.  “Respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on 
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual 
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.” 
 Assessing the attitudes that help determine whether an individual supports 
increases in government support for victims, and whether an individual is willing to 
actively advocate for or donate resources to victims provides my third opportunity to 
empirically test my overarching theory of anti-violence values. Specifically, H3h. 
“Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values.  
Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on 
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual 
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.” 
To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about women on the predictive power 
of individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between hostile 
sexism and anti-violence values. I expect hostile sexism to produce negative signs, while 
anti-violence values should produce positive signs. My key assumption, however, is that 
interacting these variables will produce a negative sign: as sexism increases, anti-violence 
values will no longer predict support for increased spending on policies and services to 
address sexual violence, or willingness to advocate for victims of sexual violence. 
Once more, I incorporated numerous control variables including age, education, 
income, biological sex, marital status, political ideology (conservatism), rape myth 
acceptance, government spending preferences, and authoritarianism. I used multiple 
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regression analysis to estimate relationships in each of these models, and the results are 
reported below in Table 4.12.1.30  
Table 4.12.1 | Support to Fund Policies and Advocate for Victims of Violence 
 
 Anti-violence values did not perform as expected in my models to predict support 
for increased government spending to assist victims and combat sexual violence. 
Specifically, H1c: “Individuals who score higher on anti-violence values will be more 
likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services, and to 
 
30 If an independent variable does not appear in one of the models it is because those items were not 
included in that sample. Covariates that did not achieve significance in either of the models were 
excluded to preserve space.  
 
             ADVOCATE
Age        -0.013 ***         -0.007 ** 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Education 0.036 -0.023        -0.008 -0.033
(0.053) (0.035) (0.040) (0.028)
Female 0.554 *** 0.515 *** 0.329 *** 0.122 *
(0.134) (0.092) (0.102) (0.072)
Conservatism -0.144 *** -0.01 -0.077 ** -0.005
(0.041) (0.012) (0.031) (0.009)
Anti-Violence -0.223 *** -0.01 0.036 0.35 ***
(0.072) (0.051) (0.055) (0.101)
Benevolent Sexism 0.161 *** 0.198 *** 0.002 0.073 **
(0.056) (0.046) (0.043) (0.037)
Hostile Sexism -0.168 ** -0.244 *** -0.253 *** -0.263 ***
(0.075) (0.060) (0.058) (0.080)
Rape Myth -0.164 * -0.81 ** -0.155 *** -0.21 ***
(0.087) (0.064) (0.740) (0.050)
Government Spending 0.127 *** 0.121 ***
(0.020) (0.016)
Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence -0.08 ***
(0.030)
Adj. R2 0.16 0.2 0.26 0.29
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)
Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)
                   FUND           
Sample DSample C Sample D Sample C
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advocate for victims of sexual violence.” was only partially supported. In Sample D; for 
every one unit increase in violence aversion individuals were significantly more (+0.35) 
supportive of increased spending, all else equal. Additionally, in both models, the more 
violence averse respondents were significantly less likely, on average, to personally 
engage and advocate for victims. A one unit increase in anti-violence in Sample C 
produced a drop of (-0.22), and a one unit increase in anti-violence in Sample D 
(although not significant) produced a drop of (-0.01) in willingness to advocate for 
victims of sexual violence, all else equal. 
My key hypothesis was supported only partially in Sample D, H3h: “Hostile 
sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values.  Violence-
averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to 
support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to 
advocate for victims of sexual violence.” The estimates of the anti-violence slope 
decrease as a function of hostile sexism in terms of increased funding. For example, at 
the lowest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence slope is at (+0.34), and at the highest 
level the slope is at (-0.16), a decrease of (-0.50). For every one unit increase in hostile 
sexism, the anti-violence slope decreases by (-0.08). To visually display the impact of 
this interaction term I created a graph of the adjusted means placing hostile sexism on the 
x-axis and separate graphs for “low”, “medium”, and “high” levels of anti-violence (See 
Figure 4.12.1). 
My measure for rape myth acceptance performed as expected, and H2d: “Because 
individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score 
higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to support increased 
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spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims 
of sexual violence” was fully supported across both of my samples. For every one unit 
increase in Sample C, individuals were significantly less (-0.16) supportive of increased 
spending and (-0.16) less willing to advocate, all else equal. Inn Sample D, individuals 
were significantly less (-0.21) supportive of increased spending and (-0.81) less willing to 
personally advocate for victims., all else equal. 
Figure 4.12.1 | Predictive Margins Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence - Survey D  
 
My measure for benevolent sexism did not perform as expected, and H3b: 
“Respondents who score higher on benevolent sexism will be more likely, on average, to 
support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to 
advocate for victims of sexual violence. However, benevolent sexism will no longer 
predict that support (or advocacy) once hostile sexism is controlled for in the model” was 
only partially supported. Benevolent sexism was not significant in Sample C – with or 
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without – hostile sexism included in the model in terms of increased funding. On the 
other hand, in the fully specified model (including hostile sexism), a one unit increase in 
benevolent sexism in Sample C produced a significant increase (+0.16) in willingness to 
advocate for victims of sexual violence, all else equal. Additionally, a one unit increase in 
benevolent sexism in Sample D also produced a significant increase (+0.20) in 
willingness to personally advocate for victims of sexual violence, all else equal. 
Unexpectedly, the coefficients for benevolent sexism, in both samples, remained 
significant, in terms of advocacy, in the fully specified model. 
 H3c: “Respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on 
average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual 
violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence.” was supported across the board 
in Sample C and D. For every one unit increase in Sample C, individuals were 
significantly less (-0.25) supportive of increased spending and (-0.17) less willing to 
advocate, all else equal. Inn Sample D, individuals were significantly less (-0.26) 
supportive of increased spending and (-0.24) less willing to advocate, all else equal. 
Females were significantly more supportive of increases in government spending 
in Sample C (+0.33) and Sample D (+0.12), all else equal. Females were significantly 
more willing to advocate for victims in Sample C (+0.55) and Sample D (+0.52), all else 
equal. Additionally, individuals’ broader attitudes toward government spending were a 
significant predictor of their support for very specific services to assist victims and to 
decrease the prevalence of sexual violence in society. Those scoring higher on 
government spending were significantly more supportive of targeted spending efforts in 
sample D (+0.12) and in willingness to advocate (+0.13).  
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4.13 Conclusion 
 Throughout this chapter, I empirically tested my assumption that individual’s 
orientation toward violence should help shape their attitudes toward victims – and 
perpetrators – of sexual violence. I expected that individuals who are more averse to 
violence would sympathize more with victims, support harsher punishments for 
perpetrators, and advocate more for resources to assist survivors and decrease the rate of 
these crimes in the United States. Anti-violence values were assessed with the inductively 
specified scale which I produced, using principal component analysis, in Chapter 3.31  
Intuitively, one might surmise that aversion to violence is a good thing. And, I did 
find empirical support for the expectation that anti-violence values will produce 
normatively positive results in terms of sexual violence-related outcomes of interest. On 
the other hand, I also found empirical support for my overarching theory, that violence-
justifying ideologies (e.g. sexism ‘hostile in particular’, rape myth acceptance, etc.) often 
diminish any normatively positive force that anti-violence values would otherwise 
produce.  
Respondents were randomly assigned to either a “Control” group which featured 
a non-descript victim and very little information about the circumstances surrounding her 
rape, a treatment group “Non-Precipitory” which featured a cautious victim who 
physically resisted her attacker and immediately reported her rape to law enforcement, or 
a treatment group “Precipitory” which featured a victim who did not behave cautiously, 
 
31 Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “It is important for a person to be tougher than other people”; A 
person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp”; You would praise a person who acted 
aggressively to an insult”; “Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable”; “It is morally 
wrong for a person to walk away from a fight”; “A person who doesn’t take any crap from anybody is an 
admirable reputation to have”; and “Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself”. 
 
138 
 
         
did not put up fierce physical resistance to her attacker, and did not immediately report 
her rape to law enforcement. Respondents were asked to put themselves in the role of a 
juror as they reviewed this incident. 
 After reading these fictitious rape scenarios, respondents were asked to report 
whether they believed that the rape occurred. In both survey samples that included this 
question, those who scored higher on anti-violence values were significantly more likely 
to believe the victim, all else equal. However, I also found that hostile sexism diminished 
the positive effects of anti-violence values to the point that they no longer produced 
significantly more belief in the victim. 
My experimental findings also produced unsettling results. When the victim 
appeared to conform to traditional gender expectations, when it was clear that she was 
cautious to not put herself in danger, when there was evidence that she fought fiercely to 
prevent being violated, and when she reported the incident to law enforcement 
immediately, both males and females were significantly more likely to believe her rape 
claim. On the other hand, when a victim did not conform to traditional gender 
expectations, when it appeared that she put herself at unnecessary risk of danger, when 
there was no physical evidence that she put up fierce resistance, and when she did not 
report the incident to law enforcement immediately, both males and females were 
significantly less likely to believe that the victim was actually raped. 
After respondents were informed that the rapist had been found guilty, they were 
asked to recommend a sentence of no less than 5, and no more than 50 years in prison for 
the perpetrator. Examining the data across four unique surveys I found little evidence that 
anti-violence values significantly impact how harshly respondents believe a perpetrator 
 
139 
 
         
should be punished. In fact, violence averse individuals might view incarceration itself as 
a form of violence. In one model, for every one unit increase in anti-violence respondents 
recommended significantly less (-2.94 years) time in prison, perhaps sparing the 
perpetrator.  
My experimental findings, once more, produced troubling results. When the 
victim conformed to traditional gender expectations, when she was cautious, when there 
was evidence that she fought back, and when she reported the incident immediately, both 
males and females recommended significantly more time in prison. When the victim did 
not conform to traditional gender expectations, when she put herself at risk of danger, 
when there was no evidence of resistance, and when she did not report the incident 
immediately, both males and females recommended significantly less time in prison. 
Survivors of sexual violence often depend upon social welfare benefits as they 
attempt to escape violent partners and rebuild their lives and budget cuts or decreased 
spending on social services erodes the capacity of women’s organizations to assist 
victims (Wasco, et al. 2004). Reductions in funding for health care, education, women’s 
shelters, grass roots feminist organizations, legal aid, and many other services including 
economic support, transportation, and childcare assistance make it difficult for victims to 
break the chains of violence.  
Respondents were asked about their support for increases in government funding 
to assist victims of sexual violence and help prevent rape in the United States. Those 
claiming to be more averse to violence supported significantly more federal funding in 
only one sample, and in two other samples the violent averse supported significantly less 
federal funding to assist victims and reduce sexual violence, all else equal. Respondents 
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were also asked whether they would personally advocate for victims or donate time and 
money to organizations that assist victims. In both samples that asked this question, 
respondents were significantly less likely to advocate for victims or donate time and 
resources to the cause, all else equal. 
Negative attitudes toward victims help perpetuate rape, and rape myths enable a 
perpetrator to justify his behavior. These negative stereotypes and misinterpretations of 
victims have serious implications. Beyond the fact that they cause harmful psychological 
damage, these prejudicial attitudes can also bleed into public policy decisions (e.g. trial 
outcomes and rape-related services expenditures). Throughout this analysis, those who 
endorsed rape myths and other negative stereotypes about women were consistently more 
likely to blame the victim, to be more lenient on her perpetrator, to resist increased 
government spending to assist victims and reduce sexual violence, and to decline to 
engage in any way personally to advocate or support victims. Individuals’ aversion to 
violence did little of substance to benefit victims or punish perpetrators, and when it did 
produce significantly positive outcomes those effects were easily diminished by violence-
justifying ideology – hostile sexism in particular. 
Efforts intended to decrease rape in the United States should focus on breaking 
down the stereotypes that allow individuals to justify violence against women. Whether 
an individual condones violence appears to have little impact on their perception of 
victims, their support for serious consequences for perpetrators, or their willingness to 
actively engage in efforts to combat the problem of sexual violence in the United States – 
once we account for the violence-justifying ideologies that work to diminish any benefits 
of aversion to violence. Additionally, a victim’s characteristics and behaviors have a 
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significant impact on whether she is believed in the first place, but also on whether her 
perpetrator will be justly punished.  
Victims’ advocates suggest that the standard for conviction in rape cases should 
require only the “preponderance of the evidence” standard applied in civil cases. Rather 
than demanding an absence of doubt, verdicts should depend on what jurists believe most 
strongly. In other words, if a victim’s testimony leads jurists to believe that they did not 
consent to sex, this would be sufficient to convict the defendant. One thing appears 
certain; efforts to reduce rape should focus on breaking down the stereotypes that allow 
people to overlook violent behavior, and reforming policies that make it difficult for a 
victim to receive justice. Absent those efforts, it appears unlikely that widespread 
aversion to violence will make any substantive difference.  
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CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE VIOLENCE AND SUPPORT FOR 
RELATED PUBLIC POLICIES 
5.1 Introduction 
During the summer of 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri a white police officer named 
Darren Wilson fired 12 shots into 18-year-old Michael Brown, an unarmed black man. 
His lifeless body lay in the street for more than four hours as detectives completed their 
investigation. Ultimately, a St. Louis County grand jury would fail to indict Officer 
Wilson and the United States Justice Department launched a civil-rights probe of its own 
(Bell & Hunn 2014). Following his adjudication in state court violent waves of protest 
and riots erupted in numerous American cities where outraged citizens vandalized, 
looted, and burned businesses to the ground. Police donning military-grade riot gear 
responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, and flash grenades. Protesters adopted the slogan 
“Hands Up, Don’t Shoot” in reference to eye-witness testimony that Brown had his hands 
in the air attempting to surrender (Hartmann 2014).32 
Brown’s death sparked heated debate over policing in the United States and 
incidents of police violence continue to dominate national media coverage. One might 
assume that a national database of information about lethal and non-lethal police 
encounters exists, but this was not so until late 2018. In fact, as recently as 2016, then-
FBI Director James Comey admitted to a gathering of police chiefs that “Americans 
actually have no idea about how often police use force because nobody has collected 
enough data” (Berman 2016). This lack of data on police violence remains a problem in 
2020. While the FBI now collaborates with law enforcement agencies across the country 
 
32 The Department of Justice concluded that Brown did not attempt to surrender, and the civil rights 
probe officially cleared Wilson’s actions. 
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to collect this information, individual police agencies are not required to participate. 
James Gagliano, writing for the Hill describes this as a ‘fundamental flaw’ in data 
collection; he worries that incomplete datasets “lead to inaccurate results and fuel 
speculation that statistics are skewed to protect law enforcement” (2018). Fortunately for 
those who research police violence there are other sources that compile use of force 
statistics. 
 Journalists for the Washington Post and the Guardian began compiling data on 
officer-involved-shootings (OIS) in 2015. The Post found that police fatally shoot 
approximately 1,000 individuals per year – this comports with the 1,134 deaths that the 
Guardian chronicled in 2015. Alarmingly, the death rate for young black men was five 
times that of white men the same age, but we know little of lesser force incidents because 
the Post and the Guardian did not collect data on non-fatal encounters with the police 
(Swaine et al. 2015). VICE News collected data directly from the 50 largest police 
departments in the United States – including statistics on non-fatal shootings. Journalists 
for VICE found that “Police shootings aren’t just undercounted – police in these 
departments shoot black people at a higher rate and shoot unarmed people far more often 
than any data have shown (Arthur et al. 2017). 
 The datasets compiled by the Washington Post, the Guardian, and VICE provide 
important information, but it is not clear whether the OIS statistics they report are a direct 
result of racial bias. That said, even the perception that the police are unjust leads many 
people to question their legitimacy. Public reactions to the non-stop news coverage of 
these incidents varies by race and many other factors (Dahlgren 1988; Eschholz et al 
2002), but frequent exposure is believed to create the misperception that they occur more 
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frequently than they actually do, and news organizations are known to emphasize the 
racial elements of the events they cover (Gilliam & Iyengar 2000; Weitzer & Tuch 2004).  
 Explaining racial disparities in police violence is not as straightforward as one 
might think. While descriptive statistics are instructive, researchers must also account for 
additional factors including race-specific crime rates and the behavior a suspect exhibits 
prior to the shooting. On the other hand, it is not clear that police departments are 
providing reliable data; we do not know how often officers “bend the truth about the 
context of a particular interaction so as to justify their own actions – for instance, 
indicating a suspect was threatening when they were calmly following an officer’s 
commands” (Fryer Jr. 2018, 4). In sum, the spotty data on OIS makes it difficult for 
researchers to examine the role that race plays in officers’ decision to pull the trigger and 
take a life.  
 One thing is certain; OIS are a serious problem in America that routinely spark 
widespread outrage. Violent protests of law enforcement swept the country following the 
shooting of 18-year-old Michael Brown, and each new body has the potential to produce 
additional violence – violence that threatens civility and democracy in the United States. 
Public scrutiny is an important check on police behavior, especially in the age of smart 
phones and streaming video, and fact-based reporting on these incidents is essential. 
Individuals must be willing to evaluate incidents of OIS objectively in order to determine 
whether the actions of the officer involved were justified. Additionally, evaluations of 
these incidents cut both ways in many instances, since the officer(s) sometimes are 
minorities as well. This chapter examines the complex considerations that help shape 
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individual evaluations of OIS and support for policies to prevent unnecessary incidents of 
police violence. 
Contributions to, and Extensions of Prior Literature 
Police shootings – justified or not – are acts of violence (Williams 2015; Seigel 
2018) yet research on OIS evaluations tends to focus mostly on the racial aspects of these 
incidents while ignoring broader attitudes toward violence. For instance, most scholarship 
focuses on racial attitudes and stereotypes alone as explanations for perceptions of law 
enforcement officers (Huang & Vaughn 1996) and criminal suspects (Barkan & Cohn 
1998). In this chapter, I use my adapted anti-violence values scale (created in Chapter 3) 
to determine whether individuals who condemn violence, on average, are more likely to: 
 Believe that a lethal officer involved shooting is inappropriate; 
 Believe that a lethal officer involved shooting was unlawful; and 
 Support increased spending on policies to reduce police violence 
I extend and contribute to the police violence literature by 1) providing theoretical 
and empirical support for my claim that anti-violence values do not always translate to 
outrage over police violence, or support for policies to reduce its prevalence; 2) providing 
additional empirical support for my broader argument that the normatively positive 
effects of anti-violence values often diminish once additional factors (violence-justifying 
ideologies) are incorporated in the model; 3) empirically demonstrating that it is the level 
of threat a suspect poses – rather than the amalgamation of race between the officer and 
suspect – which has the greatest impact on individual evaluations of OIS; and 4) moving 
beyond student samples to include Mechanical Turk workers, which prior research 
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(Berinsky et al. 2012) concludes is acceptable for peer-reviewed projects.33   To the best 
of my knowledge, individuals’ orientations toward violence in the abstract have never 
been incorporated into empirical models predicting reactions to police violence, policies 
to reduce that violence, or support for increased government spending to improve 
policing. This research builds on recent work on racial attributions in the justice system 
(Peffley et al. 2017) and law enforcement policy (Ariel et al. 2015) but expands on this 
research by incorporating my new measure of anti-violence values.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I briefly discuss public perceptions of the 
police, and the implications of breakdowns in trust and legitimacy between officers and 
citizens for democratic society. Next, I examine closely the role that the media plays in 
helping shape individual evaluations of incidents of OIS specifically, and public opinion 
of law enforcement broadly. Then, I provide a brief overview of racial disparities in the 
criminal justice system that have always disproportionately impacted blacks – disparities 
which persist today. Turning to the importance of interest groups, I review recent efforts 
to influence public opinion, including members of the public demanding institutional 
reforms to address police violence, but also law enforcement groups working to build and 
maintain public support for the police. Next, I examine various policies and reforms 
intended to minimize racial bias among law enforcement and ultimately, decrease 
instances of police violence in the United States. As it turns out, a majority of the public 
 
33 Berinsky et al. (2012) examined the benefits, and potential limitations of using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk web-based platform for subject recruitment in Political Science Research. They found that the 
demographic characteristics of Mechanical Turk workers are more representative than student, or other 
convenience samples often used in Political Science research. When the authors used Mechanical Turk 
samples to replicate previous experimental studies, they found that the average treatment effects were 
very similar. In sum, the authors argue that the potential limitations to Mechanical Turk samples – 
including subject attentiveness and the prevalence of repeat survey-takers – are not much of a problem in 
practice.  
 
147 
 
         
– and large percentages of the police – support serious institutional reform. Finally, 
extending upon my analyses in chapter three and four, I re-introduce specific violence-
justifying ideologies (racial stereotypes in particular) which I argue attenuate the 
otherwise positive force of anti-violence values. I present empirical evidence that those 
who endorse violence-justifying attitudes (racial stereotypes in the current analysis) are 
less likely to question acts of police violence, or policies and services to quell this 
violence. This is especially true for those most opposed to violence in the abstract. 
5.2 Perceptions of Police and Law Enforcement  
In order to perform their duties effectively police require the cooperation and 
support of the community. Citizens who question the legitimacy of law enforcement are 
less likely to comply with the law or cooperate with the police. Establishing and 
maintaining that legitimacy requires fair and consistent behavior; officers must be 
respectful of the public, perform their duties in an impartial manner, and act within the 
limits of the law. Positive and frequent interactions with the community help police 
officers earn the support of the citizens they are sworn to protect. This reservoir of 
goodwill, in turn, allows them to more effectively perform their duties (Tyler 2004).  
Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence across the country suggests a widespread 
breakdown in the development of trust and legitimacy between officers and citizens. In a 
number of recently publicized interactions, officers were denied services by employees of 
major businesses across the United States, a trend that some experts argue is a reaction to 
highly publicized incidents of police misconduct. An employee working the drive-
through window at an Arby’s in Pembroke Pines, Florida refused to serve a uniformed 
 
148 
 
         
police officer, and cops were also denied services at a Chuck E. Cheese in Bowling 
Green, Kentucky and a Starbucks in Philadelphia, PA (Bromwich, 2015).  
Violent, targeted attacks on law enforcement officers are also on the rise. For 
example, following a Black Lives Matter protest in Dallas, TX, during the summer of 
2016, Micah Xavier Johnson opened fire on a group of police officers killing five and 
injuring seven others. Johnson fled to a building located on the campus of El Centro 
College where he was quickly surrounded by police. Negotiators claim that Johnson was 
furious over police shootings involving black men, and that he wanted to target and kill 
white officers. The standoff ended when police used a remote controlled bomb to kill the 
suspect (Glum, 2016).  
Research on race and attitudes toward the police is extensive, and it suggests that 
Blacks are more likely to report being victimized by police (Weitzer and Tuch 2004, 
Arthur 1993; Nelson & Kinder 1996; Epp et al. 2014; Ramirez 2015) and to view the 
police less favorably (Rosenbaum 2005; Weitzer 2000; Reisig and Parks 2000; Huang 
and Vaughn 1996). Blacks are also more likely than whites to live in high crime areas 
where police misconduct is more common (Mastrofski et al. 2002). Research (Scherer & 
Curry, 2010) suggests that “by virtue of their racial group consciousness, African 
Americans experience a “linked fate” with fellow black citizens when evaluating salient 
political issues” (93). This, of course, should transfer to attitudes toward the criminal 
justice system generally, and law enforcement officers in particular. Taken together, 
extant scholarship provides a host of reasons we might expect blacks to be suspicious of, 
and negatively evaluate incidents involving police use of force.  
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 Others argue that racial disparity is not a result of law enforcement “targeting” 
blacks, but a consequence of blacks committing a disproportional percentage of crime, 
which results in more frequent interactions with the police. Some whites believe that 
blacks are more likely to be criminals, and that the justice system is a satisfactory means 
to control subordinate races. As Barkan and Cohn point out, “racial prejudice contributes 
to whites’ support for police use of force, and this relationship should be stronger for the 
use of excessive force than for the use of reasonable force” (1998, 749). 
5.3 Media Coverage of Police Use of Force Incidents 
 
Media coverage of OIS and other use of force incidents helps shape evaluations of 
law enforcement officers more broadly. Media portrayals seldom provide a complete 
picture of these incidents, but instead deliver what Gamson and Modigliani describe as a 
frame, or “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding 
strip of events” (1989, 143). Entman explains that framing strategies select “some aspects 
of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (1993, 52). So, when it comes 
to police violence, the media clearly have the power to shape the narrative and to 
influence the way consumers perceive events. This is not new; scholarship on bounded 
rationality (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) supports the idea that when individuals make a 
decision, they are limited by the information available, the cognitive limits of their brains, 
and the brevity of time they have to decide (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). Individuals will 
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interpret information differently depending on which interpretive schema applies, and 
individual perceptions are reference dependent (Druckman 2001, Iyengar 1991).  
Other work (Schlesinger et al. 1994) examines media coverage of law 
enforcement specifically and its effect on public opinion, but the results are mixed. Some 
findings (Chermak et al. 2006) suggest that the more a citizen reads the newspaper, or a 
high-profile case of police misconduct, the more likely they are to think that the officers 
involved are guilty. Others (Graziano et al. 2010) found evidence that attitudes about the 
prevalence of racial profiling are susceptible to the manner in which the media construct 
incidents of police misconduct. There is, however, widespread consensus that both 
television and newspaper coverage of crime tends to focus on the most sensational and 
violent cases (Roberts & Doob 1990). Even coverage that is not related to a specific case 
can shape public opinion in that case (Greene 1990). Media coverage and the way that 
violent incidents are framed has a powerful impact on individual evaluations of law 
enforcement and, as Hans and Dee point out, because most of the public has little direct 
experience with the justice system, knowledge and views of law enforcement are largely 
dependent on media representations – and the media presents a distorted view of the legal 
system (1991). 
Alternatively, some media coverage of OIS has directly contributed to efforts to 
better track and reduce police violence. The Washington Post, Vice News, and the 
Guardian’s in-depth investigations of people killed by police in the US convinced the 
federal government to collect better data on police use of force incidents and OIS. 
Announcing those reforms in 2016, then-FBI director James Comey remarked that it was 
“unacceptable, embarrassing, and ridiculous” that media organizations held better data on 
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the issue than his own officials. Prior to those reforms, the FBI relied on police chiefs 
voluntarily submitting their statistics – a method it turned out was capturing less than half 
of all killings nationwide. Under the new government program, the Department of Justice 
logged more than twice the rate previously reported for 2015 (Swaine & McCarthy 
2016).  
While the federal government is doing a much better job of tracking police 
violence, there is concern that data alone will not be sufficient to bring about widespread 
reforms in law enforcement. Stephen Rushin argues that newly amassed statistics should 
be publicly available; this would incentivize local departments to prioritize declines in 
violence (2016). But it would not guarantee that some of the more problematic 
departments will voluntarily make expensive reforms. On the other hand, the Attorney 
General could use civil rights litigation against law enforcement agencies to incentivize 
the implementation of steps to reduce police violence. As Rushin points out, “Under 42 
U.S.C. § 14141, the Attorney General has the power to seek equitable relief against 
police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional mis-conduct, 
including excessive uses of force” (2016, 117).  
5.4 Blacks, Law Enforcement, and Political Activism in the United States 
The relationship between blacks and the police – beginning with laws controlling 
the movement of slaves – has been adversarial throughout American history. From 
slavery, to Reconstruction, to the modern era of mass incarceration, issues of race and 
law enforcement persist. The high-profile shooting of Michael Brown during the summer 
of 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri may have been the catalyst that sparked violent protests 
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across American cities, but political activists in 2012 were already organizing to protest 
the death of another young black teenager. Outraged by the shooting death of seventeen-
year-old Trayvon Martin, community organizers Patrisse Cullors, Opal Tometi, and 
Alicia Garza created #BlackLivesMatter calling for accountability when unarmed blacks 
are murdered (Smith 2015). Black Lives Matter began as little more than scattered 
conversations on social media, but as the deaths of unarmed men mounted the movement 
gained national popularity. More vocal leaders joined the group fomenting strong 
opposition to law enforcement, and between 2014 and 2015 more than 950 protests took 
place nationwide – some of them quite violent (Ruffin 2016).  
Documents from the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security released in 
2017 revealed that the United States government viewed Black Lives Matter as a 
potential threat. Emails and internal documents, obtained through a lawsuit filed by the 
Center for Constitutional Rights and Color of Change, detailed the monitoring of Black 
Lives Matter protests. In one of those emails, the FBI assessed that “…it is very likely 
Black Identity Extremists perceptions of police brutality against African Americans 
spurred an increase in premeditated retaliatory lethal violence against law enforcement 
and will likely serve as a justification for such violence” (Vohra 2017). The Black Lives 
Matter website, however, makes it explicitly clear that the group is not anti-police, saying 
“This movement is not an anti-people movement; therefore, it is not an anti-police 
movement. Most police officers are just everyday people who want to do their jobs, make 
a living for their families, and come home safely at the end of their shifts” (Black Lives 
Matter 2020).  
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Blue Lives Matter, founded and run by current and former police officers, was 
created to honor law enforcement, bolster public support, and provide resources for 
police officers and their families. They formed in response to the Ferguson protests, and 
claim that the nature of the profession makes them easy targets who are consequently 
“bullied by slander, illegitimate complaints, frivolous law suits, and physical attacks” and 
that “America watched as criminals destroyed property, and assaulted and murdered 
innocent people, and they labeled these criminals as victims” (Blue Lives Matter 2020). 
The group worries that much of the media and many politicians have damaged 
community relations and made their job more difficult. They tout officer Darren Wilson – 
who killed Michael Brown – as a hero, a man doing his job and forced to defend himself. 
Citing an unprecedented number of attacks on police in 2016, Blue Lives Matter created 
a membership program so that interested members of the public could become actively 
involved in supporting law enforcement; the money is directed toward life-saving 
equipment and training for police officers (Blue Lives Matter 2020). 
The director at the Washington D.C. based Advancement Project, Thomas 
Mariadason, claims that officer deaths in the line of duty have recently declined, while 
the number of people killed by police has not. He argues that Blue Lives Matter is 
promoting a dangerous narrative that “…any and all criticisms of police tactics 
constitutes attacks on and a lack of respect for police officers is counterproductive, 
undemocratic, and hinders efforts to fix this broken system” (Guha 2017).  
5.5 Policies to Better Track, and Decrease the Rate of Police Violence 
Access to detailed information about police shootings and the officers involved is 
crucial if we want to create policies that minimize racial bias among police. In a recent 
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evaluation of fatal police shootings, Nix et al. (2017) found that white civilians were 
more likely to have been attacking the officer, and blacks were two times more likely to 
have been unarmed at the time of the shooting. The authors argue that new training 
programs and community engagement initiatives should be implemented to address 
implicit bias among law enforcement officers. Cox et al. (2014) argue that implicit bias is 
a factor that makes police less hesitant to shoot black suspects, while James et al. (2016) 
counters that reverse racism, or the “Ferguson Effect” is a racial bias that makes police 
more hesitant to shoot black suspects. 
Ariel et al. (2015) randomly assigned police officers to “experimental shifts” 
during which all contacts with the public were recorded on body-worn cameras. Officers 
not equipped with body-worn cameras comprised the control group. The authors found 
that officers in the control group were almost twice as likely to use force over the course 
of the experiment. Other research demonstrates that officers believe that policies 
requiring body-worn cameras would lead to improved interactions with citizens in the 
community (Jennings et al. 2014). The successful implementation of new training 
programs and community engagement initiatives for law enforcement agencies that Nix 
et al. (2017) propose will depend, in large part, upon public support for these policies.  
While discontent with police misconduct is widely documented (Chappell et al. 
2004; Chermak et al. 2006) less is known about public support for reform. Weitzer and 
Tuch examined attitudes toward corrective measures in policing and found that 
“Respondents who believe that police corruption, unwarranted stops, and verbal and 
physical abuse of citizens are common are more likely to favor reforms. The same is true 
for those who are frequently exposed to news media coverage of incidents of police 
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misconduct (2004, 391). Additionally, whites were reluctant to accept and support 
policies giving minorities preferences in hiring to increase diversity in police departments 
while close to half of blacks and Hispanics supported doing so. More than 75 percent of 
blacks and Latinos said that more minority officers should be assigned to minority 
neighborhoods, while less than half of whites agreed. On the other hand, the vast majority 
of the public favored early warning measures to identify rogue officers and agreed that 
stronger punishments for those officers would improve policing. 
In 2017, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey of police, and public 
opinion on policing and related policies in the United States. The majority of the public 
(60 percent) said that the deaths of blacks during encounters with police in recent years 
are signs of much broader problems, while a majority of police (67 percent) said that fatal 
police-black encounters are isolated incidents. There were, however, large racial 
differences on perceptions of deadly black-police encounters among both groups. The 
majority of black citizens (79 percent) claimed that OIS deaths are signs of much broader 
problems, and a majority of black police officers (57 percent) shared this view. The 
survey also found that a clear majority of officers and a much larger share of the public 
support the use of body-worn cameras. Two-thirds of police (66 percent) and most of the 
public (93 percent) favor the use of body cameras by police. Large percentages in both 
groups believe that police officers would be more likely to act appropriately, and that 
members of the public would be more likely to cooperate with police wearing body 
cameras. Finally, most of the public (73 percent) agreed that body cameras would help to 
reduce incidents of police violence (Morin et al. 2017).  
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5.6 Anti-Violence Values and Police Use of Force  
An individual’s orientation toward violence generally should help shape their 
evaluations of the circumstances surrounding recurring incidents of police violence. 
Specifically, those who are averse to violence should sympathize more with suspects, be 
less likely to approve of an officer’s use of deadly force and be more likely to advocate 
for more resources to better track and ultimately decrease the rate of police violence in 
the United States.  
 The correlational findings and regression analyses performed in previous chapters 
helped inform my expectations for my inductively derived measure. Recall that on 
average, females were significantly more averse to violence than males. Individuals who 
deplore violence were significantly more likely to believe a victim of violence, but 
violence-justifying ideology moderated anti-violence values such that they no longer 
produced the normatively positive outcomes they otherwise would. In the present 
context, those who abhor violence should disapprove of a deadly police shooting and 
support increased spending on efforts to better track and prevent police violence. Racial 
prejudice, however, should attenuate the positive force of anti-violence values – 
especially when the suspect is black. It is not clear, however, whether violence-averse 
individuals would be persuaded one way or the other by varying arguments against police 
use of deadly force. It is also not clear whether violence-averse individuals would 
approve of a police shooting when the suspect imposes a high level of threat upon an 
officer. Based upon the limited information about the nature of anti-violence values that I 
gained in the previous chapters, I derive the following hypotheses: 
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H1a: “On average, females will score higher on anti-violence values when 
compared to males.” 
H1b: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less likely, on 
average, to believe a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect is 
appropriate or legal.” 
H1c: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, 
on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to reduce 
police violence.” 
Much of my focus in this chapter is on whether individuals who condemn 
violence are more likely to support public policies to decrease the prevalence of police 
violence in the United States. I expect that the answer is “yes”, in many cases violence-
averse individuals will be significantly more likely to sympathize with, support, and 
demand justice for victims. However, I argue that violence-justifying ideologies have the 
power to dampen the effects of anti-violence sentiment. In the following pages I examine 
additional factors that should attenuate the otherwise positive effects of anti-violence 
values. When it comes to questions of police violence, one prejudicial belief system 
(violence-justifying ideologies) warrants additional discussion. Racial Stereotypes can 
lead people to excuse police violence and be unsympathetic to victims. I discuss facets of 
race and police violence in more detail in the following sections. 
5.7 Racial Attributions and Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System 
Research examining the role of racial resentment and stereotypes in predicting 
white individuals’ evaluations of the criminal justice system is extensive (Johnson 2008; 
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Ghandnoosh 2014; Hutchings 2015; Filindra & Kaplan 2016). And, the idea that racism 
drives many individuals’ crime policy preferences has serious implications; institutional 
legitimacy is based on the idea that in a “democratic society it is unacceptable for racial 
prejudice to guide public policy. Insofar as racial prejudice motivates calls by the public 
and perhaps public officials for the harsher treatment of criminals, such treatment is 
unjustified” (Barkan and Cohn 1998, 751). We know, for instance, that the punitive 
attitudes of whites toward criminals are based partially on racial prejudice (Cohn et al. 
1991; Aguirre & Baker 1993; Green et al. 2006; Peffley et al. 2017), and that racial 
prejudice conditions many whites’ fear of being criminally victimized (St. John & Heald-
Moore 1996; Oliver & Fonash 2002; Farrell et al. 2009).  
Research suggests that support for capital punishment also varies by race, and that 
whites are more likely than blacks to support the death penalty (Young 1991; Soss et al. 
2003; Barkan & Cohn 2005). This is not surprising; like much of the justice system in the 
United States, capital punishment takes a disproportionate toll on people of color. It could 
be argued, from a historical standpoint, that racial disparities in capital punishment 
represent an institutional extension of the barbarous lynching of blacks beginning in the 
19th century. Today, numerous southern states – including Mississippi, Georgia, 
Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana – are part of what scholars call the “death belt” because 
of the “high correlation they find between the history of lynching against African-
Americans and today's disproportionate arrests, prosecution, and sentencing to death of 
African-Americans” (Mikulich 2015).  
Research beyond the United States provides additional evidence that minority 
group-members oppose the death penalty more than members of the majority. Focusing 
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on Eastern Europe, Peshkopia and Voss found that “attitudes toward the death penalty 
depend on the extent to which one identifies with the rulers who would control the 
instruments of death” (2016, 39).   
While the association between racial attitudes and policy preferences is well-
documented, so too are the weaknesses of common measures for racial stereotypes and 
resentment (Huddy & Feldman 2009). In a recent study, Peffley et al. (2017) used 
dispositional attribution in place of common stereotype measures to overcome a major 
problem – they ignore perceptions of racial discrimination. The authors constructed two 
separate, and distinct measures of racial attributes, “one that focuses on blacks’ 
dispositions (e.g. blacks’ tendency toward violence and crime) and another focusing on 
discrimination against blacks (e.g. whether police and courts are biased against blacks)” 
(2017, 1). To test the new measures, they examined racial disparities in support for 
capital punishment. 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three arguments against the death 
penalty. They were presented either a “racial argument” that blacks are more likely to be 
put to death, a “innocent argument” that too many innocent people are being put to death, 
or a “no argument” baseline that simply asked whether the respondent favors or opposes 
capital punishment. Among black respondents, they found that both arguments decreased 
support for capital punishment. Across all groups, racial dispositions had no significant 
effect on support for capital punishment in the baseline condition. On the other hand, 
results indicated that whites who blame blacks’ harsh treatment by the criminal justice 
system on their disposition, when presented the “racial argument”, became more 
supportive of the death penalty compared to those in the baseline condition – what 
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scholars call the “backlash effect” (Knoll et al. 2011). This research provides important 
insight on how arguments against punitive policies are received by different audiences. If 
individuals, interest groups, politicians, and policymakers want to gain support for 
criminal justice reforms, issue-framing suggests that tailoring policy proposals to specific 
audiences is one way to increase support. This should apply to reforms intended to 
decrease incidents of lethal officer-involved shootings.  
Numerous cities in the United States have implemented training programs to 
prepare law enforcement officers to de-escalate and safely manage crises. When an 
individual poses a serious threat to an officer or others the officer is authorized to use 
lethal force, yet de-escalation methods enable officers to manage many dangerous 
encounters without discharging a firearm. Effective communication and active listening 
are sometimes sufficient, but if an individual resists verbal commands an officer could 
use “soft” bodily force (e.g. grabbing, restraining), or “hard” bodily force (e.g. hitting, 
kicking) if necessary, to gain control of the situation. When these methods are not 
enough, officers have a range of non-lethal technologies including batons, chemical 
sprays, and high-voltage tasers. If officers use these methods appropriately the need for 
using deadly force decreases (Oliva et al. 2010). Convincing officers on the beat that less 
aggressive measures can be effective, however, may be difficult. In a 2016 survey of law 
enforcement, 56 percent of officers agreed that “in certain areas of the city it is more 
useful for an officer to be aggressive than to be courteous”, and 44 percent agreed that 
“some people can only be brought to reason the hard, physical way” (Morin et al. 2017). 
Officers’ tendency to be aggressive could be rooted in self-preservation; recent research 
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suggests that law enforcement officers working for departments with de-escalation 
policies are more likely to be killed or injured in the line of duty (Douliery 2017).  
Following the Michael Brown shooting in 2014 public demands for police 
reforms reached a fever pitch, leading then-President Barack Obama to order a 
Presidential Task Force on 21st Century Policing to conduct nationwide inquiries of law 
enforcement agencies. The final report, released in 2015, included 60 recommendations 
to improve police-community relations. One of those recommendations was a call to 
designate de-escalation a core element of police training and practice (President’s Task 
Force on 21st Century Policing 2015). Research suggests that de-escalation will help 
decrease use-of-force incidents and improve officers’ ability to resolve conflicts without 
violence (Oliva et al. 2010). Others argue that de-escalation training is as important as 
academy training in physical force and self-defense (Walker & Katz 2013). Much like the 
death penalty and other punitive policies, it is likely that support for police reforms varies 
by race. In order to gain support for police reforms, issue-framing suggests that tailoring 
policy proposals to specific audiences is one way to increase support. Based on prior 
research I derive the following hypotheses: 
H2a.  “Blacks and other minorities will be more likely, on average, to attribute 
racial disparities in the justice system to racial discrimination when compared to 
whites.”  
H2b. “Because discrimination attributions focus on racial bias among police and 
courts, individuals who embrace the idea that the justice system is biased against 
blacks will be less likely, on average, to approve of a police officer shooting – and 
killing – a black suspect.” 
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H2c. “Because dispositional attributions focus on racial stereotypes, whites who 
embrace negative stereotypes about blacks, when presented the “racial 
argument” will be less likely, on average, to support institutional reforms to 
decrease police violence when compared to those in the baseline condition.” 
H2d. “Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-
violence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black 
dispositions will be less likely, on average, to condemn a police officer shooting – 
and killing – a black suspect.” 
H2e. “Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-
violence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black 
dispositions will be less likely, on average, to support policies to track and reduce 
police violence.” 
5.8 Racial Amalgamation of Officer and Suspect  
 Researchers, activists, and interested members of the public do not have access to 
definitive statistics on police-involved fatalities in the United States. While detailed 
information is not always available, journalists and organizations that maintain data on 
police killings agree that around 1,000 to 1,200 occur annually. Young black males – 
particularly those in their 20s – are at greatest risk of being killed by police, and 
minorities in general are more likely to be killed than white individuals (Edwards 2019). 
The amalgamation of race between an officer and suspect in OIS incidents matters – 
especially when the officer is white, and the suspect is black. Debates over shootings 
exhibit a recurring theme; white officers are primarily to blame for the death of young 
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black males. Yet, it is difficult to test whether racial disparities vary by officer 
characteristics because most available databases do not include details about the officers 
involved. Johnson et al. (2019) spent more than 1500 hours collecting data for their paper 
on racial disparities in OIS. Armed with the information reported by the Washington Post 
and the Guardian, the authors contacted listed police departments (more than 650 in 
total) to uncover the characteristics of the officers involved. They used that information 
to create a national database for every fatal OIS (more than 900) that occurred in the 
United States in 2015, and it includes the race/ethnicity of the officer involved. After 
close examination of the data, the authors found “no evidence of anti-black or anti-
Hispanic disparities across shootings, and white officers are not more likely to shoot 
minority civilians than non-white officers. Instead, race-specific crime strongly predicts 
civilian race. That is, as crime rates increase for a given group (e.g. blacks or Hispanics) 
the odds that a person belonging to that group will be killed by police increases as well 
(2019, 15877). The authors admit, however, that their analyses examine racial disparities 
only in shootings that result in deaths, and not officers’ decision to use force more 
generally.  
 Extant research provides many reasons blacks might be suspicious of, and 
negatively evaluate incidents involving police use of force (Weitzer and Tuch 1999; 
Reisig and Parks 2000; Rosenbaum 2005). Shootings involving a white officer and a 
black civilian often spark additional violence and destruction. From Ferguson, Baltimore, 
and Charlotte we know that local protests of police violence sometimes transform to 
widespread riots. Following the announcement that Officer Darren Wilson would not be 
indicted for killing Michael Brown more than 25 buildings in and around Ferguson were 
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burned and many more were vandalized and looted. Hundreds of vehicles, and entire car 
lots were also set ablaze (New York Times 2014). Widespread riots in Baltimore in 
protest to the death of Freddie Gray while in police custody caused an estimated $9 
million in damages. More than 100 vehicles and 15 buildings were incinerated as 
violence swept the city (Toppa 2015). Finally, protests turned to riots lasting weeks in 
Charlotte after police shot and killed Keith Lamont Scott in an apartment complex 
parking lot. Damage to buildings, including the Nascar Hall of Fame and the Convention 
Center, along with overtime pay for police and firefighters cost taxpayers upwards of 
$4.6 million (Harrison 2016). 
 In its 2017 survey of police and the public, the Pew Research Center asked, 
“How much of the protest over deaths of blacks during encounters with the police are 
motivated by long-standing bias against the police?” 95 percent of white officers and 85 
percent of whites believe that protests are at least somewhat motivated by anti-police 
bias, and 64 percent of black officers agree. However, 64 percent of blacks believe that 
protests are motivated by a genuine desire to hold police accountable for their actions. 
Understanding the factors that contribute to evaluations of police violence is crucial from 
a policy standpoint. If citizens believe that racial disparities in OIS are a direct result of 
discrimination by white officers, policies to increase the diversity of those officers might 
improve community-police relations. Based on prior research assessing attitudes toward 
law enforcement, I derive the following hypotheses: 
H3a. “Police shootings involving a white officer and a black suspect are common 
in the news. When a black suspect is killed by a white officer respondents will be 
less likely, on average, to agree that the use of deadly force was appropriate.” 
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H3b. “In some cases, officers have no choice but to use lethal force. When a 
suspect imposes a high level of threat on an officer respondents will be more 
likely, on average, to believe that the use of deadly force was legal.” 
 To examine the role of race and other factors in citizens’ evaluations of police 
violence I utilized a 2 * 2 * 3 experimental survey design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either a control, or one of four treatment conditions which varied the racial 
amalgamation of a police officer and a suspect (“baseline” vs. “BO / BS” vs. “BO / WS” 
vs. “WO / WS” vs. “WO / BS), and media frames depicting the level of threat imposed 
by a suspect (“low” vs. “medium”, vs. “high”) as the independent variables.34 The photo 
variation is important; respondents were told nothing explicitly to make them focus on 
race.  Threat was portrayed using four fictitious police shooting scenarios. In each 
scenario, the suspect was wanted on felony charges for assault with a deadly weapon. In 
the “low threat” condition, he exits his vehicle and advances toward the responding 
officer before suddenly stopping and running in the opposite direction. In the “medium 
threat” condition the suspect also advances on the officer before stopping and reaching 
for his inside jacket pocket. Finally, in the “high threat” condition, our suspect advances, 
stops, but then reaches for a firearm protruding from his waistband. The treatments I 
employed in the survey experiment are included in “Appendix B”, and examples of each 
are included in Figure 5.8.1, and 5.8.2 below.35 
 
 
34 In sample A, the threat condition was presented as a fictional newspaper account of a police shooting. 
In sample B, the threat condition was presented textually in the body of the survey. 
35 Racial amalgamations: baseline: race-neutral control group; BO/BS: black officer/black suspect; 
BO/WS: black officer/white suspect; WO/WS: white officer/white suspect; WO/BS: white officer/black 
suspect. Threat: low; medium; high. 
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Figure 5.8.1 | Image Frame for White Officer / Black Suspect 
  
Figure 5.8.2 | Image Frame for High Threat to Officer 
 
This experimental manipulation allowed me to establish the causal effect of racial 
characteristics and threat on individuals’ belief that the officer acted not only 
appropriately, but legally. 
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5.9 Data and Measurements 
To test my assumptions about anti-violence values, racial attributions in the 
justice system, confidence in the police, and experience with law enforcement – along 
with the level of threat a suspect imposes, the racial amalgamation of an officer and 
suspect, on respondents’ evaluations of an officer involved shooting incident, and support 
for policies to reform policing, I administered two surveys.  
Data from two unique surveys are reported throughout this chapter. Anti-violence 
values were assessed with one of two measures, but my primary focus is on the 
inductively specified scale produced in chapter 3 (see Table 5.9.1). Independent and 
dependent variables of interest are not uniform across each survey sample, so findings are 
reported where available throughout the relevant subsections herein. Sample A 
administered question items in an online questionnaire form to 736 unique Mechanical 
Turk workers. This survey included a seven-item honor-based measure which I 
constructed using deductive reasoning (i.e. choosing the question items from the full 
honor beliefs scale which I premised would best capture a person’s orientation toward 
violence).36  
 
36 Deductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “An individual should not be afraid to fight”; “People should be 
expected to fight for themselves”; “You would want your child to stand up to bullies”; “A person who 
doesn’t ‘take any crap’ from anybody is an admirable reputation to have”; “It is a person’s responsibility 
to protect their family”; “If an individual is insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family 
should be their number one priority”. 
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Sample B administered additional question items, including the seven-item 
inductive version of anti-violence values to 1,120 unique Mechanical Turk workers.37 
violence).38 Sample B administered additional question items, including the seven-item 
inductive version of anti-violence values to 1,120 unique Mechanical Turk workers.39  
Table 5.9.1 | Survey Samples for Police Violence Analyses 
 
I controlled for the effects of factors common to most empirical analyses in the 
social sciences including individuals’ age, biological sex, education, income, and political 
ideology. Based on prior research, I also included several items which should be useful in 
characterizing individuals and their views of the justice system, or that might influence 
 
37 Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “It is important for a person to be tougher than other people”; A 
person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp”; You would praise a person who acted 
aggressively to an insult”; “Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable”; “It is morally 
wrong for a person to walk away from a fight”; “A person who doesn’t take any crap from anybody is an 
admirable reputation to have”; and “Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself”. 
 
 
38 Deductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “An individual should not be afraid to fight”; “People should be 
expected to fight for themselves”; “You would want your child to stand up to bullies”; “A person who 
doesn’t ‘take any crap’ from anybody is an admirable reputation to have”; “It is a person’s responsibility 
to protect their family”; “If an individual is insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family 
should be their number one priority”. 
 
39 Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “It is important for a person to be tougher than other people”; A 
person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp”; You would praise a person who acted 
aggressively to an insult”; “Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable”; “It is morally 
wrong for a person to walk away from a fight”; “A person who doesn’t take any crap from anybody is an 
admirable reputation to have”; and “Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself”. 
 
 
INDUCTIVE DEDUCTIVE
SURVEY DATE SAMPLE TYPE MHBS HBS ANTI-VIOLENCE ANTI-VIOLENCE
Sample A 5/21/2018 N = 737 M-Turk O O O P
Sample B 3/10/2020 N = (1,120) M-Turk O O P O
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attitudes toward suspects, law enforcement, and policies to address police violence. 
Following Jacoby (2000) I included a control for attitudes toward government spending 
which asked respondents to place themselves on a continuum between the following 
positions: 0 “Government should provide many fewer services, reduce spending a lot”, 
and 10 “Government should provide many more services, increase spending a lot”.  
In both samples I included a control for authoritarianism. The most popular 
measure today is Altemeyer’s Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale (Altemeyer 1981; 
1988, 1996), but critics argue that it confounds social conservatism and authoritarianism 
(Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). While much of the extant research suggests that 
authoritarianism is a uniquely right-wing phenomena, recent research (Conway III et al. 
2017) supports the idea that left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) is also a viable construct 
in ordinary United States samples. 
Conway III et al. found that left-wing authoritarianism significantly correlates 
with measures of liberalism, prejudice, dogmatism, and attitude strength which “largely 
paralleled those correlating with RWA with identical conservative-focused 
measurements, and an overall effect-size measurement showed LWA was similarly 
related to those constructs” (2017, 1). In sample A, I included a truncated version of both 
the right-wing (Altemeyer 1996) and the left-wing (Conway III et al. 2017) 
authoritarianism scales. Respondents were randomly assigned to complete either the 
RWA, or LWA battery.  
In sample B, following Hetherington et al. (2011) I used the four-item 
authoritarianism index included in the American National Election Survey (ANES) which 
asks respondents to indicate which of two positive traits is most important for a child to 
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have: “respect for elders” versus “independence”; “obedience” versus “self-reliance”; 
“curiosity” versus “good manners”; and “being considerate” versus “being well-
behaved”. As the authors point out, these values are “fairly well-divorced from political 
ideology and attitudes; therefore, the measure is unlikely to be conflated with social 
conservatism and is easily distinguishable from the dependent variables” (551).  
Where anti-violence values play a primary role in my analysis, I focus solely on 
sample B, which includes the inductively derived anti-violence measure. Recall that 
principal component analysis in Chapter 3 produced a 7-item attitudes toward violence 
factor (Eigenvalue = 1.85) including items that tap either the belief that individuals 
should maintain a no-nonsense reputation, or that violence is often acceptable. These 
were the least popular question items suggesting that most individuals do not condone 
violence. Respondents reported their agreement with these statements on seven-point 
scales ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”, and the scale was then 
recoded so that higher scores indicated a greater aversion to violence. 
Sex Differences: 
Recall H1a, that “On average, females will score higher on anti-violence values 
when compared to males”. An independent t-test was run on the data from Sample B to 
determine if there were differences in the endorsement of anti-violence values based upon 
the respondent’s biological sex. H1a was supported and is visually displayed in Figure 
5.9.2 below.40 
 
 
40 Sample B: (t = 7.12, with 1,119 degrees of freedom, p < .001) 
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Figure 5.9.1 | Anti-Violence Values 
 
Females, on average, scored significantly higher on anti-violence values when 
compared to males in sample B. Because the deductively derived scale administered in 
sample A is statistically inferior to the inductively derived version administered in sample 
B, results for the former were excluded.41  
Respondents’ dispositional (internal) and systemic (external) explanations for 
racial disparities in the justice system were measured following Peffley et al. (2017). The 
“blacks discriminated against” items tap respondents’ agreement with the idea that the 
police and the justice system are biased against blacks. The “blacks’ negative 
dispositions” items tap respondents’ agreement with the idea that blacks are more 
aggressive by nature, and more likely to commit crimes.  
 
41 Some question items (e.g. “It is a person’s responsibility to protect their family”; “If an individual is 
insulted, that person’s pride is insulted”; “A person’s family should be their number one priority”) are 
likely not related to individuals’ orientation toward violence, which might explain the lower scores on 
these scales for both sexes when compared to the statistically constructed scale in sample B. 
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Recall H2a. Blacks and other minorities will be more likely, on average, to 
attribute racial disparities in the justice system to racial discrimination when compared 
to whites. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine whether 
individual perceptions of discrimination in the justice system varied by respondents’ 
race/ethnicity. Data is mean +/- standard error.  
In sample A, participants were classified into four groups: white (n= 562), black 
(n= 52), Hispanic/Latino (n= 43), and other (n= 79). Despite the fact that the number of 
respondents in most groups is relatively small, and disproportionately so compared to the 
“white” group, these numbers are high enough to warrant subgroup analyses.42 
Preliminary analyses showed that there were statistically significant differences between 
group means (F (3, 732) = 12.99, p < .001), and a Tukey post-hoc test revealed that 
blacks (0.82 +/- 0.14, p < .001), and Hispanics/Latinos (0.38 +/- 0.15, p = .060), are 
significantly more likely than whites to believe that the police and the justice system are 
biased against blacks.43 However, those who identified as “other” were significantly less 
likely than blacks to believe that the police and the justice system are biased against 
blacks (-0.38 +/- 0.17, p < .001). There were no statistically significant differences 
between the remaining racial/ethnic groups. An additional analysis was conducted to 
 
42 Six assumptions must be met to obtain valid results using a one-way Anova: 1) the dependent variable 
should be continuous; 2) the independent variable should consist of three or more unrelated groups; 3) 
there should be independence of observations; 4) there should be no significant outliers; 5) data should 
be normally distributed in each group; and 6) there should be homogeneity of variance. While 
unequal/small sample sizes can affect the homogeneity of variance assumption, a Bartlett’s test for equal 
variance indicated that heterogeneity of variance is not a problem. For sample A, all six assumptions for a 
valid one-way Anova analysis were satisfied. 
 
43 A Tukey post-hoc test is used to examine the specific differences between three or more groups when 
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) produces a significant F-test. ANOVA alone will not reveal exactly where 
those differences lie. 
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determine whether individual perceptions of blacks’ dispositions varied by respondents’ 
race.  
Preliminary analyses showed that there were statistically significant differences 
between group means (F (3, 732) = 2.65, p < .05), and a Tukey post-hoc test revealed that 
blacks are significantly less likely than whites to believe that blacks are more aggressive 
by nature and more likely to commit crimes (-0.30 +/- 0.12, p < .05). However, those 
who identified as “other” were significantly more likely than blacks to embrace negative 
black stereotypes (0.37 +/- 0.15, p < .05) see Table 5.9.2 below. 
Table 5.9.2 | ANOVA for Justice System Discriminatory, by Race/Ethnicity 
 
In sample B, participants were classified into four groups: white (n= 837), black 
(n= 92), Hispanic/Latino (n= 63), and other (n= 127). Preliminary analyses showed that 
Justice System Discriminatory
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Prob > F
Between Groups 36.17 3.00 12.06 12.99 0.00
Within Groups 679.57 733.00 0.93
Total 715.74 736.00 0.98
Group Means
N Mean SD
White 563 2.47 0.97
Black 52 3.29 0.79
Hispanic/Latino 43 2.85 1.09
Other 79 2.51 0.96
Total 736 2.55 0.99
Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)
Differences in Means
Contrast Std. Err. ᵼ p > |ᵼ| Lower Upper
Black v. White 0.82 0.14 5.88 0.00 0.46 1.18
Hispanic/Latino v. White 0.38 0.15 2.50 0.06 -0.01 0.77
Other v. White 0.05 0.12 0.39 0.98 -0.25 0.34
Hispanic/Latino v. Black -0.44 0.20 -2.21 0.12 -0.95 0.07
Other v. Black -0.78 0.17 -4.51 0.00 -1.21 -0.33
Other v. Hispanic/Latino -0.34 0.18 -1.84 0.26 -0.81 0.13
Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)
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there were statistically significant differences between group means (F (3, 1115) = 7.99, 
p < .001), however, the data did not meet the six assumptions required for a valid 
ANOVA. As a result, I was not able to conduct sub-group analyses for sample B.44  
 Overall, H2a was partially supported. In sample A, blacks (0.82 +/- 0.14, p < 
.001), and Hispanics/Latinos (0.38 +/- 0.15, p = .060), were significantly more likely than 
whites to believe that the police and the justice system are biased against blacks. 
However, respondents who identified as “other” were not statistically different from 
whites. Additionally, blacks were significantly less likely than whites to believe that 
blacks are more aggressive by nature and more likely to commit crimes (-0.30 +/- 0.12, p 
< .05). In sample B, however, I was not able to conduct sub-group analyses because the 
ANOVA assumptions were not satisfied.  
Recall H3a, that “Police shootings involving a white officer and a black suspect 
are common in the news. When a black suspect is killed by a white officer individuals will 
be less likely, on average, to agree that the officers’ use of deadly force was 
appropriate”. Additionally, while the racial characteristics of an officer and suspect 
likely impacts individuals’ evaluation of a lethal OIS, the level of threat imposed by a 
suspect should be an important consideration as well. Thus, H3b, “In some cases, officers 
have no choice but to use lethal force. When a suspect imposes a high level of threat upon 
an officer individuals will be more likely, on average, to believe that the officer’s use of 
lethal force was appropriate or legal”. 
 
44 The data for sample B did not meet the six assumptions required for valid ANOVA results. The 
unequal/small sample sizes in sample B affected the homogeneity of variance assumption. Although 
ANOVA is considered robust to moderate departures from this assumption, they should be small when 
the sample sizes are vastly different. Additionally, a Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that the data for “whites” 
and “blacks” was not normally distributed – another assumption required to obtain valid ANOVA results 
(Pierce et al. 2004). 
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Respondents were randomly assigned to either a baseline condition with very 
little information about the suspect or officer in a fictional account of a deadly OIS, or 
one of four treatment conditions varying the racial amalgamation of the officer and 
suspect involved. Using an experimental design, I examined the effect of the racial 
amalgamation of an officer and suspect, and the level of threat imposed upon an officer, 
on respondents’ evaluations of a police shooting – including whether they believe the 
officer’s actions were appropriate or legal.45 The distinction is important; some OIS are 
determined to be technically legal, but not necessarily appropriate (e.g. some form of 
non-lethal force may have been sufficient).  
I also developed four fictitious police shooting scenarios to examine the impact of 
the level of threat imposed. In each scenario, the suspect was wanted on felony charges 
for assault with a deadly weapon. In the “low threat” condition, he exits his vehicle and 
advances toward the responding officer before suddenly stopping and running in the 
opposite direction. In the “medium threat” condition the suspect also advances on the 
officer before stopping and reaching for his inside jacket pocket. Finally, in the “high 
threat” condition, our suspect advances, stops, but then reaches for a firearm protruding 
from his waistband.  
 
 
45 Control: No racial information provided; BO/BS: Black officer; black suspect; BO/WS: Black officer; 
white suspect; WO/WS: White officer; white suspect; WO/BS: White officer; black suspect. In survey 
sample A, whether the officer acted appropriately was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1. 
“Inappropriately” to 5. “Appropriately”.  
 
Whether the officer acted within the law was a dichotomous measure: 0. “No” and 1. “Yes”. Because this 
is not a continuous variable, I did not conduct ANOVA to examine differences in group means. Evaluations 
of legality are assessed using logistic regression in the following section. 
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5.10 Experimental Results – Belief that a Lethal OIS was Appropriate  
Racial Amalgamation of Officer and Suspect 
Respondents were randomly assigned to view either the control, or one of four 
treatment conditions. In survey sample A (N= 736), the difference in the average score on 
“appropriate” between treatment groups was significant (F (4, 732) = 6.46, p < 0.001). 
The Post Hoc results are displayed in Table 5.10.1.46 
Table 5.10.1 | ANOVA for Racial Amalgamation Experimental Conditions 
 
 
46 Differences in group means are excluded if the difference did not achieve statistical significance. 
 
Officer Acted Appropriately
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Prob > F
Between Groups 48.80 4.00 12.20 6.46 0.00
Within Groups 1381.46 732.00 1.89
Total 1430.26 736.00 1.95
Group Means
N Mean SD
Baseline 129 2.24 1.43
Black Officer/Black Suspect 136 2.51 1.33
Black Officer/White Suspect 153 2.80 1.44
White Officer/White Suspect 148 2.45 1.44
White Officer/Black Suspect 170 2.07 1.23
Total 736 2.41 1.39
Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)
Differences in Means
Contrast Std. Err. ᵼ p > |ᵼ| Lower Upper
BO/WS v. Baseline 0.56 0.16 3.43 0.01 0.11 1.01
WO/BS v. BO/BS -0.44 0.16 -2.81 0.04 -0.88 -0.01
WO/BS v. BO/WS -0.73 0.15 -4.79 0.01 -1.15 -0.31
Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)
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In survey sample B (N= 1120), the difference in the average score between treatment 
groups on “appropriate” was significant (F (4, 731) = 6.46, p < 0.001). The Post Hoc 
results are displayed in Table 5.10.2.47 
Table 5.10.2 | ANOVA for Racial Amalgamation Experimental Conditions 
 
Overall, H3a “Police shootings involving a white officer and a black suspect are 
common in the news. When a black suspect is killed by a white officer respondents will be 
less likely, on average, to agree that the use of deadly force was appropriate” was 
partially supported. In many cases, respondents were prejudiced against white police 
officers dealing with African-American suspects. In sample A, respondents who received 
the “WO/BS” treatment were significantly less likely than those who received the 
“BO/BS” to believe the officer’s actions were appropriate (-0.44 +/- 0.16, p < .05). Those 
 
47 Differences in group means are excluded if the difference did not achieve statistical significance. 
In survey sample B, whether the officer acted appropriately was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 
1. “Extremely Inappropriately” to 7. “Extremely Appropriately”. 
 
Officer Acted Appropriately
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Prob > F
Between Groups 48.88 4.00 12.22 3.39 0.01
Within Groups 4000.11 1016.00 3.61
Total 4048.99 1120.00 3.64
Group Means
N Mean SD
Baseline 211 4.36 1.88
Black Officer/Black Suspect 205 4.58 1.86
Black Officer/White Suspect 239 4.78 1.89
White Officer/White Suspect 223 4.23 1.98
White Officer/Black Suspect 240 4.71 1.88
Total 1120 4.54 1.91
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)
Differences in Means
Contrast Std. Err. ᵼ p > |ᵼ| Lower Upper
WO/BS v. BO/BS -0.55 0.18 -3.11 0.02 -1.03 -0.07
BO/WS v. WO/BS 0.48 0.17 2.70 0.04 -0.01 0.97
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)
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who received the “WO/BS” treatment were significantly less likely than those who 
received the “BO/WS” to believe the officer’s actions were appropriate (-0.73 +/- 0.15, p 
< .001). Those who received the “BO/WS” treatment were significantly more likely than 
those who received the “Control” to believe the officer’s actions were appropriate (0.56 
+/- 0.16, p < .001).   However, respondents who received the “WO/BS” treatment were 
not significantly more likely to disapprove of the officer’s actions compared to those in 
the “Control” group (F (-0.17) = 0.16, p = .828).  
To unpack these results in more detail, treatment group means for sample A – 
broken down by respondents’ race/ethnicity, on belief the officer acted appropriately – 
compared to control group means – are displayed in figure 5.10.1 below. Surprisingly, 
significant differences in evaluations of the officer’s actions, across treatment groups, 
emerged only among white respondents. 
In sample B, preliminary analyses showed that there were statistically significant 
differences between group means (F (3, 1115) = 7.99, p < .001), however, the data did 
not meet the six assumptions required for a valid ANOVA. As a result, I was not able to 
conduct sub-group analyses for sample B.48 
 
 
 
 
48 The data for sample B did not meet the six assumptions required for valid ANOVA results. The 
unequal/small sample sizes in sample B affected the homogeneity of variance assumption. Although 
ANOVA is considered robust to moderate departures from this assumption, they should be small when 
the sample sizes are vastly different. Additionally, a Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that the data for “whites” 
and “blacks” was not normally distributed – another assumption required to obtain valid ANOVA results 
(Pierce et al. 2004). 
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Figure 5.10.1 | Belief that the Officer Acted Appropriately, by Race/Ethnicity 
 
Level of Threat Imposed by the Suspect 
Respondents were randomly assigned to view one of three treatment conditions 
varying the level of threat imposed upon the officer. In survey sample A (N = 736), the 
difference in the average score on “appropriate” between treatment groups was not 
significant (F (2, 734) = 0.15, p = 0.86). In survey sample B (N = 1,120), however, the 
difference in the average score on “appropriate” between treatment groups was 
significant (F (2, 1,118) = 20.90, p = 0.00). The Post Hoc results are displayed in Table 
5.10.3.49 
 
 
49 Differences in group means are excluded if the difference did not achieve statistical significance. 
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Table 5.10.3 | ANOVA for Threat Imposed Experimental Conditions 
 
Overall, H3b “In some cases, officers have no choice but to use lethal force. When 
a suspect imposes a high level of threat on an officer respondents will be more likely, on 
average, to believe that the use of deadly force was legal.” was partially supported. In 
sample B, respondents who received the “Medium Threat” treatment were significantly 
more likely than those who received the “Low Threat” to believe the officer’s actions 
were appropriate (+0.52 +/- 0.14, p = 0.00). Those who received the “High Threat” 
treatment were significantly more likely than those who received the “Low Threat” to 
believe the officer’s actions were appropriate (+0.88 +/- 0.14, p < 0.00). Finally, those 
who received the “High Threat” treatment were significantly more likely than those who 
received the “Medium Threat” to believe the officer’s actions were appropriate (+0.36 +/- 
0.14, p < 0.02).    
 
Threat Imposed by Suspect
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Prob > F
Between Groups 146.83 2.00 73.42 20.90 0.00
Within Groups 3902.16 1018.00 3.51
Total 4048.99 1120.00 3.64
Group Means
N Mean SD
Low Threat 369 4.06 1.89
Medium Threat 356 4.58 1.85
High Threat 395 4.94 1.88
Total 1120 4.54 1.91
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)
Differences in Means
Contrast Std. Err. ᵼ p > |ᵼ| Lower Upper
Medium v. Low Threat 0.52 0.14 3.69 0.00 0.19 0.84
High v. Low Threat 0.88 0.14 6.45 0.00 0.56 1.20
High v. Medium Threat 0.36 0.14 2.65 0.02 0.04 0.68
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)
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Multiple-Regression Models 
 Overall, ANOVA indicated that when it comes to evaluations of lethal officer-
involved shootings the racial amalgamation of the officer and the suspect involved 
matter. When the officer is white, people tend to be more suspicious and less likely to 
view his actions favorably. On the other hand, when the officer is black, people tend to be 
less skeptical and more likely to believe the officer’s actions were appropriate. The 
treatment that garnered the strongest opposition, as expected, was the lethal OIS 
involving a white officer and a black suspect. For the reasons put forth throughout this 
chapter, it is not surprising that people are often apprehensive when a white officer kills a 
black suspect.  
 When it comes to assessments of the level of threat the suspect imposes, the 
results were mixed. In sample A, there were no significant differences in evaluations of 
the officer’s actions based upon “threat”. I suspect, however, that this was because 
respondents failed to closely read the fictitious newspaper accounts of the OIS, which 
rendered the treatment ineffective. In sample B, threat was transmitted textually within 
the body of the survey. As a result, approval of the officer’s actions increased 
significantly as the level of threat increased.   
My results thus far are unfolded mostly as expected, however, I have examined 
differences in individuals’ evaluation of an OIS based only on the racial characteristics of 
the officer and suspect – and the level of threat imposed by the suspect – independently, 
absent additional covariates. I now turn to testing my remaining hypotheses for 
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evaluations of a lethal OIS. Specifically, H1b: “Respondents who score higher on anti-
violence values will be less likely, on average, to believe a police officer shooting – and 
killing – a suspect is appropriate or legal”, and H2b. “Because discrimination 
attributions focus on racial bias among police and courts, individuals who embrace the 
idea that the justice system is biased against blacks will be less likely, on average, to 
approve of a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect. 
My overarching argument throughout this project is that violence-justifying 
ideologies (primarily racial animus in the current analysis) will cancel out any 
normatively positive outcomes that individuals’ aversion to violence might otherwise 
produce. Assessing the attitudes that help determine individuals’ assessment of a lethal 
police encounter provide another opportunity to empirically test my theory. Specifically, 
H2d: “Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence 
values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less 
likely, on average, to condemn a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect.” 
In order to test my hypotheses, I estimated five models.50 My key independent 
variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the 2-item measure of negative 
stereotypes (blacks’ negative dispositions). To assess the effect of negative stereotypes 
about blacks on the predictive power of individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an 
interaction term between blacks’ negative dispositions and anti-violence values. I expect 
racial stereotypes to produce negative signs: respondents who believe that blacks are to 
 
50 In the first model, I looked only at the racial amalgamation of the officer and suspect, and the 
race/ethnicity of the respondents. Model 2 incorporates the level of threat imposed upon the officer. 
Model 3 includes my measure of anti-violence values to examine its function absent competing 
covariates. Model 4 incorporates the remaining independent variables that I believe help shape 
evaluations of police violence, and Model 5, which I discuss in detail, includes my interaction term of 
blacks negative dispositions * anti-violence values. 
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blame for racial disparities in the justice system, will be more likely to endorse police 
violence. Anti-violence values should produce positive signs: the more a respondent 
abhors violence, the more likely they will be to disapprove of a lethal officer-involved 
shooting. My underlying assumption, however, is that interacting these variables will 
produce a negative sign; as racism increases, anti-violence values will no longer predict 
disapproval of the officer’s actions. 
I included additional experimental variables including the racial amalgamation of 
the officer and suspect (Control, BO/BS, BO/WS, WO/WS, WO/BS), and the level of 
threat imposed by the suspect (Low, Medium, High). The models also include age, 
education, income, biological sex, race/ethnicity, blacks’ negative dispositions, blacks 
discriminated against, political ideology (conservatism), and authoritarianism.51 Results 
from the fully specified model are reported for sample B; entries are OLS coefficients 
with standard errors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 In the interest of saving space age, education, income, and biological sex (not significant) were omitted 
from the regression table. 
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Mechanical Turk Sample B 
Table 5.10.4 | Belief that the Officer Acted Appropriately 
 
In the fully specified model for sample B, we see that the racial characteristics of 
the officer and suspect have a significant impact on individuals’ belief that the officer’s 
MODEL 5
Racial Amalgamation
Black Officer / Black Suspect 0.418 ** 0.384 ** 0.413 ** 0.437 ** 0.439 **
(0.179) (0.176) (0.176) (0.171) (0.172)
Black Officer / White Suspect 0.354 ** 0.313 ** 0.342 ** 0.399 ** 0.403 **
(0.179) (0.177) (0.172) (0.171) (0.172)
White Officer / White Suspect 0.207 0.203 0.208 0.216 0.217
(0.186) (0.183) (0.183) (0.178) (0.178)
White Officer / Black Suspect        -0.118        -0.118        -0.095        -0.021        -0.017
(0.182) (0.179) (0.179) (0.174) (0.174)
Level of Threat Imposed
Medium 0.511 *** 0.516 *** 0.573 *** 0.571 ***
(0.139) (0.138) (0.134) (0.134)
High 0.852 *** 0.843 *** 0.851 *** 0.849 ***
(0.136) (0.135) (0.131) (0.131)
White 0.516 *** 0.517 *** 0.503 *** 0.298 * 0.293 *
(0.180) (0.177) (0.177) (0.173) (0.173)
Black 0.125 0.152 0.074 0.04 0.036
(0.261) (0.257) (0.259) (0.254) (0.255)
Hispanic / Latino 0.346 0.424 0.398 0.397 0.384
(0.292) (0.288) (0.281) (0.255) (0.283)
Anti-Violence -0.117 ** 0.009 0.061
(0.049) (0.053) (0.129)
Blacks Discriminated Against -0.28 *** -0.286 ***
(0.066) (0.068)
Blacks' Negative Dispositions          0.211 *** 0.133
(0.074) (0.190)
Conservatism 0.493 *** 0.493 ***
(0.132) (0.132)
Authoritarianism 0.146 0.15
(0.244) (0.244)
Blacks Negative Dispositions * -0.025
Anti-Violence (0.055)
Adj. R2 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.13
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1     
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)
MODEL 4MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
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actions were appropriate.52 Respondents in the “Black Officer / White Suspect” group 
(+0.40), and the “Black Officer / Black Suspect” (+0.44) groups were significantly more 
likely to believe the officer acted appropriately. White respondents were significantly 
more likely to agree (+0.29), all else equal. H2b. “Because discrimination attributions 
focus on racial bias among police and courts, individuals who embrace the idea that the 
justice system is biased against blacks will be less likely, on average, to approve of a 
police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect” was supported. For every one unit 
increase in a respondent’s belief that blacks are discriminated against respondents were 
less likely (-0.29) to approve of the officer’s actions. H1b: “Individuals who embrace anti-
violence values will be less likely to believe a police officer shooting – and killing – a 
suspect is appropriate or legal”; was not supported. Additionally, conservatives (+0.49) 
were more likely to side with the officer.  
Respondents presented with a medium level of threat (+0.57), or a high level of 
threat (+0.85) to the officer approved of the shooting significantly more than those 
presented with the low threat scenario. I found no empirical evidence to support H2d: that 
“Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. 
Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, 
on average, to condemn a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect.” The 
 
52 In the first model, I looked only at the racial amalgamation of the officer and suspect, and the 
race/ethnicity of the respondents. Model 2 incorporates the level of threat imposed upon the officer. 
Model 3 includes my measure of anti-violence values to examine its function absent competing 
covariates. Model 4 incorporates the remaining independent variables that I believe help shape 
evaluations of police violence, and Model 5, which I discuss in detail, includes my interaction term of 
blacks negative dispositions * anti-violence values. 
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coefficient for my interaction of blacks’ negative dispositions * anti-violence values 
performed as expected (-0.03) but was not significant.  
Table 5.10.5 | Belief that the Officer’s Actions were Legal 
 
In the fully specified model for sample B, we see that the racial characteristics of 
the officer and suspect have a significant impact on individuals’ belief that the officer’s 
actions were legal. Respondents in the “Black Officer / Black Suspect” group were 
significantly more likely (+0.44) to believe the officer acted within the law. H2b. 
MODEL 5
Racial Amalgamation
Black Officer / Black Suspect 0.087 ** 0.082 * 0.077 * 0.089 ** 0.089 **
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
Black Officer / White Suspect 0.004        -0.003        -0.007 0.003 0.005
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042)
White Officer / White Suspect 0.033 0.029 0.025 0.025 0.026
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
White Officer / Black Suspect        -0.024        -0.025        -0.022        -0.025        -0.031
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042)
Level of Threat Imposed
Medium 0.125 *** 0.124 *** 0.138 *** 0.137 ***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
High 0.167 *** 0.168 *** 0.174 *** 0.174 ***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
White 0.077 * 0.077 * 0.079 * 0.02 0.019
(0.043) (0.420) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Black        -0.066        -0.063        -0.051        -0.040        -0.041
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Hispanic / Latino 0.108 0.122 0.126 * 0.096 0.094
(0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068)
Anti-Violence 0.017 0.032 ** 0.042
(0.012) (0.012) (0.031)
Blacks Discriminated Against -0.061 *** -0.062 ***
(0.016) (0.016)
Blacks' Negative Dispositions          0.009 0.005
(0.018) (0.046)
Conservatism 0.097 *** 0.097 ***
(0.032) (0.032)
Authoritarianism 0.111 0.111
(0.059) (0.061)
Blacks Negative Dispositions * -0.005
Anti-Violence (0.013)
Adj. R2 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.1
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1     
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)
MODEL 4MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
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“Because discrimination attributions focus on racial bias among police and courts, 
individuals who embrace the idea that the justice system is biased against blacks will be 
less likely to approve of a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect” was 
supported. For every one unit increase in a respondent’s belief that blacks are 
discriminated against respondents were less likely (-0.06) to believe the officer’s actions 
were legal. H1b: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less 
likely, on average, to believe a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect is 
appropriate or legal” was not supported.  
Respondents presented with a medium level of threat (+0.14), or a high level of 
threat (+0.18) to the officer approved of the shooting significantly more than those 
presented with the low threat scenario. I found no empirical evidence to support H2d: 
“Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. 
Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, 
on average, to condemn a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect.” The 
coefficient for my interaction of blacks’ negative dispositions * anti-violence values 
performed opposite as expected (-0.03) but was not significant.  
In sum, the findings from sample B reveal consistent factors that impact 
individual evaluations of incidents of lethal OIS. Anti-violence values were not in this 
category; they were not a significant factor once other important predictors were included 
in the model. Respondents were not significantly more likely to disapprove of a shooting 
when the officer is white and the suspect is black, yet in every analysis, respondents were 
more likely to approve of the shooting when a black officer was involved. When the level 
of threat was measured in a straightforward manner, the perceived danger to the officer 
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pulling the trigger was an important factor. As the level of threat increased, respondents 
were significantly more likely to approve of the shooting and believe that the officer 
acted within the law. Those who believe that racial disparities in the criminal justice 
system result from discrimination against blacks were consistently less likely to approve 
of the shooting or believe that it was legal. Finally, conservatives were consistently and 
significantly more likely to condone police violence – regardless of the circumstances.  
5.11 Support for Policies to Better Track and Reduce Police Violence 
I now assess additional hypotheses concerning support for policies to better track 
and reduce police violence.53 Specifically, H1c: “Respondents who score higher on anti-
violence values will be more likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies 
and services to reduce police violence” and H2c. “Because dispositional attributions 
focus on racial stereotypes, whites who embrace negative stereotypes about blacks, when 
presented the “racial argument” will be less likely, on average, to support institutional 
reforms to decrease police violence when compared to those in the baseline condition.” 
My overarching argument throughout this project is that violence-justifying 
ideologies (racial animus in the current analysis) will cancel out any normatively positive 
outcomes that individuals’ aversion to violence might otherwise produce. Specifically, 
H2e: “Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence 
 
53 Responses ranged between “strongly disagree”, and “strongly agree” on a 7-point Likert scale. Full 
question battery is included in Appendix A. Additional items measuring support for increased government 
funding were included in sample B. Respondents were asked “In terms of policies to help investigate and 
prevent police violence please indicate whether you believe that government funding for the following 
initiatives should be higher, or lower than the current levels”. Responses ranged between “much lower” 
and “much higher” on a 7-point Likert scale. Full question batteries are included in Appendix B. 
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values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less 
likely, on average, to support policies to track and reduce police violence.” 
In order to test my hypotheses, I estimated four models. My key independent 
variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the 2-item measure of negative 
stereotypes (blacks’ negative dispositions). To assess the effect of negative stereotypes 
about blacks on the predictive power of individuals’ aversion to violence, I included an 
interaction term between blacks’ negative dispositions and anti-violence values. I expect 
racial stereotypes to produce negative signs: respondents who believe that blacks are to 
blame for racial disparities in the justice system, will be less likely to support policies to 
better track and reduce police violence. Anti-violence values should produce positive 
signs: the more a respondent rejects violence, the more likely they will be to support 
those policies. My underlying assumption, however, is that interacting these variables 
will produce a negative sign; as racism increases, anti-violence values will no longer 
predict support for policies to address police violence. 
I also included an issue-framing experiment following Peffley et al.’s (2017) 
examination of support for the death penalty, but to assess instead the power of negative 
stereotypes about blacks to influence support for policies to decrease incidents of police 
violence.54 The authors found that “when presented with the argument that the death 
penalty is biased against blacks, whites who blame blacks’ harsh treatment on their 
dispositional shortcomings actually become more, not less, supportive of the death 
 
54 Control Argument: Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to use non-lethal 
methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is non-compliant and being physically 
aggressive toward an officer or other individual? Treatment conditions included in Appendix B. 
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penalty compared with the baseline condition” (1046). In my analysis, I suspect that 
whites who blame blacks’ harsh treatment on their dispositional shortcomings, when 
presented with the “racial argument” will be less supportive of institutional reforms to 
decrease police violence compared to those in the baseline condition. Results from the 
fully specified model are reported; entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors. 
Table 5.11.1 | Policies to Track, and Decrease Instances of Police Violence 
 
SAMPLE B SAMPLE B 
(Interactive)
Age 0.006 *** 0.006 **
(0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.086 0.085
(0.064) (0.064)
Income        -0.003        -0.003
(0.015) (0.015)
Education        -0.023        -0.026
(0.022) (0.022)
White        -0.168 *        -0.182 *
(0.098) (0.098)
Black        -0.099        -0.112
(0.144) (0.144)
Hispanic / Latino        -0.384 ***        -0.428 ***
(0.159) (0.159)
Anti-Violence 0.154 *** 0.329 ***
(0.030) (0.073)
Government Spending 0.09 *** 0.087 ***
(0.013) (0.013)
Blacks Discriminated Against 0.397 *** 0.377 ***
(0.039) (0.044)
Blacks' Negative Dispositions        -0.115 **        -0.377 ***
(0.042) (0.040)
Conservatism 0.063 0.059
(0.076) (0.076)
Authoritarianism 0.092 0.079
(0.139) (0.138)
Blacks Negative Dispositions *        -0.082 ***
Anti-Violence (0.031)
Adj. R2 0.25 0.25
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample B;  (N=1,120)
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In the fully specified model for sample B, we see that whites were significantly 
less likely (-0.17) to support police reforms as were Hispanics/Latinos (-0.38). The more 
violent-averse were (as expected) more likely to support policy changes (+0.15), all else 
equal. Those who blame racial disparities in the justice system on blacks’ dispositional 
shortcomings were significantly less likely to favor reforms (-0.12). For every one unit 
increase in a respondent’s belief that government should provide increase funding for 
additional services support for policies to reduce police violence increased (+0.08). In 
sample B, H1c: “Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more 
likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to reduce 
police violence” was supported. For every one unit increase in anti-violence values, 
support for policies to reduce police violence increased (+0.33).  
My primary hypothesis, H2e: “Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively 
positive force of anti-violence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative 
black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to support policies to track and reduce 
police violence.” was fully supported in the interactive model of sample B. The estimates 
of the anti-violence slope decrease as a function of blacks’ negative dispositions. For 
example, at the lowest level of blacks’ negative dispositions the anti-violence slope is at 
(+0.25), and at the highest level the slope is at (0.00), a decrease of (-0.25). For every one 
unit increase in blacks’ negative dispositions, the anti-violence slope decreases by (-
0.08). To visually display the impact of this interaction term I created a graph of the 
adjusted means placing blacks’ negative dispositions on the x-axis and separate lines for 
“low”, “medium”, and “high” levels of anti-violence (See Figure 5.11.1). 
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Figure 5.11.1 | Predictive Margins Negative Black Dispositions * Anti-Violence  
 
I now turn to the issue-framing experiment to assess the power of negative 
stereotypes about blacks to influence support for policies to decrease incidents of police 
violence. In my analysis, I theorized that whites who blame blacks’ harsh treatment on 
their dispositional shortcomings, when presented with the “racial argument” would be 
less supportive of police reforms to decrease police violence compared to those in the 
baseline condition. H2c. “Because dispositional attributions focus on racial stereotypes, 
whites who embrace negative stereotypes about blacks, when presented the “racial 
argument” will be less likely, on average, to support institutional reforms to decrease 
police violence when compared to those in the baseline condition” was not supported. 
There was no significant difference between support for police reform between the 
baseline and racial argument conditions along the negative blacks’ dispositions scale 
among white respondents. Results from the fully specified and interactive model (whites 
only) are reported; entries are logistic coefficients with standard errors. 
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Table 5.11.2 | Support for Police Reforms to Decrease Violence 
 
5.12 Conclusion 
 Throughout this chapter, I empirically tested my argument that individual’s 
orientation toward violence should help shape their evaluations of police violence. I 
expected that individuals who are more averse to violence would be more likely to 
disapprove of a police shooting, and more likely to support policies and spending to 
better track and reduce incidents of police violence. Anti-violence values were assessed 
SAMPLE B SAMPLE B 
(Interactive)
Age 0.023 *** 0.023 ***
(0.008) (0.008)
Female 0.035 0.032
(0.202) (0.204)
Education 0.007 0.006
(0.064) (0.065)
Blacks Discriminated Against 1.501 *** 1.53 ***
(0.386) (0.387)
Blacks' Negative Dispositions        -0.643 *        -0.343
(0.377) (0.499)
Conservatism 0.091 0.093
(0.224) (0.224)
Authoritarianism 0.11 0.101
(0.444) (0.442)
Blacks Negative Dispositions *        -0.290
Racial Argument (0.556)
Blacks Negative Dispositions *        -0.516
Innocence Argument (0.538)
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  *** p < .01  ** p < .05  * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample B; Whites (n=595)
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with my inductively specified scale which I produced using principal component analysis 
in Chapter 3.55  
As was the case in the previous chapter on sexual violence, I found empirical 
support for the expectation that anti-violence values will produce normatively positive 
results in terms of police violence-related outcomes of interest. On the other hand, I also 
found empirical support for my overarching theory, that violence-justifying ideologies 
(e.g. racial stereotypes) often diminish the normatively positive force that anti-violence 
values would otherwise produce.  
Across two empirical models, H1b: “Respondents who score higher on anti-
violence values will be less likely, on average, to believe a police officer shooting – and 
killing – a suspect is appropriate or legal” was supported in only one model. Overall, I 
found little evidence that violence averse individuals were more (or less) likely to 
disapprove of the lethal OIS, or to believe that the officer acted outside of the law. 
Additionally, I did not find any support for my claim that interacting anti-violence values 
and negative black dispositions would produce negative signs; as racism increased, anti-
violence values would no longer predict disapproval of the officer’s actions. The 
interaction term did not achieve significance in any of my models.  
On the other hand, my primary hypothesis, H2e: “Racist stereotypes will attenuate 
the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence averse individuals who 
endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to support policies to 
 
55 Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: “It is important for a person to be tougher than other people”; A 
person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp”; You would praise a person who acted 
aggressively to an insult”; “Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable”; “It is morally 
wrong for a person to walk away from a fight”; “A person who doesn’t take any crap from anybody is an 
admirable reputation to have”; and “Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself”. 
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track and reduce police violence.” was fully supported in the interactive model of sample 
B. The estimates of the anti-violence slope decreased as a function blacks’ negative 
dispositions. Throughout this analysis, those who endorsed negative stereotypes about 
blacks and were often more likely to approve of police violence, to resist police reform 
policies and increased government spending to reduce that violence. Individuals’ 
aversion to violence did not translate to a propensity to question police violence, and 
when it did produce significantly positive outcomes those effects were often diminished 
by violence-justifying ideology – racism in particular. 
Efforts intended to decrease police violence in the United States should focus on 
breaking down the stereotypes that allow individuals to justify violence. Whether an 
individual condones violence appears to have little impact on their perception of victims, 
or their support for policies to better track and reduce OIS incidents once we account for 
the violence-justifying ideologies that diminish the benefits of aversion to violence. 
Victims’ advocates suggest that there should be a greater number of minorities in law 
enforcement. I found some evidence that this would help police, community relations – 
especially when a racially charged OIS takes place. In every case, respondents were 
significantly more likely to say that the officer’s actions were both legal, and appropriate 
when the officer involved was black. Absent efforts to break down violence-justifying 
ideologies, it appears unlikely that widespread aversion to violence will make any 
substantive difference. 
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CHAPTER 6. DISSERTATION CONCLUSION 
6.1 Conclusion 
 Stephen Pinker (2011) argues, in his seminal work The Better Angels of Our 
Nature, that violence has declined over time and that we are living in the most-peaceful 
era of human existence. He attributes the decline in violence to changing cultural norms. 
It’s not just that opportunities for violence have declined, or that incentives for violence 
have changed. Rather, “civilizing” influences are winning out. People are socialized into 
a value system that teaches them to reject violence. This project focused on the 
behavioral mechanism that supposedly explains declining violence – cultural norms and 
anti-violence values. I was skeptical from the start about the extent to which abstract 
values actually constrain politically relevant behavior, including how an individual 
processes specific acts of violence or evaluates public policies rooted in violence. 
Optimists argue that attitudes lead the way, that a decline in citizens’ tolerance of 
violence has produced a corresponding increase in support for public policies that assist 
victims and promote equitable judicial outcomes. Whether this is true is an important and 
timely question in the United States. Do individual attitudes rejecting violence matter in 
terms of politics and public policy? If so, does a broad decline in violence-justifying 
attitudes actually translate to public support for policies to support victims and punish 
perpetrators? What role do racial and gender stereotypes play in terms of public 
perceptions of victims and suspects, or support for violence-related public policies? I 
addressed these questions directly in this project.  
I developed a theory that a wide-range of “ideological waivers” allow individuals 
to forgive violent behavior – behavior they otherwise claim to abhor. To test my theory 
 
197 
 
         
required that I create a gender-neutral measure of anti-violence values. Rather than ask 
about men, husbands, or sons I asked about people more generally. Respondents may 
have made assumptions about who would or would not be engaging in the actions I 
presented, but I did not impose that judgement on them.56 While I must admit that I was 
not able to entirely divorce gender attitudes from attitudes toward violence, I did provide 
strong support for the utility of my scale and evidence that it performs in a consistent 
manner theoretically distinct from its gendered counterpart. I then used my new scale to 
examine individual attitudes toward victims and support for public policies to reduce 
violence.  
Throughout chapter 4, I empirically tested my assumption that individual’s 
orientation toward violence should help shape their attitudes toward victims – and 
perpetrators – of sexual violence. I expected that individuals who are more averse to 
violence would sympathize more with victims, support harsher punishments for 
perpetrators, and advocate more for resources to assist survivors and decrease the rate of 
these crimes in the United States. I did find empirical support for the expectation that 
anti-violence values will produce normatively positive results in terms of sexual 
violence-related outcomes of interest. On the other hand, I also found empirical support 
for my overarching theory, that violence-justifying ideologies (e.g. sexism ‘hostile in 
particular’, rape myth acceptance, etc.) often diminish the normatively positive force that 
anti-violence values would otherwise produce.  
 
56 In one of my surveys (N=923) the final question item asked respondents “When you were answering 
the questions about violence (e.g. physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable) were you 
primarily thinking about… 1. Male and female behavior; 2. Male behavior; or 3. Female behavior? 52.11 
percent (481) said male and female behavior; 43.88 percent (405) said male behavior; 4.01 percent (37) 
were thinking primarily of female behavior. 
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My experimental findings produced unsettling results. When a victim appeared to 
conform to traditional gender expectations, when it was clear that she was cautious to not 
put herself in danger, when there was evidence that she fought fiercely to prevent being 
violated, and when she reported the incident to law enforcement immediately, both males 
and females were significantly more likely to believe her rape claim. On the other hand, 
when a victim did not conform to traditional gender expectations, when it appeared that 
she put herself at unnecessary risk of danger, when there was no physical evidence that 
she put up fierce resistance, and when she did not report the incident to law enforcement 
immediately, both males and females were significantly less likely to believe that the 
victim was actually raped. 
Respondents were also asked to recommend a sentence of no less than 5, and no 
more than 50 years in prison for the perpetrator. Examining the data across four unique 
surveys I found little evidence that anti-violence values significantly impact how harshly 
respondents believe a perpetrator should be punished. In fact, violence averse individuals 
might view incarceration itself as a form of violence. In one model, for every one unit 
increase in anti-violence respondents recommended significantly less (-2.94 years) time 
in prison, perhaps sparing the perpetrator.  
Throughout my analyses, those who endorsed rape myths and other negative 
stereotypes about women were consistently more likely to blame the victim, to be more 
lenient on her perpetrator, to resist increased government spending to assist victims and 
reduce sexual violence, and to decline to engage in any way personally to advocate or 
support victims. Individuals’ anti-violence values did little of substance to benefit victims 
or punish perpetrators, and when it did produce significantly positive outcomes those 
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effects were easily diminished by violence-justifying ideology – hostile sexism in 
particular. Efforts to reduce rape should focus on breaking down the stereotypes that 
allow people to overlook violent behavior, and reforming policies that make it difficult 
for a victim to receive justice. Absent those efforts, it appears unlikely that widespread 
aversion to violence will make any substantive difference. 
Throughout chapter 5, I empirically tested whether an individual’s orientation 
toward violence would help shape their evaluations of police violence. I expected that 
individuals who are more averse to violence would be more likely to disapprove of a 
police shooting, and more likely to support policies and spending to better track and 
reduce incidents of police violence. Overall, I found very little evidence that violence 
averse individuals were more (or less) likely to disapprove of a lethal officer-involved 
shooting, or to believe that the officer acted outside of the law. Throughout my analyses, 
those who endorsed negative stereotypes about blacks were often more likely to approve 
of police violence, to resist police reform and increased government expenditures to 
reduce that violence. Individuals’ aversion to violence did not translate to a propensity to 
question police violence, and when it did produce normatively positive outcomes those 
effects were often diminished by violence-justifying ideology – racism in particular. 
Victims’ advocates suggest that there should be a greater number of minorities in 
law enforcement. I found some evidence that this would help police, community relations 
– especially when a racially charged OIS takes place. In every case, respondents were 
significantly more likely to say that the officer’s actions were both legal, and appropriate 
when the officer involved was black. Absent efforts to break down violence-justifying 
 
200 
 
         
ideologies, it appears unlikely that widespread aversion to violence will make any 
substantive difference. 
This dissertation speaks to a much broader debate over the success of the 
“civilizing process” and its likely durability. Had I found that anti-violence values are 
more than just lip service, that they genuinely constrain people – that they shape policy 
preferences or govern politically relevant judgements about predators and victims of 
violence – would have offered some hope that the relative peacefulness of today’s world 
is a construct that can be passed down through socialization to future generations. 
Unfortunately, my empirical evidence suggests that people can partition these abstract 
values from their practical assessments of real-life circumstances, and apply them only to 
certain groups of people, and only some of the time. The “civilizing process”, therefore, 
seems to be more vulnerable to changes in context than the optimists let on.  
My data are cross-sectional, so I cannot observe how these attitudes and policy 
preferences have changed over time. Additionally, I am limited to a “snap-shot” – a 
single moment in time when public opinion is shaped, in part, by the current events of the 
day. Additionally, my analysis was limited strictly to officer-involved shootings that 
resulted in the suspect’s death; I did not include scenarios involving excessive physical 
force by the police. Finally, each of my experimental vignettes portrayed a suspect 
imposing some level of threat upon an officer prior to the shooting. As that level of threat 
increased, respondents were more sympathetic to the officer’s use of deadly force. Future 
research designs should include scenarios depicting a victim who is in police custody 
when the incident occurs; people are much less likely to endorse police violence when the 
officer involved is not in serious danger. 
 
201 
 
         
  As it was, I collected my survey data well before May 25, 2020 when George 
Floyd, a 46-year-old African American man, was choked to death by Derek Chauvin, a 
white Minneapolis police officer. All four officers involved in Floyd’s arrest have been 
fired and criminally charged and Chauvin, who was filmed kneeling on Floyd’s neck for 
almost eight minutes faces second-degree unintentional murder, third-degree murder, and 
second-degree manslaughter.  He faces a combined maximum of 35 years in prison. 
Floyd’s death represents an additional decline in threat that I would have predicted to 
undermine public support even more than occurred in my experimental design. Much like 
the instances I detailed in chapter 5, his death sparked a new surge in both peaceful 
protest and outright violence.  
In June, a large but peaceful group of Black Lives Matter demonstrators gathered 
in front of a police station in Seattle, Washington. They were quickly met by riot officers 
donning combat helmets and brandishing batons. While police are given broad discretion 
in responding to demonstrations that get out of hand, an arbitrary or excessive response 
sometimes escalates violence unnecessarily. Protesters were given no warning before 
police deployed flash-bang grenades, tear gas, and pepper spray to disperse the crowd. 
During a subsequent protest weeks later and at the same location, police scaled back their 
response and protesters ultimately dispersed without incident (Del Pozo, 2020). 
In other cases, the lines have blurred as other groups with ulterior motives have 
hijacked peaceful protests calling for racial justice.  Thousands of people have swarmed 
the streets in at least 140 American cities. Protests have descended into absolute chaos in 
some cases including shootings, lootings, and wide-spread vandalism. In at least 21 states 
the National Guard was activated to restore order (Silverstein 2020). Demonstrators 
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vandalized police vehicles with graffiti in Minneapolis where officers used tear gas and 
rubber bullets to disperse crowds. In Atlanta, protesters threw bottles and other projectiles 
at police, and when crowds gathered outside the White House President Trump was 
moved to an underground bunker intended for terrorist attacks. Reacting to violence in 
major cities across America, President Trump threatened to deploy the military, saying 
“If a city or a state refuses to take the actions that are necessary to defend the life and 
property of their residents, then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve 
the problem for them” (Taylor 2020, 10).  
This dissertation focused on the behavioral mechanism that supposedly explains 
declining violence. One observable implication of the Pinker school of thought is that 
cultural norms ought to shape public opinion in a fashion that alters public policy. At the 
individual level, therefore, whether someone rejects, or embraces violence-justifying 
attitudes ought to shape that person’s policy-relevant opinions. I remain skeptical about 
the extent to which abstract anti-violence values actually constrain politically relevant 
behavior, including how an individual processes a specific act of violence as well as how 
the individual evaluates public policies rooted in violence. It seems instead that 
individuals’ “better devils” quite easily diminish the otherwise positive force of anti-
violence sentiment. The evidence suggests that we must confront these darker forces if 
we want to reduce violence in the United States.  
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APPENDIX A: SEXUAL VIOLENCE EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTES 
Setting the Scene (Everyone Views) 
The following pages provide a brief summary of a trial involving a rape allegation. We 
would like you to put yourself in the role of a juror as you evaluate the evidence in this 
case. When determining the severity of the prison sentence you impose, please be 
realistic - as if you were an actual juror at the sentencing phase of this trial. Thank you 
for your time and help with our research. 
A middle-aged female answered a knock at her apartment door late one Friday night. She 
opened the door to a stranger who explained that he was having car trouble and wanted to 
borrow her phone to call AAA. She agreed, and after placing his call, the man claimed 
that it would be about two hours before a tow truck would arrive. 
Baseline (Control) 
While waiting for the tow truck, the accuser claimed that the man raped her and then fled 
the apartment. She immediately called the police to report the rape. Later the next day, 
the police arrested a suspect who fit the description given. The suspect, a man named Jim 
Reynolds admitted that he'd had sexual intercourse with the accuser, but claimed it was 
consensual. Nonetheless, police charged Reynolds with rape. 
Non-Precipitory Vignette 
While waiting for the tow truck, she told the man that he would have to wait on her front 
porch until the driver arrived.  The woman alleges that the suspect then forced his way 
in, raped her in her own living room, and then fled the apartment. She immediately called 
the police to report the rape. Later the next day, the police arrested a suspect who fit the 
description given. The suspect, a man named Jim Reynolds, admitted that they had sexual 
intercourse, but claimed it was consensual. Nonetheless, police charged Reynolds with 
rape. 
At the trial, the accuser's attorney revealed that the she had never lived with a male, and 
that she has developed a deep fear of men since the attack. Her attorney argued that a 
medical examination provided evidence that she had put up physical resistance to 
Reynolds. She showed bruising and had skin under her fingernails. Her attorney argued 
that the reason his client resisted was that she feared for her life. 
Precipitory Vignette 
While waiting for the tow truck, she asked the man if he would care to wait in her 
apartment and watch television until the driver arrived. The woman alleges that at some 
point between 10:30 and 11:00 pm the suspect forcibly raped her in her own living room, 
then fled the apartment. She called the police a few days later to report the alleged rape. 
Later that week, the police arrested a suspect who fit the description given. The suspect, a 
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man named Jim Reynolds admitted that they had sexual intercourse, but claimed it was 
consensual. Nonetheless, police charged Reynolds with rape. 
At the trial, Reynold's attorney revealed that the accuser had previously lived with other 
men to whom she was not married. During cross examination, she also admitted to 
having sexual relations with other men since the alleged attack. The defense team argued 
that a medical examination did not provide evidence that the accuser had put up any 
resistance to Reynolds. She showed no bruising and did not have skin under her 
fingernails. Her attorney argued that the reason his client did not resist was that she 
feared for her life. 
Trial and Sentencing Phase (Everyone Views) 
In the courtroom, the accuser positively identified Reynolds as the offender. After careful 
deliberation, a jury found Jim Reynolds guilty of rape in the first degree. During the 
sentencing phase, the judge informed jury members that the punishment they impose for 
this felony could range from 5 to 50 years in prison. Reynolds continues to maintain that 
the sex was consensual. 
We would like you to put yourself in the role of a juror and indicate how many years you 
think the perpetrator should be confined to prison based on the facts provided. When 
determining the severity of the sentence you recommend, please be realistic - as if you 
were an actual juror at the sentencing phase of this trial. 
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APPENDIX B: POLICE VIOLENCE EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTES 
Threat. Participants were exposed to one of three newspaper accounts of a police 
shooting, which varied in the level of threat imposed by the suspect (pictured below). 
       
                                     
 In the “low threat” condition, he exits his vehicle and advances toward the 
responding officer before suddenly stopping and running in the opposite direction. In the 
“medium threat” condition the suspect also advances on the officer before stopping and 
reaching for his inside jacket pocket. Finally, in the “high threat” condition, our suspect 
advances, stops, but then reaches for a firearm protruding from his waistband.   
Racial Amalgamation of Officer/Suspect. In this project I varied the race of the officer 
involved in the shooting, and the race of the suspect. Respondents were not explicitly 
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directed to focus on race. I randomly assigned respondents to be exposed to one of the 
racial manipulations below: 
     
     
Police Reforms.  
Sample A: 
1. "Law enforcement agencies, in every state, should be required to collect and share 
the details of each and every incident involving police use-of-force so that this 
information can be stored in a national database." 
2. "The details of incidents involving police use-of-force should include not only 
offender characteristics, but officer characteristics as well, including race, age, 
gender, rank, and education." 
3. "Police departments should require body-worn cameras for officers in the field so 
that each and every citizen engagement will be recorded from the officer's 
standpoint." 
4. "Police departments should require that officers take part in racial sensitivity and 
bias training at least twice annually." 
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Funding Preferences (Sample B) 
1. "Funding to help police departments adopt Department of Justice recommended 
reforms that stress the importance of de-escalation and the sanctity of life." 
2. "Funding to create civilian review boards to provide independent oversight of 
police use-of-force incidents." 
3. "Funding to provide police departments body-worn cameras for officers in the 
field." 
4. "Funding to provide police departments dash cameras for all squad cars active in 
the field." 
 
Issue Framing Experiment 
Control Argument: Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to 
use non-lethal methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is non-
compliant and being physically aggressive toward an officer or other individual? 
Racial Argument: Some people say that police kill a disproportionate number of blacks, 
compared to whites. Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to 
use non-lethal methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is non-
compliant and being physically aggressive toward an officer or other individual? 
Innocence Argument: Some people say that police kill a disproportionate number of 
innocent people. Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to use 
non-lethal methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is non-
compliant and being physically aggressive toward an officer or other individual? 
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